Catherine E. Allen

The plaintiffs and defendants were equal shareholders in two closely held corporations that owned and operated gas stations and a driving range.

Following a breakdown in their relationship and a deadlock over succession planning and the division of corporate assets, both parties alleged oppressive conduct against the other.

The court found that both shareholders had engaged in conduct that unfairly disregarded the other's interests.

Given the irreparable breakdown of trust and the deadlock, the court ordered the winding up and liquidation of the companies by a court-appointed receiver.

The court dismissed the claims of the plaintiff's wife, finding she was not a shareholder or officer, but awarded the plaintiff $250,000 in compensation for his historical management of the companies.

Following the defendant's unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $70,777.55, while the defendant argued for no costs or costs on the Small Claims Court scale.

The court found no basis for full or substantial indemnity costs, nor for restricting costs to the Small Claims Court scale, noting the motion involved a novel issue regarding Infectious Disease Emergency Leave.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $22,840.13.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's constructive dismissal action, arguing that the temporary layoff was deemed an Infectious Disease Emergency Leave under O. Reg 228/20 of the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the IDEL Regulation does not displace an employee's common law right to pursue a civil claim for constructive dismissal, as section 8(1) of the Act expressly preserves civil remedies.

The court directed a summary trial on the remaining issue of whether the employer had just cause for termination.

The applicants, owners of a servient tenement, brought an application to discharge two right-of-way easements encumbering their property and benefiting the respondents' neighbouring property.

The applicants also sought $500,000 in damages for trespass.

The court found that the respondents had intentionally abandoned the easements decades prior by ceasing to use them for vehicular access and building a parking pad on their own property.

The court ordered the easements discharged under section 61 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act.

The trespass claim was dismissed because the applicants did not have possession of the property at the time of the alleged trespass.

No costs were awarded.

The defendant landlord brought a motion to discharge an ex parte Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) obtained by the plaintiff tenant regarding a hotel property.

The tenant had a right of first refusal to match a third-party offer to purchase the property.

After the third-party transaction failed, the landlord offered the property to the tenant on the same terms, but the tenant sought to amend its claim to enforce a different agreement with an abatement of the purchase price.

The court found that the tenant's only enforceable right was to match the original offer, which it failed to do.

Applying the factors for discharging a CPL, the court concluded the CPL should be vacated as the tenant no longer had a reasonable claim to the interest in the land on the terms originally pleaded.