Glenn P. Christie

The respondent, a deputy chief of police, sought a declaration that the fixed-term provision in his employment contract was void after the police services board declined to renew it.

The application judge found the provision was a colourable device to bypass statutory termination procedures and declared it void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, finding no evidence of an ulterior motive.

The Court held that the expiry of a fixed-term contract does not constitute a dismissal under the Police Services Act, and that a three-year term does not undermine the independence required of a deputy chief.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that limited her long-term disability benefits and assessed her wrongful dismissal notice period at 12 months.

The respondent cross-appealed the calculation of short-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to mitigate her disability by not seeking medical assistance.

The court increased the notice period to 18 months based on the Bardal factors.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, affirming that short-term benefits should be calculated on base pay and commissions.

The plaintiff appealed a Divisional Court decision setting aside a motion judge's order that appointed judges and judicial officers as referees to determine individual class members' claims under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a court cannot appoint a judge or judicial officer to conduct a reference under s. 25(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act without first obtaining the authorization of the Chief Justice or her designate under s. 14(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The consent of individual judicial officers is not an adequate substitute for the Chief Justice's overarching responsibility for judicial assignments.

The appellant employer appealed a motion judge's order regarding the plaintiff employee's claim for long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in finding the collective agreement's benefits terms fell within Brown & Beatty's third category.

The language of the collective agreement and Letter of Understanding clearly incorporated the benefits plan into the collective agreement, meaning disputes over entitlement must be submitted to arbitration.

The appeal was allowed and the civil action against the employer was dismissed.