Self-represented

The Corporation of the Township of South Frontenac brought a motion seeking a contempt order against Jason and Terri Brunette for alleged breaches of a prior consent order concerning property by-laws, specifically regarding vehicle storage and salvage operations.

The Township also sought an order requiring the respondents to provide proof of vehicle ownership upon request.

The court found that while some minor breaches of the consent order occurred (unplated vehicles, extended parking of a broken-down vehicle), the Township failed to prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for the alleged salvage operation or the storage of a friend's vehicle.

The court declined to find contempt, emphasizing that it should be a last resort, and also refused the request for proof of ownership, stating it would reverse the onus of proof.

The respondents were found guilty of breaching the order and ordered to pay $300 in costs.

The plaintiff, Jean-Marie Dixon, sought to conduct Rule 39.03 examinations of three witnesses (Registrar of HRTO, former ALOC president, and Crown counsel) in preparation for a jurisdiction motion brought by His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (HMK).

HMK, the Association of Law Officers of the Crown (ALOC), and the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (HRTO) each moved to quash the respective summonses.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's preliminary motion to strike portions of HMK's material.

The court granted all motions to quash, finding that the evidence sought was not relevant to the jurisdiction motion, was protected by statutory privilege (for HRTO Registrar) or solicitor-client privilege (for Crown counsel), or constituted an abuse of process as a fishing expedition for the underlying claim's merits.

The parties brought cross-motions to change existing final orders for spousal support, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The court determined the duration of spousal support, rejecting the applicant's request for termination and ordering it to continue until April 30, 2027, based on the total cohabitation period.

Retroactive spousal support amounts were adjusted based on the applicant's increased income, and arrears were calculated.

The court also addressed section 7 education expenses, ordering the applicant to reimburse the respondent for a portion of Adam's expenses but making no order for Heather or Jared.

This trial concerned a mother's application for retroactive and ongoing child support for the parties' 18-year-old son, and for the father's proportionate share of post-secondary expenses.

The father had stopped paying child support and failed to comply with disclosure orders.

The court applied the Colucci framework for retroactive support, finding the presumptive start date to be March 1, 2019 (date of effective notice), and declined to depart from this date due to the father's blameworthy conduct and the hardship caused to the mother and child.

The court quantified the arrears and ordered ongoing support and contributions to post-secondary expenses.

The appellant, B.B., appealed his conviction for multiple counts of assault and sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a general propensity instruction to the jury regarding uncharged conduct and cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that while such an instruction is generally required for morally outrageous behaviour, in this specific case, the defence had strategically utilized the bad character evidence to challenge the complainant's credibility.

The court reasoned that providing a limiting instruction would have risked prejudicing the appellant by needlessly highlighting impermissible reasoning.

The court further noted that the uncharged conduct was less severe than the charged offences and was integral to the narrative of the relationship, diminishing the risk of improper jury reasoning.

The Applicant mother sought final orders for sole decision-making responsibility, child support, and section 7 expenses for the child.

The Respondent father sought additional parenting time and joint decision-making responsibility.

The court, after an uncontested trial where the Respondent's pleadings were struck for financial issues, granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility with a duty to consult, ordered the father to pay child support based on his current income and arrears for section 7 expenses, and increased the father's parenting time beyond alternate weekends, including mid-week overnights, finding the previous contact insufficient for a child of the child's age.

The court also ordered life insurance as security for child support and continued health benefits.

The defendants, including William Adamson Skelly and two corporations, were convicted of 11 counts of operating a place of refreshment without a license and 6 counts of operating a refreshment vehicle without a license, contrary to the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate penalties, considering general and specific deterrence, proportionality, and totality.

The court imposed fines of $1,500 for 10 counts and suspended sentences for 7 counts, finding that daily charges for the same offence over a short period were unaligned with proportionality and totality principles.

The applicant, Sharon Hartin, objected to the accounts of the respondent, Mary McInnis, in her capacities as attorney for property and estate trustee of Anna Evelyn Hartin's estate.

The applicant alleged undue influence, improper transfers, failure to keep proper records, and breach of court orders.

The court found a presumption of undue influence arose due to the deceased's dependency on the respondent, which the respondent largely failed to rebut.

The court also found the respondent acted as attorney for property and failed to keep adequate records.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the estate $127,167.70, revoked her Certificate of Appointment as Estate Trustee, and denied her compensation.

The Landlord, Radice Management Services Inc., brought a motion for default judgment against the Tenant, Alex Balm (wrongly named Alex Baum), for rental arrears and an order for possession.

The Landlord also sought to amend the title of proceeding to correct the misnomer.

The court granted the default judgment, finding the Landlord established liability based on deemed admissions.

Damages for outstanding rent and utilities were awarded, totaling $111,656.15.

The court confirmed its concurrent jurisdiction with the Landlord and Tenant Board under section 207 of the Residential Tenancies Act to award monetary damages exceeding the Board's jurisdiction and to grant orders for possession.

The court also allowed the amendment to correct the misnomer in the defendant's name.

Costs were awarded to the Landlord on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order regarding parenting time.

The court considered the children's strong and consistent views, their maturity, and the father's failure to take responsibility for past family violence.

The court granted the mother's request, ordering that contact with the father be at the children's sole discretion and initiative, and dismissed the father's requests for joint decision-making, compelled psychological assessments, and police enforcement of contact.

The registrar's office referred two statements of claim to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, following a request from the defendant, as the claims appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The court ordered that notice be given to the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01(3)(1) regarding the potential dismissal of the actions.

Pending the outcome of a written hearing, the plaintiff's actions were stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and no further filings were to be accepted except the plaintiff's written submissions.

This decision concerns an application for state-funded counsel for a summary conviction appeal.

The applicant, convicted of assault, assault with a weapon, and choking, sought legal assistance after Legal Aid Ontario denied his application.

Applying the two-stage test from *R. v. Abbey*, the court found the applicant met the financial eligibility criterion.

However, the court determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate any arguable grounds of appeal, as his submissions primarily sought to re-litigate factual findings rather than identify legal errors.

Consequently, the application for state-funded counsel was dismissed.

The applicants, Inivos Limited and Warrick Fentiman, brought a motion seeking a civil contempt order against the respondent, Richard Marsh, for allegedly breaching a prior Ontario Superior Court order that recognized and enforced English High Court injunctions prohibiting him from publishing defamatory statements.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the November 7 order was not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to require the respondent to take positive steps to remove pre-existing defamatory content from the internet.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent had actual knowledge of the order's full terms until January 1, 2024, and he posted no new violating material after that date.

The court also stated it would have exercised its discretion to decline a contempt finding, as contempt is a remedy of last resort and there had been substantial compliance since the respondent gained full knowledge of the order.

The Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs (the "Federation") brought an application seeking declarations of defamation and a permanent injunction against Paul Ireland (also known as Robert Paul Ireland) for an online campaign of defamatory posts.

Mr. Ireland failed to respond to the application.

The court applied the three-part test for defamation from Grant v. Torstar, finding that Mr. Ireland's posts, which alleged corruption, fraud, and criminal conduct, were defamatory and would lower the Federation's reputation.

As Mr. Ireland presented no evidence, the court found no valid defence (justification, fair comment, or qualified privilege).

Consequently, the court granted the Federation's requested declaratory and equitable relief, ordering Mr. Ireland to remove the defamatory posts and permanently enjoining him from publishing similar statements.

The court also awarded costs to the Federation.

The applicant father brought an ex parte application under section 7 of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act to obtain information (mother's and child's addresses, mother's employer) from the Minister of Justice Canada to enforce an existing parenting order.

The court found that the father had taken reasonable steps to locate the mother and child and that the application met the criteria under section 9 of the Act, including providing police and vulnerable sector checks and affirming the sole purpose was enforcement.

The court was satisfied the order would not jeopardize the safety or security of the mother or child, despite historical concerns that had been resolved by a subsequent consent order.

The court authorized a court official to make the application to the Minister, ordering that notice be sent to the mother and child as per section 12.1 of the Act, and deferred a decision on further confidentiality restrictions until the information is received.

The applicant brought a motion to remove an arbitrator due to undue delay by the arbitrator and the respondent's non-cooperation in the arbitration process.

The respondent failed to appear or file materials for the motion.

The court found that the arbitrator's unexplained delays, combined with the respondent's lack of engagement, caused significant prejudice to the applicant by preventing timely resolution of the matter, which was originally set for trial.

The court granted the motion, removed the arbitrator, terminated the mediation/arbitration agreement, and ordered the parties to return to the trial management process, awarding full indemnity costs to the applicant.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, specifically Jaskaran Singh Bajwa, based on a guarantee agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the responding defendant filed no material to support pleaded defences.

However, the court limited the plaintiff's cost recovery to partial indemnity costs, despite contractual agreements for elevated costs, due to concerns about "forum shopping" and the lack of discernible connection between the underlying dispute and the London/Middlesex County venue.

The appellant, Massimo Conti, appealed an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation, which was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs for the successful self-represented respondents, John Duca, Joseph Duca, and Daytona Auto Centre Ltd., and the intervenor, Sergio Grillone.

The court considered the principles for awarding costs to self-represented litigants, including claims for lost income and opportunity costs, and the general principle of indemnification.

The court found no evidence to support the respondents' claim for lost commissions or special costs due to the appellant's counsel's conduct.

However, acknowledging the time and annoyance caused by the appeal, the court exercised its discretion to award modest costs to both the respondents and the intervenor.

The applicant, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), sought to register an Alberta judgment in Ontario without notice to the respondent.

The court found that CMHC failed to establish that the respondent was personally served with the "original action" (the Alberta application for a new judgment) and that the respondent did not appear or defend in that action.

Consequently, under s. 2(2) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (REJA), CMHC was required to give reasonable notice.

The application was adjourned, and CMHC was ordered to proceed on notice to the respondent, with the court also noting concerns regarding the quality of CMHC's affidavit evidence and the calculation of the judgment amount.

Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports brought a motion for temporary care and custody of the child Z, seeking placement in society care and supervised access for the mother.

The respondent mother, S.A., opposed the motion, seeking Z's immediate return to her care.

The court granted the mother's request to provide oral evidence due to her self-represented status and past delays.

The court found that Linck failed to discharge its onus to prove a risk of harm to Z in the mother's care, criticizing the society's evidence as speculative, inconsistent, and tailored to justify apprehension.

The court also found Linck's interventions unjustified and overly intrusive, noting a pattern of baseless apprehensions.

The motion for temporary care was dismissed, and Z was ordered to be immediately returned to the mother's care without supervision.