HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Michael Christianson
Applicant
-and-
Office of the Independent Police Review Director
Respondent
AND BETWEEN:
Michael Christianson
Applicant
-and-
Windsor Police Service
Respondent
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Adjudicator: Alison Renton
Indexed as: Christianson v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director
1In Decision 2014 HRTO 1445, dated September 26, 2014, the Tribunal dismissed two Applications filed by the applicant as having no reasonable prospect of success.
2The applicant filed a Request for Reconsideration (“the Request”) which he emailed to the Tribunal on Saturday, September 26, 2015 at 11:34 p.m. As this was a Saturday and the Tribunal’s offices were not opened, it is deemed received on September 28, 2015 pursuant to Rule 1.22(d) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure (“the Rules”). The applicant marked off all the boxes on the Request form as the basis for his Request.
3The respondents have not filed responses to the applicant’s Request because they have not been directed to do so by the Tribunal.
law and analysis
4Under section 45.7 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (“the Code”), the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules:
45.7 (1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.
(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.
5The Tribunal has issued Rules governing such requests. Rules 26.1 and 26.5.1A are most relevant to this situation and they state:
26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within 30 days from the date of the decision.
26.5.1A A Request for Reconsideration made more than 30 days following the Decision will not be granted unless the Tribunal determines that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
6The applicant’s Request was filed just over a year after the Decision was issued and is therefore well beyond the 30-day deadline for making such requests. Accordingly, the applicant’s Request will not be granted unless the Tribunal determines that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay. Rule 26.5.1A parallels the language in section 34(2) of the Code.
7The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for delay in section 34(1) applications, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances that justify exercising the discretion under section 34(2) of the Code. See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241. The principles the Tribunal has applied in section 34(2) cases pertaining to good faith have also been applied in reconsideration decisions. See, for example, Thompson v. PUC Distribution Inc., 2015 HRTO 1191 at para. 6, and Rosario v. FORM Architecture Engineering, 2014 HRTO 1466 at para. 15.
8The applicant provides some explanations about why his Request was filed in an untimely manner. Within the body of his Request, the applicant acknowledges that his Request is untimely because the Decision itself was filed late and took longer than “the Rules of Procedure allow”. He submits that the respondents were permitted to “gang up” on him, and that he had to represent himself because “the Human Rights Legal Support Centre colluded with Alsion [sic] Renton and Windsor Police Service to procure its decision by way of fraud and disability”.
9Furthermore, he submits:
The Tribunal has only itself to blame for not granting the request for extension of time for filing a Request for Reconsideration. Alison Renton’s decision is not only another instance of a discriminatory denial of service, entitling me to another year to file, it is also the indictable crime of obstruction of justice for which there is no deadline for filing. The Tribunal can only blame itself for failing to realize that Alison Renton’s “decision” is a perverse obstruction of justice and self-reporting like the case law of Alexrod v. City of Toronto, where the court set aside, varied, or amended its order on its own, of its own volition. Alison Renton perpetrated an indictable crime against me as she threw her decision; recasting the application lying about who I was complaining about what is proper forum for making criminal complaints about a lying attorney. The Tribunal itself said it is a serious offence to make false statements to it, as well Ms. Renton is impossibly ignorant of the public domain case law of the People v. Peter Pocklington where Mr. Pocklington was put on trial in criminal court for perjury when he made false statements in his civil bankruptcy filing. Ms. Renton lies about what constitutes a crime as well as what the proper forum for criminal complaints is, and further Ms. Renton lies about what constitutes a police service; that it is the laying of charges without every accepting or investigating a criminal complaint.
In conclusion Alison Renton deceitfully recast the application to make it match “Dabic v. Windsor Police” lying about who I was complaining about, what defines a crime, what defines a police service, what proper forum for a for a [sic] criminal complaint is so that she denied that there was a discriminatory denial of service.
10In his September 26, 2015 email to the Tribunal, in which he sent his Request, the applicant provided further reasons for the delay in filing his Request. Those reasons were that he was “placed on hold for 7 months from ODSP” starting in August 2014 and that he was “split in two while suing the Human Rights Legal Support Center [“HRLSC”] for representation, with the final denial only coming in a few days before Christmas 2014”.
11The applicant is incorrect that he had a year to file his Request because of when the Decision was issued. Regardless of when the Decision was issued, Rule 26.1 is clear that a Request for Reconsideration is to be made within 30 days from the date of the Decision.
12His assertion that he did not have legal representation and that he had to represent himself at the summary hearing does not constitute good faith within the meaning of Rule 26.5.1A of the Tribunal’s Rules. The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Representation before the Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario’s (“SJTO”), which is found on the Tribunal’s website at www.sjto.gov.on.ca/hrto, makes it clear that legal representation is not required for a party appearing before the Tribunal. Furthermore, it states:
A party may be self-represented and appear before the Tribunal and present his or her case. The SJTO’s rules are interpreted and applied to allow parties to participate effectively in the process, whether or not they are represented by a lawyer or paralegal.
13The Tribunal has held that ignorance of its Rules does not constitute good faith, either under section 34(2) or in requests for reconsideration. See, for example, Imrie-Howlett v. Peel District School Board, 2009 HRTO 1339 at para. 10 and Thompson v. PUC Distribution Inc., 2015 HRTO 1191 at para. 8.
14The fact that the applicant claims to have “sued” the Human Rights Legal Support Centre (“HRLSC”), and that the “final denial” came days before Christmas 2014 illustrates that the applicant was able to pursue legal action. The Tribunal has held in section 34(2) cases that an applicant’s ability to pursue other legal actions, but not commence an application with the Tribunal, does not constitute good faith. See, for example, Cloutier v. CABO Drilling Corporation, 2015 HRTO 1269 at para. 10. Furthermore, the applicant has provided no explanation for the delay that occurred between “Christmas 2014” and the date he submitted his Request.
15The applicant’s assertion that he was “placed on hold for 7 months from ODSP” starting in August 2014 also does not constitute a good faith explanation or really any explanation for why he could not file this Reconsideration request. Again, and additionally, there is no explanation about why there is a delay from March 2015, the end of the seven months, until September 26, 2015, when he sent his Request by email to the Tribunal.
16The applicant is not a stranger to the Tribunal’s processes, having filed a number of applications over the years against different respondents. In addition to the applications he has filed, he had filed 13 other requests for reconsideration. See, Christianson v. Special Investigations Unit, 2012 HRTO 894; Christianson v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2011 HRTO 1942; Christianson v. Windsor Police Services, 2011 HRTO 815; Christianson v. Lai Estate, 2011 HRTO 564; Christianson v. Post Meridium (P.M.) Plastics, 2011 HRTO 370; Christianson v. University of Windsor, 2010 HRTO 1935; Christianson v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 896; Christianson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2010 HRTO 422; Christianson v. Special Investigations Unit, 2010 HRTO 406; Christianson v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2009 HRTO 1318; Christianson v. Attorney General (Ontario), 2009 HRTO 1250; Christianson v. Social Benefits Tribunal, 2009 HRTO 1245; and Christianson v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009 HRTO 424.
17The applicant has provided no meaningful justification for why his Request was made well beyond the timeline stipulated in Rule 26 and therefore has not established a good faith explanation within the meaning of Rule 26.5.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules.
18As I have found that the delay was not incurred in good faith, it is not necessary to consider whether substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
19I find that the Request is untimely and should be dismissed on that basis. Accordingly, I do not need to consider the reasons upon which the applicant based his Request.
ORDER
20The Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 3rd day of November, 2015.
“Signed by”
Alison Renton
Vice-chair

