Daron Earthy

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the mandatory notice requirements for constitutional issues under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act had not been complied with, depriving the Attorneys General of the opportunity to participate.

Consequently, the court set aside the order below and directed that any further pursuit of the matter must be reheard before the Superior Court on proper notice.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's trip and fall claim.

The self-represented plaintiff tripped and fell while stepping off a curb and argued that the height difference exceeded permitted limits under O. Reg. 239/02 and that the lack of colour or height difference was a deficiency.

The court found that the regulation did not apply to curbs and there was no evidence that the curb's condition was a deficiency or contrary to industry standards.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant builder commenced construction on several blocks of a housing development without building permits.

The City's Chief Building Official issued Orders to Comply and Stop Work Orders.

The applicant appealed the orders under section 25 of the Building Code Act, arguing they were impossible to comply with due to the City's delays in issuing permits.

Although the appeal was moot because the orders had since been cleared, the court exercised its discretion to hear it.

The court affirmed the Orders to Comply, finding they reasonably required the applicant to stop illegal construction immediately.

However, the court rescinded the Stop Work Orders because the Act requires a breach of an Order to Comply before a Stop Work Order can be issued, which had not occurred.

The applicant, a retail appliance store, sought a declaration that it was permitted to remain open for in-person shopping during the COVID-19 grey lockdown stage in Toronto and Peel.

The applicant argued it qualified as an essential business under O. Reg 82/20, either as a 'hardware store' or as part of the construction supply chain.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislature intended the term 'hardware store' to be given its conventional, everyday meaning, which does not include a store exclusively selling home appliances.

The court rejected the applicant's attempt to stretch the plain language of the regulation.

The applicant, a home appliance retailer, sought an interim injunction to allow its showrooms to remain open despite being ordered to close under Covid-19 public health regulations.

The applicant argued it qualified as an essential 'hardware store' and would suffer irreparable financial harm if closed during the busy December retail season.

The court dismissed the request for interim relief, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and potential irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The court held that the public interest in enforcing public health measures to prevent the spread of Covid-19 outweighed the applicant's private economic interests at this preliminary stage.

A municipal elector sought a declaration under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act alleging that the mayor contravened s. 5 by speaking and voting on a motion requiring him to personally repay an alleged municipal budget over‑expenditure.

The court considered whether the application was brought within the limitation period under s. 9 and whether any exceptions under s. 4 applied.

The court held that although the application was timely and the statutory exceptions did not apply, the mayor did not possess a real pecuniary interest because the municipality lacked legal authority to require personal repayment.

As the proposed financial sanction was ultra vires and therefore a nullity, there was no genuine pecuniary interest engaging s. 5.

The application seeking removal from office and restitution was dismissed.