HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Wayne Ferron
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Metropolitan Police Services Division 13 and P.C. Green
Respondents
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir
Indexed as: Ferron v. Toronto Metropolitian Police Services – Division 13
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Wayne Ferron, Applicant
Self-represented
1On May 8, 2015, the Tribunal issued its Decision, 2015 HRTO 597, (the “Decision”) dismissing the Application. The applicant has asked the Tribunal to reconsider its Decision.
2In the Decision, I dismissed this Application because I concluded that it was plain and obvious that there were no acts of discrimination identified in the Application and accordingly the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with it.
3In his Request the applicant argues that the Request should be granted because:
a. There are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not have reasonable have been obtained earlier.
b. The Decision is in conflict with established jurisprudence and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance;
DECISION
4Under section 45.7 of the Code, the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules.
45.7(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.
(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.
5The Tribunal has issued Rules governing such requests as well as a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the community on the Tribunal’s exercise of its reconsideration powers (Practice Direction on Reconsideration, January 2008 amended June 2008). Most relevant to this Decision is Rule 26 which states:
26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within (thirty) 30 days of the date of the decision
26.5. A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that
(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or
(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or
(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or
(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.
6The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration begins with the following statements:
Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.
Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.
7As is evident from the above, reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That is, while the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to reopen and reconsider its own decisions, it is not obliged to do so. It may decide when reconsideration is advisable, both through the promulgation of rules setting out conditions for the exercise of its discretion and through the application of its discretion on a case-by-case basis.
8I find that the applicant has not met the burden of establishing that the Decision is inconsistent with Tribunal jurisprudence or that there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier.
9The applicant’s submissions are voluminous and they are equally difficult to follow. However, to the extent that they can be understood the applicant repeats much of what was contained in his submissions in response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”). In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34 the Tribunal stated that reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-argue a case. Once the parties have had the opportunity to present their evidence and arguments to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has made a decision disposing of the issues, parties are entitled to treat the matter as closed, subject to limited exceptions. I find that the submissions in this Request amount to additional argument on issues already fully canvassed before the Tribunal.
10The applicant has not identified any new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier.
11The applicant argues that the Decision is in conflict with established jurisprudence on procedural fairness and natural justice. The applicant points to no conflict between the Decision and Tribunal’s jurisprudence. I am not convinced that the conclusion reached in the Decision is in conflict with established jurisprudence. The Tribunal stated in Sigrist and Carson, above, that a “conflict with established jurisprudence or procedure” requires (at a minimum) that there be a settled understanding about the legal rules that apply, and a clear and surprising departure from those legal rules. While the applicant clearly disagrees with my conclusion, he points to no clear and surprising departure from the established legal rules in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence or procedures.
12For these reasons, I find that the applicant has not established the existence of any of the criteria in Rule 26 that would lead to reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Decision. The Request is denied.
Dated at Toronto, this 23rd day of June, 2015.
“Signed by”
David Muir
Vice-chair