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The court granted a vesting order to a conservation authority after finding the respondent's competing claim relied on a fraudulent chain of title.
The Grey Sauble Conservation Authority (GSCA) sought a declaration that it is the proper owner of a parcel of land (PIN 37092-0350(R)) within the Hibou Conservation Area.
The respondent, Leroy David Dirckx, claimed title based on a chain of title beginning in 2013.
The court reviewed the historical chain of title, the registry and land titles systems, and allegations of a fraudulent scheme to create a false chain of title.
The court found that GSCA had established ownership by chain of title and, alternatively, by adverse possession.
The court granted a vesting order in favour of GSCA and extinguished any claim of Dirckx or others to the property.
The court dismissed a motion to compel compliance with an easement order, finding the remaining obstructions were the applicants' maintenance responsibility.
The Applicants brought a motion to compel the Respondent to comply with a previous order regarding the removal of obstructions from a right-of-way over the Respondent's property.
The court found that the Respondent had largely complied with the prior order, particularly concerning the shore well, based on a concession from the Applicants' counsel.
The court determined that other alleged obstructions (cedar trees, hostas, boulder, encroaching trees) were maintenance issues not proven to have been placed by the Respondent, and thus the Applicants were responsible for their removal at their own expense.
The motion was largely dismissed, with the Applicants only gaining permission to clear certain items at their own cost.
The court affirmed the applicants' right-of-way for vehicular and pedestrian access and ordered the removal of obstructions.
The applicants sought a determination of their rights regarding a 20-foot easement over the respondent's property for access to Chesley Lake.
The respondent disputed the scope of the easement and the right of some applicants to use it.
The court found that all applicants had a valid right-of-way, including a prescriptive easement for the Steckle Applicants.
The scope of the easement was determined to include both vehicular and pedestrian traffic, as well as the right to build and maintain a dock.
The respondent was ordered to remove obstructions she placed on the right-of-way but was not obligated to maintain it.