Brent McQuestion

The applicant requested a reconsideration of an adjudicator's decision denying a request to strike evidence from the respondent's submissions.

The Associate Chair dismissed the request for reconsideration because, under the amended Rule 18.1 of the Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, requests for reconsideration are only accepted for decisions that finally dispose of an appeal.

Since the proceeding was ongoing, the request was dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a bicycle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

Prior to the hearing, the applicant filed a motion to exclude the evidence of an independent medical examiner.

The respondent failed to file its written submissions responding to the exclusion motion by the deadline due to an administrative error, although it did file its affidavit and brief on time.

The respondent brought a motion to extend the time to file its written submissions.

The Tribunal granted the extension, finding that the error was inadvertent, the respondent moved quickly to rectify it, and denying the extension would unfairly limit the respondent's participation and deny it the opportunity to present its case fully.

A child protection application brought by Brant Family and Children's Services seeking Crown wardship without access for two young Indigenous children was resolved by consent order.

The children's mother sought their return to her care subject to supervision.

The court approved a staggered reintegration plan whereby the younger child would immediately return to the mother's care under supervision for twelve months, and the older child would be reintegrated over a two-month period.

The central legal issue concerned the interpretation of section 70 of the Child and Family Services Act, which imposes time limits on society wardship.

The court held that the statutory time limits should be viewed as presumptive ceilings rather than hard caps, allowing for extensions consistent with the child's best interests.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to rescind its appointment as legal representative for a medically fragile infant subject to a child protection proceeding and to remove its assigned counsel.

The child, born with serious cardiac defects, was in the care of the Society and subsequently suffered a life-threatening infection.

A dispute arose between the child's mother and the hospital regarding medical treatment, including a potential do-not-resuscitate order.

The court dismissed the OCL's motion, finding that legal representation remained desirable to protect the child's interests despite the child's inability to provide instructions.

The court awarded costs against the OCL for failing to properly re-evaluate its position in light of changed circumstances.

In a child protection proceeding involving a medically fragile infant hospitalized with severe cardiac complications, the Society sought authority over medical decision‑making after concerns arose about the mother’s refusal to consent to a potential do‑not‑resuscitate order.

The court held the matter should be determined de novo and that the Society bore the burden of showing why the parent should be deprived of decision‑making authority.

Evidence demonstrated the mother had consistently engaged with medical professionals and appropriately consented to prior treatments.

Applying the principle of least intrusive intervention under the Child and Family Services Act, the court concluded there was no basis to remove the mother’s authority.

The court therefore vested medical decision‑making authority in the mother pursuant to s.62 while the child remained in temporary Society care.

This is a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a medically fragile 13-month-old child with significant cardiac defects.

The Society sought authority to make medical decisions for the child, including potential do-not-resuscitate orders.

The mother sought to retain authority to consent to medical treatment.

The court found that the mother had consistently demonstrated sound judgment in making medical decisions for the child throughout her hospitalization and post-discharge care.

The court granted the mother authority to consent to and authorize any medical treatment for the child, finding that absent compelling evidence of parental incapacity, the least intrusive intervention consistent with the child's best interests is to preserve parental decision-making authority, particularly regarding critical medical decisions such as do-not-resuscitate orders.