Elena E. Mazinani

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $160,862 following motions for interim child and spousal support.

The court found that while success on the motions was divided, the respondent and co-respondents had behaved unreasonably, justifying a costs award in favour of the applicant.

However, the court found the applicant's claimed costs to be excessive, disproportionate, and manifestly unreasonable, noting the unnecessary duplication of effort by two counsel.

The court reduced the costs award significantly, ordering the respondent to pay $40,500 and the co-respondents to pay $5,000.

The applicant's motion for an advance equalization payment or interim costs was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $11,735.55 on a full recovery basis or $7,895.87 on a partial recovery basis.

The applicant argued costs should be left to the trial judge and cited limited ability to pay.

The court found the applicant's conduct unreasonable for bringing the same motion that had been previously dismissed without correcting evidentiary deficiencies.

The respondent had also made a valid offer to settle.

The court ordered the applicant to pay costs of $8,500 to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child and spousal support.

The respondent claimed he was laid off and had no income, despite a history of funding a lavish lifestyle through unreported cash from his family's tax-preparation business.

The court found the respondent intentionally under-employed, imputed his income at $209,355, and ordered interim child support of $2,789 per month and spousal support of $2,769 per month.

Claims for retroactive support were deferred to trial.

The applicant wife sought leave to bring a motion for an advance equalization payment of $100,000 or interim disbursements of $100,000 to fund expert reports and legal fees.

A nearly identical motion had been dismissed by another judge six weeks prior due to a deficient evidentiary record.

The court found that the wife failed to meet the higher burden of showing a change in circumstances or providing the necessary factual foundation to support the revived motion.

The motion for leave was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant wife brought a motion seeking an order that the respondent husband provide dental practice appraisals to their jointly retained valuation expert, and for a $100,000 advance equalization payment or interim costs.

The court granted the request for the appraisals, finding the expert's request reasonable and necessary to properly value the respondent's dental practices.

However, the court dismissed the request for a further advance equalization payment, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a realistic chance that the advance would not exceed the ultimate equalization amount, and failed to provide sufficient evidence of her need for the funds or the estimated future litigation costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for damages arising from an incident where the defendant pushed the plaintiff, fracturing his teeth.

At the hearing, the plaintiff sought an adjournment to cross-examine the defendant.

The court denied the adjournment, noting that Rule 76 prohibits cross-examination on affidavits for summary judgment motions.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding the evidentiary record inadequate, including the plaintiff's reliance on inadmissible apology evidence and insufficient proof of damages, concluding that a summary trial was the appropriate procedure.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to strike portions of the plaintiff’s statement of claim that referenced settlement discussions and an offer made during negotiations concerning the early termination of a commercial lease.

The court considered whether the impugned paragraphs disclosed privileged settlement communications.

It held that references to settlement offers or negotiations are generally improper in pleadings because such communications are privileged and inadmissible.

While statements merely describing the landlord’s intention to demolish the building were permissible, references to an offer contained in counsel’s letter and the tenant’s rejection of that offer constituted settlement communications.

The court ordered the offending portions struck while leaving the remainder of the pleading intact.