Gerard E. McAndrew

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion to strike, the successful applicant sought costs of $5,085.

The respondent argued for costs in the cause, citing the simplicity of the motion and the applicant's failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding costs outlines and bills of costs.

The court agreed with the respondent's criticisms of the applicant's materials and the disproportionate time claimed.

However, the court declined to order costs in the cause, instead fixing the applicant's costs at a reduced amount of $1,000 payable within 30 days.

The respondent club brought a motion seeking to strike the member’s application or, alternatively, convert the proceeding to an action on the basis that material facts were in dispute regarding events leading to disciplinary proceedings and expulsion from membership.

The applicant argued that the application concerned the procedural fairness of the club’s disciplinary process rather than the underlying factual dispute.

The court held that the central issue was whether the club complied with its constitution and principles of natural justice, a matter capable of determination through the application process.

Applying the proportionality principles endorsed in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found it premature to require a full trial.

The motion was dismissed and the application permitted to proceed.

The applicant corporation brought a motion to remove the respondent municipality's law firm, alleging a conflict of interest based on prior representation.

The court found as a fact that the law firm had never been retained by the applicant or its principals, but rather had acted for the parties who successfully foreclosed on the applicant's property.

Finding no evidence of a solicitor-client relationship or conflict of interest, the court dismissed the motion to remove counsel.

The court also granted leave for the applicant's principal to represent the corporation.

Neighbouring property owners disputed ownership and use of three narrow strips of land including a shared driveway, a storage area, and a backyard strip.

The plaintiffs claimed adverse possession and alternatively an easement under the doctrine of lost modern grant.

The court held that adverse possession failed for the driveway and storage area because the plaintiffs’ use was not inconsistent with the true owner’s use and their claimed mistaken belief of ownership was not credible.

However, adverse possession succeeded for a backyard strip where a fence had been erected under a mutual mistake as to the boundary.

The court also recognized a prescriptive easement over the driveway under the doctrine of lost modern grant, permitting parking and related maintenance rights.

Following a successful trial, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after obtaining a judgment exceeding its settlement offer.

The defendant argued that proportionality warranted a reduced costs award.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1).

The court held that the defendant could not rely on proportionality after forcing the plaintiff to prove every aspect of its claim despite an earlier favourable default judgment and an unaccepted settlement offer.

The requested costs were found to be fair and reasonable and were awarded in full.

Multiple motions were brought in three related actions arising from the failure of steel connections on a construction project.

Tribury sought to declare Sandro's construction lien expired and dismiss the lien action.

The court declared the lien expired but allowed the action to continue as a breach of contract claim.

Edward and Tribury also moved for summary judgment to dismiss Sandro's claims, counterclaims, and crossclaims based on the expiration of the limitation period.

The court found that an agreement to mediate suspended the limitation period under section 11 of the Limitations Act.

Consequently, Sandro's 2010 action and its crossclaim for contribution and indemnity were timely.

However, Sandro's counterclaim and crossclaim for remediation costs in the 2009 action were delivered after the extended limitation period expired and were dismissed.