T. Sarantis

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a house arrest term of a release order contrary to s. 145(5)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He was found alone at 4:30 a.m. near Yonge and Dundas in Toronto, holding an open alcoholic beverage.

The defence brought a directed verdict application, arguing the Crown failed to negate exceptions in the release order permitting travel to and from work.

The court dismissed the application, relying on R. v. Blaker to hold the exceptions were not essential elements of the offence.

On the merits, the court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as no evidence supported any applicable exception to the house arrest condition.

In this judge-alone criminal trial, the accused admitted inflicting injuries but asserted self-defence in relation to an apartment-hallway altercation involving a metal pole and a knife.

The court applied the D.W. framework, assessed credibility and reliability in light of internal inconsistencies, substance-use evidence, criminal records, and video corroboration, and rejected the accused’s account.

The court held there was no evidentiary foundation for self-defence and, alternatively, that the accused’s own testimony failed the motive and reasonableness components under s. 34.

The court accepted key factual findings supported by surveillance and medical evidence, including repeated knife strikes and post-incident concealment conduct.

Convictions were entered for assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, and two probation breaches.

The accused was arrested for possession of a loaded restricted firearm following a high-risk takedown where he was tasered by police.

The arrest was based on a confidential informant's tip and police surveillance.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging arbitrary arrest, excessive force, unlawful search, and breaches of his rights to be informed of the reasons for arrest and to counsel.

The court found that the arrest was lawful and the force used was reasonable, but concluded that the police breached the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights by delaying the communication of the reasons for arrest and the right to counsel, and by questioning him before he could consult a lawyer.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the breaches did not cause the seizure and the evidence was essential to the prosecution.

The accused was found guilty.