Taylor B. Robertson

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating her tenancy, arguing that COVID-19 made finding new accommodations difficult.

The appeal was filed after the expiry of the appeal period without a motion to extend time, but a certificate of stay was issued.

During a case management conference, the tenant agreed to vacate the premises by September 3, 2020, and consented to the dismissal of her appeal without costs and the lifting of the stay.

The appellant appealed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to suspend his driver's licence under section 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act due to alcohol dependence.

The suspension was triggered by a medical report from a physician who treated the appellant after a fall.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the appellant's testimony unreliable and preferred the medical evidence confirming a diagnosis of alcohol dependence.

Applying the CCMTA Medical Standards for Drivers, the Tribunal concluded the appellant's condition was likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely, as he had not abstained from alcohol for 12 months or completed a rehabilitation program.

The licence suspension was confirmed.

Following a jury trial dismissing an occupiers’ liability claim arising from a workplace accident at a homeowner’s property, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant had previously delivered a Rule 49 offer to dismiss the action without costs, which was more favourable than the eventual jury verdict.

The court considered the discretion under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the simplicity of the case, the modest value of the claim, and the conduct of the litigation.

While the defendant was entitled to costs, the court found the requested amounts excessive for what was effectively a simple case resembling a Small Claims Court matter.

The court fixed modest costs payable by the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action had been struck from the trial list because the appellants were not ready for trial, and they failed to restore it within 180 days.

The Court of Appeal upheld the status hearing judge's decision, finding no error in considering the entire history of the delay rather than just the 180-day period, and concluding that the judge's finding of no reasonable explanation for the delay was supported by the evidence.

Following dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action after a status hearing, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court determined that partial indemnity costs were appropriate because there were no offers to settle affecting the scale of costs.

The litigation involved a relatively simple breach of contract and negligence claim concerning alleged defects in a house purchased by the plaintiffs, with limited procedural activity over several years before dismissal.

The court also held that additional disbursements arising from a defendant’s decision to retain out‑of‑town counsel should not be borne by the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

Each successful defendant was awarded a fixed all‑inclusive costs amount.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs were required to show cause why their action should not be dismissed for delay after it was struck from the trial list and not restored within 180 days.

The court applied the two-part test requiring a reasonable explanation for delay and proof that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

Although the court found little evidence of actual prejudice given earlier discovery evidence and expert reports, the plaintiffs failed to provide any reasonable explanation for prolonged inactivity in prosecuting the action.

Significant unexplained delays occurred both before and after the action was struck from the trial list.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their onus and dismissed the action for delay.