3 total
The court removed counsel for a children's aid society due to an unmitigated conflict of interest involving his law partner's prior representation of the mother.
The respondent mother brought a motion to remove Mark Hurley as counsel of record for the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society in a pending status review proceeding involving four children.
The motion was based on a conflict of interest arising from the fact that Hurley's law partner, Frank Philcox, had previously represented the respondent mother in protection proceedings involving the same children.
The court found that a solicitor-and-client relationship existed between the mother and Philcox, that confidential information was shared, and that insufficient safeguards were in place to protect the mother's solicitor-client privilege.
The court granted the motion and ordered Hurley's removal from the file.
The court denied a motion to qualify a psychotherapist as an expert in sexual offender risk assessment due to insufficient credentials and a conflict of interest.
This is a ruling on a voir dire motion during a status review trial under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.
The respondent maternal grandmother sought to qualify Paul Adams as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence on three matters: assessing the risk status of sexual offenders regarding potential re-offending, providing relapse prevention recommendations, and providing treatment recommendations.
The Children's Aid Society opposed only the first area.
The court denied the motion to qualify Adams as an expert, finding he lacked sufficient qualifications to offer opinion evidence on sexual offender risk assessment.
Motion to dispense with 12-year-old child's and birth father's consent to step-parent adoption dismissed.
The applicant step-father sought to adopt his wife's 12-year-old child and brought a motion to dispense with the consent of both the birth father and the child.
The applicant argued that the child believed the applicant was his biological father and that learning the truth would cause emotional harm.
The court dismissed the motion to dispense with the birth father's consent because no genuine efforts were made to serve him.
The court also dismissed the motion to dispense with the child's consent, finding insufficient expert evidence of emotional harm and emphasizing the child's statutory right to participate in the adoption process.
