Don H. Jack

The applicant brought a motion to change a court-ordered schedule for questioning and a settlement conference, citing commitments to a national project and a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant had not provided sufficient specific details for her commitments, had previously managed her project and litigation simultaneously, and that the application was time-sensitive due to the respondent's unemployment and the applicant's history of delaying proceedings.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to court-ordered timetables to ensure the just and timely resolution of cases under the Family Law Rules.

The respondent husband brought a motion for interim costs of $125,000 under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules to defend against the applicant wife's claim for an annulment and to advance his own claim to enforce their marriage agreement.

The applicant, who has a very high net worth, conceded the merit of the respondent's case and the reasonableness of the fees, but argued he could fund his own litigation.

The court found the respondent was unemployed, had significant debts, and could not afford his legal fees.

The motion was granted, and the applicant was ordered to pay $125,000 as an advance on costs, plus $10,000 for the costs of the motion.

The appellants asserted an oppression claim under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, alleging misappropriation of funds from a widely held public company and seeking to recover those funds for the company.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding it was solely that of the company and had to be pursued as a derivative action with leave of the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where a claim seeks to recover solely for wrongs done to a public corporation and does not allege harm to the complainant's individualized personal interests, it must be pursued as a derivative action.

The applicant sought directions regarding the respondent corporation's failure to advance legal fees for his defence against U.S. criminal charges and Canadian extradition proceedings, pursuant to a prior court order and s. 124(2) of the CBCA.

The court held that the test for advancement is whether the expenses were thought prudent and appropriate in the good faith professional judgment of competent counsel, without second-guessing specific tactics.

The court ordered the advancement of most of the claimed legal fees, subject to a discount for duplication of effort, but denied advancement for certain investigator fees due to insufficient evidence of reasonableness.

The respondent's cross-motion seeking to impose prospective conditions and security requirements on future advances was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.