A.

This trial decision addresses the validity of a Cohabitation Agreement (CA) and associated property claims between common-law spouses.

The Applicant sought to set aside the CA, alleging duress, undue influence, unconscionability, misrepresentation, and lack of meaningful independent legal advice (ILA), and claimed a constructive trust interest in the family home.

The court found that the Applicant was not under duress or undue influence when signing the CA, nor were the property division provisions unconscionable.

The court also determined that the parties' conduct did not repudiate the CA.

The Applicant's claims regarding the CA's validity concerning property rights and her constructive trust claim were dismissed, affirming that property should be divided according to legal title as per the agreement.

The plaintiff mortgagor sought summary judgment against the defendant second mortgagee regarding disputed charges included in a discharge statement.

The mortgagee had charged a $42,000 default maturity fee, increased the interest rate from 12% to 18% upon default, and levied $4,000 in administrative fees for payments made to the first mortgagee.

The court found that the default maturity fee and interest rate increase violated section 8 of the Interest Act as prohibited penalties.

The court also found no contractual basis for the administrative fees.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the overpaid amount of $53,457.10 plus costs.

The applicant father sought an urgent motion to change the children's residential schedule to establish equal time-sharing or primary residence with him, citing concerns about the respondent mother's work as a healthcare professional during the COVID-19 pandemic and the children residing with maternal grandparents.

The court, acting as a Triage Judge, found that the motion to change the residential schedule was not urgent, as the father failed to provide substantive evidence that the children were unsafe or that the existing arrangements needed urgent modification.

Furthermore, the court determined that the father's lack of access since March 20, 2020, was not urgent because he had refused offered access that did not meet his demand for equal time-sharing.

The court denied the urgent motion, encouraging parties to resume the regular residential schedule.

The plaintiff, a land developer, brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over one of the defendant's properties, 5318 Stouffville Road, based on a right of first refusal (ROFR) in a development management agreement.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing the ROFR had terminated, was void for vagueness, or was not triggered as the property was part of a larger package.

The court found that while the plaintiff raised a triable issue regarding the ROFR, it failed to demonstrate the uniqueness of the land or that damages would be an inadequate remedy.

Considering the defendant's advanced age and reliance on the property for retirement, the court concluded that the harm to the defendant from a CPL outweighed the harm to the plaintiff, whose losses could be compensated by damages.

The motion for leave to issue a CPL was dismissed.

This is a costs ruling following the dismissal of recusal motions brought by the Moving Parties (Sam Cosentino, Concetta Cosentino, and Cesare Cosentino).

The court rejected the Moving Parties' request to refer costs to an assessment officer, affirming that judges typically fix costs to avoid delay.

It found that the Moving Parties should have reasonably anticipated the responding defendants' participation and associated legal costs.

While the recusal motion was ill-conceived and involved a substantial record, the court determined that the Moving Parties' conduct was not egregious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court adjusted some cost claims for duplication of counsel and excluded time spent on non-party witnesses, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs to the successful defendants.

The moving parties (Sam, Concetta, and Cesare Cosentino) sought the recusal of the case management judge, Daley RSJ, in seven related high-conflict family litigation actions, alleging bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

They also sought a transfer of the actions from Brampton to Toronto.

The court dismissed both the recusal motions and the transfer request, finding no cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The judge emphasized the higher threshold for recusal in a case management context, where close interaction and familiarity with the case are expected.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

An investigating officer observed the defendant operating a tractor-trailer and believed he saw the defendant holding a cell phone.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer photographed a Motorola device in the cab.

The defendant testified he was holding a water bottle and that the device in question was a scanner used to record delivery details for his employer, not a communication device capable of making phone calls.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was holding a hand-held communications device or another object, and dismissed the charge.

The plaintiff sought to add Manulife as a defendant to a long-term disability claim after the expiry of the presumptive limitation period, having initially sued the wrong insurer (Great-West Life).

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to discover the correct insurer and that adding Manulife would cause actual prejudice, as they lost the opportunity to conduct timely medical assessments and charge back benefits to the policyholder.

The moving party accountant sought an order that two related professional negligence actions—one against an accountant and another against lawyers—be tried together.

Both actions arose from the plaintiffs’ failed attempt to claim allowable business investment losses (ABILs) on their tax returns, which were rejected by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The court held that the claims involved common questions of fact and law, including the viability of the ABIL strategy, the advice provided by both professionals, contributory negligence, and overlapping damages.

Trying the matters separately risked inconsistent findings and duplicated evidence.

The court therefore ordered that the two actions be tried together or sequentially before the same judge and provided directions regarding the use of existing discovery transcripts.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of his action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the contextual approach and the Reid factors, considering the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence explaining prolonged delay in advancing the action, including outstanding undertakings and discovery obligations, and relied primarily on unsupported assertions of health issues.

Given the age of the action, the expiry of the limitation period, and the presumption of prejudice to the defendants, the court found the evidentiary record inadequate to justify reinstatement.