Frank N. Marrocco Coroza

In a murder prosecution, the accused sought exclusion of multiple statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, and further challenged the legality of his arrest.

The court found that statements made at the crime scene, during a witness video interview, and in post‑arrest interviews were voluntary and not the product of threats, promises, or oppression.

The court determined that the accused was detained prior to arrest without being immediately informed of his right to counsel, constituting a s.10(b) Charter breach.

Applying the s.24(2) framework from Grant, the court held the breach was technical, had minimal impact on the accused’s interests, and did not justify exclusion of the statements.

The court also concluded that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for murder.

The accused sought exclusion of a knife alleged to be the murder weapon in a first‑degree murder prosecution, arguing it was discovered as a result of statements obtained in breach of their Charter s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that several statements were indeed elicited in violation of the right to counsel, including roadside questioning and later questioning in hospital.

However, applying the framework in Grant, the court concluded that the knife was independently discoverable through the planned search of the defined area and the canine track leading to the creek.

While the seriousness of the Charter breaches favoured exclusion, the reliability of the physical evidence and its independent discoverability attenuated the impact on the accused’s interests.

The statements were excluded but the knife was admitted into evidence.

In a jury trial for first-degree murder, the court ruled on pre‑charge issues concerning the theories of liability that could be left with the jury.

The Crown sought to rely on constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code based on alleged forcible confinement, and on contracted murder under s. 231(3) arising from BBM messages suggesting a promise of a vehicle in exchange for participation in the killing.

The court held there was insufficient evidentiary foundation to leave constructive first‑degree murder to the jury because there was no evidence of unlawful confinement distinct from the killing itself.

However, the BBM messages were capable of supporting a reasonable inference of a murder-for-hire arrangement involving a vehicle as consideration.

The court therefore ruled that the contracted‑murder pathway under s. 231(3) could be left with the jury but not the constructive first‑degree theory.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion under s. 24(2) of digital evidence obtained from Blackberry phones and a Blackberry Playbook after the court previously found the searches violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the Charter breach, the impact on the accused’s privacy interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court admitted certain communications data, including BBM chats, SMS messages, emails, notes, and call logs, but excluded other categories of device data such as browser history, cookies, multimedia files, and related metadata.

The accused also challenged production orders issued to telecommunications and health authorities.

The court rejected those challenges, holding that sufficient grounds existed for the issuing justice and declining to excise references to chats that were also lawfully obtained from another device.