Sonya Madeline Katrycz

The plaintiffs were successful on a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Claim to add their automobile insurer as a defendant.

The plaintiffs sought costs of the motion on a partial indemnity scale, while the insurer argued no costs should be awarded.

The court found no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event, noting the insurer's opposition unnecessarily added to the costs of the proceedings.

The court awarded the plaintiffs costs fixed at $6,500, reducing the requested amount to reflect divided success on some issues and procedural delays caused by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim to add their own automobile insurer, TD Insurance, as a defendant under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement, following an accident with an uninsured motorist.

The motion considered the application of the Limitations Act, 2002, to claims for indemnification against an insurer, specifically when the limitation period begins and if discoverability and due diligence apply.

The court granted leave to amend, finding triable issues regarding discoverability and due diligence, and that no non-compensable prejudice would result to TD Insurance, which had been involved in the plaintiffs' accident benefits claims since 2014.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike several paragraphs from the defendant insurer's statement of defence.

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a motor vehicle and suffered catastrophic injuries.

The insurer, added as a defendant, pleaded that the collision was an intentional act in self-defence and included allegations about the plaintiff's past criminal record, gang affiliation, and drug involvement.

The court found these allegations to be irrelevant evidence that improperly cast a derogatory light on the plaintiff's character.

The court struck the offending paragraphs under Rule 25.11, concluding that their prejudicial effect outweighed any potential probative value.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing a civil action alleging misuse of personal financial information obtained from court filings in related family litigation.

The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant, a mortgage broker associated with the former spouse of one plaintiff, provided their financial information to a third‑party lender without consent, leading to the creation of a financing letter later used in court proceedings.

The defendant argued the claim disclosed no cause of action and was barred by the two‑year limitation period.

The court held that the pleadings could potentially support the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as recognized in Jones v. Tsige and that alternative legal characterizations of pleaded facts do not create a new cause of action outside the limitation period.

It was not plain and obvious that the action would fail, and the defendant’s motions for dismissal for delay and summary judgment were dismissed.