Colleen Liggett

The accused, facing drug charges following a vehicle search, brought an application for the disclosure of police GPS tracking data to challenge the arresting officers' version of events and support a Charter claim of unreasonable search.

The court held that police GPS data, while not gathered primarily as an investigative tool, relates to the investigation and falls under the Crown's first-party disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe rather than the third-party O'Connor regime.

Finding the data relevant to the accused's defence, the court ordered its production but narrowed the temporal scope of the request.

The applicants sought to vary a sealing order under s. 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to obtain access to the Information to Obtain search warrants executed at two residences.

They argued that, as non‑accused persons affected by the search, they had a presumptive right to access the materials in order to assess potential Charter s. 8 violations.

The Crown opposed, arguing that a non‑accused must first present some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully before a court will review sealed materials.

The court adopted the approach from Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General) and R. v. Schmidt, requiring a preliminary evidentiary basis before varying a sealing order.

Because the applicants filed no evidence suggesting unlawful authorization of the warrants, the application was dismissed.