Catherine Gleason-Mercier

The responding parties brought an application seeking declaratory relief regarding the moving parties' alleged failure to retain an operator for a light rail transit project.

The moving parties brought a motion to stay the application in favour of arbitration, relying on a dispute resolution clause in prior Minutes of Settlement.

The court granted the stay, applying the competence-competence principle and finding that the moving parties established an arguable case that the dispute fell within the arbitration agreement.

The court also found no undue delay by the moving parties in seeking the stay.

The plaintiffs, prospective franchisees, entered into agreements with the defendant franchisor to open two frozen yogurt stores and paid a $75,000 development fee.

After failing to secure suitable store locations within the agreed and extended timeframes, the franchisor terminated the agreements and retained the fee.

The plaintiffs sued for rescission under the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging deficient disclosure regarding lease costs and location availability, as well as common law misrepresentation and frustration of contract.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the disclosure provided was sufficient to allow an informed investment decision, no misrepresentations were made, and the failure to find a location was a foreseeable event explicitly contemplated by the contracts.

The defendant successfully moved to strike the plaintiff's jury notice and sought costs of $80,461.65 on a substantial indemnity basis or $61,175.38 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs of $15,000.

The court rejected the defendant's request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in refusing to withdraw its jury notice despite the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and the expectations of the parties, the court fixed the defendant's costs at $42,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's jury notice in an action arising from a tender process for the refurbishment of a nuclear reactor.

AECL argued the case was too complex for a jury, that a jury trial against a federal Crown agent is prohibited by the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (CLPA), and that the plaintiff sought equitable relief.

The court granted the motion, finding that the factual and legal issues were too complex for a jury and that section 26 of the CLPA applies to AECL, prohibiting a jury trial.

The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff was seeking equitable relief.