Family and Matrimonial Law

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to terminate a father's access to his child and for restraining orders protecting the child's grandparents and Society staff from the father.

The court dismissed the request for a restraining order in favour of the grandparents due to insufficient evidence of threats.

The court also held that the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act does not permit a restraining order in favour of the Society.

The court declined to terminate the father's access, finding insufficient evidence of harm to the child, but imposed strict conditions on his access, including a requirement that the Society hire a professional supervised access service and that the father communicate with the Society only through its legal counsel.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The respondent father, a self-employed bricklayer, claimed a modest income but failed to provide adequate financial disclosure regarding his business dealings, subcontractors, and cash deposits.

The court drew an adverse inference and imputed the father's income at $533,426.74.

Applying the Child Support Guidelines for incomes over $150,000, the court ordered table child support of $4,060 per month.

The court also found the mother entitled to compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support, ordering $5,000 per month on a temporary basis.

Following a five-day trial regarding parenting and support arrangements, both parties sought costs.

The applicant mother sought $46,945.47, while the self-represented respondent father sought $42,724.23 and reimbursement for a paternity test.

The court found the mother was the successful party on the dominant issues of decision-making, primary residence, and child support.

The court noted the father's unreasonable conduct, including his failure to provide financial disclosure and his intentional under-employment.

The father was ordered to pay the mother $26,964.00 in costs, payable in monthly installments of $200.00, with 35% of the award enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as an incident of support.

The father brought a motion for temporary care and custody of his two young children, supported by the children's aid society.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking to have the children remain in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother.

The court analyzed who had 'charge' of the children prior to the society's intervention under section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, concluding that the mother and maternal grandmother had charge, not the father.

The court found that the society failed to adequately investigate the father's plan and that placing the children in his care would pose a risk of harm.

The father's motion was dismissed, and the children were ordered to remain in the care of the maternal grandmother.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship without access for two young children.

The mother had a lengthy history of child welfare involvement, housing instability, and parenting capacity issues.

The father of the younger child had been incarcerated and had never met the child.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, as neither parent presented a realistic plan for the children's care.

The children were found in need of protection and made Crown wards with no access, prioritizing their need for permanency.

The applicant society sought to introduce the expert opinion evidence of a psychiatrist regarding the impact of substance abuse on parenting in a child protection trial.

The respondents opposed the admission of the evidence.

The court conducted a voir dire and applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for the admissibility of expert evidence.

The court found that the proposed evidence was neither relevant nor necessary, as the expert had not met the parents or the child and could only speak in generalities.

Furthermore, the expert was not properly qualified in the specific area of addictions, and the late service of the expert report caused undue prejudice to the respondents.

The request to introduce the expert evidence was denied.

Following a motion to change where the applicant successfully obtained an increase in spousal support and defeated the respondent's cross-claim to fix a termination date, the applicant sought costs.

The court considered the offers to settle under Rule 18 and the costs factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

Finding that the applicant was largely successful and the respondent had not made any offers to settle, the court awarded the applicant $2,500 in costs.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two children were in need of protection.

The mother had experienced marijuana-induced psychotic episodes.

The younger child had been living with his father since apprehension, while the older child, who suffered from severe anxiety and selective mutism, was in foster care.

The court found both children in need of protection.

The younger child was placed in his father's custody subject to supervision.

The older child was made a Crown ward.

The court ordered ongoing access between the mother and the older child, finding the relationship beneficial and meaningful, and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

At the outset of a child support trial, it was discovered that the respondent's purported lawyer was not licensed to practise law in Ontario and lacked liability insurance.

The individual had failed to disclose this to the court, opposing counsel, or his own client.

The court refused to grant him permission to act as an agent under the Family Law Rules due to his lack of honesty and integrity.

The trial was adjourned, and the unlicensed representative was ordered to pay costs personally to the applicant and the City of Toronto.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside a default order granting custody, access, and child support based on imputed income.

The court found that while the respondent acted in a timely manner, he failed to disclose a viable defence, provided contradictory and incomplete financial information, and did not act in good faith.

The motion to set aside the order was dismissed, though the child care costs were varied to reflect a reduction in the applicant's actual costs.

The applicant brought a motion to change the terms of a separation agreement to reduce or terminate spousal support, alleging a material change in circumstances since a previous order dismissed his earlier motion.

The applicant cited deteriorating health, depletion of assets, and separation from his second wife, who previously assisted him in his business.

The court found that while the applicant's health issues were ongoing, his separation from his second wife compromised his ability to generate income, constituting a material change.

The court imputed an income of $45,000 to the applicant and reduced his spousal support obligation to $800 per month.

The applicant mother brought a motion to strike the respondent father's pleadings or dismiss his claims due to his failure to comply with a consent disclosure order and the Child Support Guidelines.

The father, a self-employed locksmith, failed to provide complete tax returns, business records, and other financial documents despite multiple requests and a court order.

The court found the father demonstrated a complete disdain for court orders and the rules.

The court dismissed the father's case, ordered final supervised access, and allowed the mother to proceed with her claims unopposed.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a newborn child at birth and sought a temporary care and custody order placing the child with the paternal grandmother.

The parents sought the return of the child.

The court found that while the society met the test under s. 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act with respect to the mother due to her history of alcohol abuse and other concerns, it failed to meet the test with respect to the father.

The court ordered the child returned to the father's care and custody, subject to a supervision order with conditions, including that the mother not have unsupervised access.

On a family law appeal, the appellant challenged the inclusion of sick leave credits in net family property, the retirement age used for pension valuation, a paragraph of the judgment characterized as a support order triggered by default in payment, and the trial costs order.

The court held that the evidentiary record supported the trial judge’s treatment of the sick leave credits and pension valuation, and that the impugned paragraph was authorized on consent and properly viewed as support rather than conversion of a property order.

The court declined to interfere with the costs ruling, including the application of Rule 49.

The appeal was dismissed subject only to a consent variation reducing the equalization payment.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration requiring payment of life insurance proceeds to the respondent, who was the named beneficiary under a policy maintained pursuant to a separation agreement.

The insured died accidentally from cocaine intoxication after ingesting narcotics, and the insurer argued both an implied contractual exclusion for criminal acts and a public policy bar against recovery flowing from criminal conduct.

The Court of Appeal held the policy was unambiguous, the insured did not intend to cause his own death, and the respondent claimed as an ordinary beneficiary rather than through the insured's estate.

Applying prior authority on the crime-profit rule, the court held that public policy did not bar recovery by an innocent beneficiary and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged an order requiring it, as an income source for a support payor, to remit support enforcement funds to the respondent.

The appellant accepted that the evidentiary findings against it were supported but argued that the court should nonetheless have made a reasonable estimate of income despite missing disclosure.

The Court of Appeal held that, given the appellant's knowledge of the substantial claim and its failure to produce documents that could resolve the dispute, the judge was entitled to draw an adverse inference and accept the amount claimed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Appeal from an order varying a pre-Guidelines child support order to the table amount under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court held it was bound by prior Ontario authority requiring the party seeking variation to establish a material change in circumstances beyond the mere coming into force of the Guidelines, but strongly questioned that authority and recommended reconsideration.

The court also held that, following the Supreme Court’s decision on s. 4(b), a high-income payor must have the opportunity to show that the table amount is inappropriate.

Fresh evidence was refused, the variation order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appeal concerned whether a pre-1986 marriage contract removed designated property from the equalization regime under the Family Law Act.

The court held that the agreement, read as a whole, clearly provided that the property would remain the wife's alone and would prevail over the Family Law Reform Act or any successor legislation.

The court distinguished prior authorities where contractual wording was materially different.

Applying s. 70(3), the court concluded that the contract deemedly excluded the property from s. 5 equalization.

The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.

In this family property appeal arising from a fact-driven trial, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s findings, particularly concerning ownership of a triplex, and alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the factual findings were amply supported by the record and disclosed no palpable or overriding error.

It also rejected the bias allegation and dismissed the contingent cross-appeal, including the claim for pre-judgment interest.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed, and appeal costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

After a 23-year unmarried cohabitation, the appellant challenged a trial judgment that found the respondent had been unjustly enriched through her child care, household management, financial contributions, and work in the family business.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the appellant was enriched, the respondent suffered a corresponding deprivation, and there was no juristic reason for the enrichment.

It also upheld a remedial award that effectively increased the respondent's asset position by $170,000 through property transfers and cash, finding the result fell within the generous ambit of reasonableness in long-term domestic unjust enrichment cases.

The respondent's cross-appeal seeking a 50 percent share of total assets was dismissed.