Michael Christianson v. The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and Carol Leet, 2010 HRTO 422

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Michael Christianson

Applicant

-and-

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and Carol Leet

Respondents

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: Faisal Bhabha

Date: February 24, 2010

Citation: 2010 HRTO 422

Indexed as: Christianson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario

INTRODUCTION

1On January 14, 2010, the Tribunal issued a Decision granting a request by the respondents to dismiss the Application pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code. In that Decision, the Tribunal found that the substance of the Application had been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. In that Decision, the Tribunal also denied a request by the applicant to remove the adjudicator from hearing this matter.

2On February 16, 2010, the applicant filed a Request for Reconsideration (Form 20) and brief submissions in support of his Request for Reconsideration. A respondent is not required to respond to a Request for Reconsideration unless directed to do so by the Tribunal. In the circumstances of this Request, the Tribunal did not deem it necessary to seek submissions from the respondent.

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

3Section 45.7 of the Code allows any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal to request it reconsider its decision. The Rules elaborate on the conditions and requirements of such a request. Pursuant to Rule 26.5, reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:

a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

4It is also useful to consider the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration, which states in part:

Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.

Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.

5The applicant’s request is based solely on an allegation that the adjudicator was “obviously biased and incompetent”. I will examine the claim of bias within the context of factors (a) and (d) of Rule 26.5.

6First, it is worth noting that the applicant’s allegation of bias is a repetition of allegations made in other matters before this Tribunal as well as previously in these proceedings. Identical claims of bias were addressed in Christianson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2010 HRTO 72, and were previously heard and decided in Christianson v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009 HRTO 424, where I found the applicant’s concerns to be based on innuendo and speculation rather than fact and reason:

While an allegation of compromised impartiality must be accorded serious consideration, a completely unfounded allegation cannot be considered reasonable, especially when it is grounded in ethnic stereotyping. The applicant makes assumptions based on respondent counsel’s given name and the Vice-chair’s surname to assert collusion, unfairness and bias. I find it impossible that reasonable and right-minded persons viewing the matter realistically and practically would find even a kernel of plausibility in the applicant’s allegations [para. 13].

7In the light of my earlier decisions addressing the substance of the applicant’s bias allegations, and in the absence of any new information or facts, there is no basis to reconsider these claims of bias.

8The applicant now appears to be additionally relying on the fact that I have previously ruled against him as a basis for a further bias allegation. He characterizes my findings as “insults”, argues that I misapplied the law, and concludes on that basis that I must be biased against him.

9No doubt, many parties will experience the impact of an adverse decision of the Tribunal in a personal way. Parties are often certain about the justness of their case, and expect an impartial adjudicator to agree with them. This is understandable, since parties wish to succeed in their arguments. However, this does not lead logically to the conclusion that if an adjudicator agrees with one party’s argument over another’s, the adjudicator thereby loses his or her impartiality and is biased by mere fact of his or her decision. An adverse finding does not give rise to bias.

10While the applicant may be correct in assuming that language and tone can sometimes reveal bias, there is no support for his allegation that such is the case here. He alleges that I called him a “liar” in a previous decision, although the Decision clearly fails to support his contention. In my previous consideration of his bias allegation, I concluded that the information relied on by the applicant gave rise to no reasonable apprehension of bias. While I found he relied on stereotypes rather than facts, nothing about the Decision was personal, even though the applicant may have perceived it that way.

11Further, there is no basis for the applicant’s assertion of incompetence.

12Reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-argue a case where the party disagrees with the result: Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34. Once the parties have had the opportunity to make submissions and the Tribunal has made a decision disposing of the issues, parties are entitled to treat the matter as closed, subject to limited exceptions.

13It is clear that the applicant’s allegations of bias and incompetence merely repeat his view that his matters before the Tribunal have been improperly decided, and stem from previous unfounded claims that have already been addressed. The request for reconsideration is therefore denied.