Bryan Douglas Laushway

The plaintiff, a grieving father, sued his son's mother, a funeral home, and its director for breach of contract, deceit, and intentional infliction of mental distress after being excluded from his son's funeral.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of the lawsuit.

The court dismissed all claims, finding no enforceable contract between the parties, no false misrepresentation to support deceit, and insufficient evidence of subjective intent to cause psychological harm for intentional infliction of mental distress, despite acknowledging the defendants' callous and insensitive conduct.

The defendant brought a threshold motion following a jury trial on damages for a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff claimed general non-pecuniary damages, loss of income, and psychological services.

The court assessed whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of the accident, as required by s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act and O. Reg. 381/03.

The court found that the plaintiff's physical injuries (whiplash) had resolved within 8 weeks and were not continuous.

The plaintiff's expert orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Cooke, ultimately could not attribute the plaintiff's current subjective symptoms to the accident.

The court also rejected the opinion of the plaintiff's psychological expert, Dr. Holowaty, due to her lack of objectivity, failure to report inconsistencies in the medical record, and failure to consider malingering as per DSM-5 guidelines.

The court found the plaintiff's testimony lacked credibility due to exaggerated pain behaviour and inconsistencies with reported activities.

Consequently, the court declared that the plaintiff did not meet the statutory threshold for permanent serious impairment, dismissed the claims for health care expenses and loss of income, and assessed non-pecuniary damages at nil after applying the statutory deductible.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, relating to incidents that occurred between 1983 and 2001.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed for delay, as it was filed in 2008, well beyond the one-year time limit under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant argued the delay was justified due to a poisoned work environment and her mental health issues.

The Tribunal found the application was filed out of time and that the applicant failed to establish the delay was incurred in good faith under section 34(2), noting she had been capable of initiating other legal proceedings during the same period.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent was charged with offences under the Ontario Water Resources Act.

At his second trial, the trial judge stayed the proceedings and awarded costs against the Crown, finding that the Crown had engaged in egregious prosecutorial misconduct amounting to an abuse of process and a breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld this decision.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the stay and costs award, and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of prosecutorial misconduct was tainted by palpable and overriding error and that many of the Crown's actions were sanctioned by court order.