A. Prevost

The three accused were charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and found large quantities of drugs and two handguns.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance showing the accused coming and going from the building, and the presence of two of the accused in the apartment during the raid.

The court found that while the evidence established the apartment was a stash house, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the contraband, as there was a reasonable alternative inference that the drugs and guns belonged exclusively to the tenant of the apartment.

During an ongoing trial for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of surveillance video clips from an apartment building.

The defence challenged the authenticity of the video due to time stamp discrepancies and jumps in the recording.

The court applied section 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act and the test from R. v. Bulldog, finding that the Crown only needed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the video was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.

The court held that the time jumps were attributable to the camera being motion-activated and the time stamp was inaccurate to a provable degree, ruling the video admissible.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the facial validity of a tele-warrant issued for her residence during a drug trafficking investigation.

The court found that while there were reasonable and probable grounds to search other locations associated with the main target, the evidence connecting the applicant's residence to drug activity amounted to mere suspicion based solely on a single visit by the target.

The court concluded the search violated section 8 of the Charter and excluded the seized methamphetamine under section 24(2), finding the serious intrusion into a private residence outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The defendants were charged with various drug and firearms offences following the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove possession.

The court found the first defendant guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking based on drugs found near where she was sleeping, but not guilty regarding drugs found in a common kitchen area.

The second defendant, the principal occupant, was found guilty of possessing MDMA found in her bedroom, but not guilty of possessing the cocaine.

The careless storage of a firearm charge against the second defendant was dismissed due to an evidentiary gap regarding the standard of care.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at a residence.

Cocaine was found in a bedroom and the kitchen.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive or joint possession.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first accused occupied the bedroom or that the second accused had a measure of control over the drugs found in the common kitchen area.

Both accused were acquitted.

The offenders, both of aboriginal descent, pleaded guilty to offences arising from an altercation at a private residence.

Doxtator pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and Elijah pleaded guilty to assault.

The court applied Gladue principles, noting both offenders' difficult backgrounds and recent rehabilitative efforts.

Doxtator received a suspended sentence and 18 months' probation.

Elijah, who caused significant facial injuries to the victim, received a 45-day intermittent custodial sentence and 18 months' probation.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence seized from his residence and vehicle.

The court initially denied standing regarding the residence but allowed the applicant to reopen evidence, ultimately finding he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for the residence lacked sufficient corroboration, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

However, the court dismissed the section 7, 8, and 9 claims regarding the vehicle search and arrest, finding them lawful.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence from the residence, concluding the police acted in good faith and the highly reliable evidence was essential to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the reasons were inadequate, and the trial judge improperly applied the credibility analysis from R. v. W.(D.).

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that strict adherence to the W.(D.) formula is unnecessary so long as the substance of the instruction is respected.

Reviewing the reasons as a whole, the court found the trial judge properly assessed credibility, rejected the appellant’s explanation, and concluded the Crown proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

Accused charged with drug offences sought exclusion of evidence seized from residences pursuant to search warrants under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the Information to Obtain and found the warrants were issued without sufficient grounds.

The police had re‑submitted essentially the same ITO to a different judicial officer after a justice of the peace refused the warrant, amounting to impermissible judge‑shopping and misleading drafting.

The search warrants were therefore invalid and the searches constituted unreasonable searches contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the accused’s privacy interests outweighed society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.