Christie Ngan

A third‑party insurer moved for summary judgment dismissing a coverage claim brought by another insurer following a motor vehicle collision.

The dispute concerned whether the driver was an insured under an automobile policy issued to his father and whether the insurer was obligated to indemnify him.

The court considered the Insurance Act, the Ontario Automobile Policy (OAP 1), and evidence relating to ownership of the vehicle and consent to drive it.

The court found the driver was the registered and actual owner of the vehicle and was not operating it with the consent of the named insureds.

Accordingly, he was not an insured under the policy and the insurer had no duty to indemnify.

Following a jury verdict awarding general damages and past income loss arising from a pedestrian-motor vehicle accident, the defendant brought a threshold motion contending that the claim for non-pecuniary loss was barred by s. 267.5(5)(b) of the Insurance Act.

The court accepted that the accident caused the plaintiff's post-accident left shoulder pain, but held the plaintiff failed to prove that the impairment substantially interfered with his regular employment or with most usual activities of daily living within the meaning of O. Reg. 461/96, s. 4.2.

The plaintiff had continued working full-time for more than four years, the evidence about retirement and re-employment intentions undermined his reliability, and the daily-living evidence was insufficient.

The threshold motion was granted.

The third party insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a third party claim brought by another insurer in a motor vehicle accident action.

The dispute concerned whether the moving insurer had an obligation to indemnify the driver under a policy issued to his father where the vehicle had been transferred into the driver’s name prior to the collision.

The responding insurer argued the policy applied either through statutory absolute liability provisions or because the driver was an insured operating the vehicle with the named insured’s consent.

The court held that material factual disputes remained regarding common law ownership of the vehicle and whether the driver had express or implied consent to operate it.

Because these issues required additional evidence, particularly from the named insured, summary judgment was not appropriate.