A. Bouchelev

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for delay and discharge certificates of pending litigation.

The action, commenced in 2014, arose from an alleged oral trust agreement and wrongful eviction.

The original plaintiff lost capacity and passed away during a lengthy period of inactivity, and her evidence was never preserved.

The court found the delay to be inordinate, inexcusable, and highly prejudicial, as a fair trial was no longer possible without the deceased plaintiff's direct evidence.

The motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and the certificates of pending litigation were discharged.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for damages arising from the defendants' failure to close on a residential real estate transaction.

The plaintiffs alleged the failure to close was due to a lack of financing, while the defendants claimed it was due to deficiencies identified during the pre-delivery inspection.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting evidence on the reason for the breach of contract, combined with the prohibition on cross-examinations under Rule 76, created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants brought a motion to have a 2015 action tried together with two earlier actions (the Loan Actions) which had already been ordered to be tried together.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the 2015 action did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Loan Actions, and there were no common questions of fact or law.

Furthermore, the court noted the defendants' unexplained delay in bringing the motion, which would have unnecessarily delayed the trial of the 2015 action currently scheduled to proceed.

The applicants, the RCMP Registrar of Firearms and a section head, sought to quash subpoenas requiring them to testify at a reference hearing in the Ontario Court of Justice regarding the revocation of firearms registration certificates.

The respondents had obtained the subpoenas under section 698 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice held that a reference under the Firearms Act is not a proceeding to which the Criminal Code applies, as it is more akin to an administrative or civil proceeding.

Consequently, the subpoenas were quashed.

The defendants brought a motion to release $114,000 held in trust as security in place of a discharged Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The plaintiffs had originally obtained the CPL ex parte to secure a disputed $150,000 loan related to a real estate development project.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs had no reasonable interest in the property because the mortgage was discharged and replaced by an unsecured promissory note, and that the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure on the ex parte motion.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding a triable issue regarding the validity of the promissory note and mortgage discharge, and accepting the plaintiffs' explanation for not disclosing certain documents they did not possess or recall signing.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside an ex parte order that froze their bank accounts and required them to pay funds into court.

The court found that the responding parties failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts when obtaining the ex parte order, specifically by providing misleading evidence regarding the urgency of the matter and the connection to a related action.

The court set aside the ex parte order, granting leave to bring the motion again on proper notice.

In supplementary reasons addressing costs following earlier reasons under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the applicant mortgage lender sought full indemnity costs based on contractual mortgage provisions.

The court confirmed that while contractual entitlement to full indemnity costs exists, the court retains supervisory authority to ensure the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable.

The applicant’s bill of costs was reduced for inefficiencies, including excessive research time and the use of senior counsel for work that could have been delegated or billed at a lower rate.

Additional reductions were made for excessive preparation time on reply materials.

The court ultimately fixed reasonable full indemnity costs and rejected arguments for further reductions based on partial success or for awarding costs to another resisting respondent.