Douglas Lent

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

She argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to recall a witness, in finding she was the driver, and in finding reasonable and probable grounds for her arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's procedural discretion, factual findings on identification, or conclusion that objective grounds existed for the arrest.

The court also upheld the trial judge's alternative finding that the breath samples would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach had occurred.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml.

At trial, it was found that the police breached his Charter rights by arbitrarily detaining him for five hours after his breath tests, as the officer in charge had no notes explaining the detention.

The trial judge declined to stay the proceedings under s. 24(1) and held that s. 24(2) was not applicable because the breath tests were completed before the over-holding occurred.

On appeal, the court found no error in refusing a stay of proceedings.

However, the appeal court held that the trial judge erred in finding s. 24(2) inapplicable, as there was a sufficient temporal and contextual connection between the breath tests and the subsequent unlawful detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the appeal court concluded that the admission of the breath test results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand, that his identity as the driver was not proven, and that the breath tests were not administered 'as soon as practicable'.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in concluding that reasonable grounds existed, that the appellant was the driver, and that the breath tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time following the collision.

The court heard consolidated summary conviction appeals concerning police authority to stop motorists emerging from LCBO stores or licensed establishments to assess sobriety.

One trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence and acquitted an accused after finding that a targeted stop outside an LCBO constituted arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, while two other trial judges upheld convictions following similar stops near bars.

The court held that s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act authorizes random roadside stops related to highway safety, including targeting motorists leaving alcohol-related establishments, even without prior signs of impairment.

Such stops are constitutionally valid under the Charter as reasonable limits justified under s. 1.

The court also held that videotaping detainees in a telephone room did not violate s. 10(b) where conversations with counsel were not recorded and there was no evidence that the accused believed their consultations lacked privacy.

The Crown's appeal from acquittal was allowed and the conviction appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding the standard of proof for a s. 8 Charter breach, the lawfulness of the police officer entering his driveway, the timing of the breath tests, and the failure to find arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer was lawfully on the driveway under an implied invitation, the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and although the trial judge erred in inferring the reasons for the appellant's continued detention, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.