Self-represented

The plaintiff, Tiffany Longarini, brought a summary judgment motion against Clifford Lloyd, Konstantine Dimakis, and Silkport Capital for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from legal services provided in connection with litigation involving her business interests.

The court found that the defendants, despite their denials, acted as her legal representatives and fell below the standard of care, particularly in their handling of affidavits and advice regarding a key injunction motion.

Damages were awarded for costs and fees paid, but not for psychological harm or future legal fees.

The plaintiff, Tiffany Longarini, brought a summary judgment motion against Clifford Lloyd, Konstantine Dimakis, and Silkport Capital for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from legal services provided in connection with litigation involving her business interests.

The court found that the defendants, despite their denials, acted as her legal representatives and fell below the standard of care, particularly in their handling of affidavits and advice regarding a key injunction motion.

Damages were awarded for costs and fees paid, but not for psychological harm or future legal fees.

Following an appeal and a fresh evidence motion, the court issued a costs endorsement.

Costs were awarded to the successful respondent on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $5,000.

Following an appeal and a fresh evidence motion, the court issued a costs endorsement.

Costs were awarded to the successful respondent on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $5,000.

The court sentenced Nathaniel Dillon for assault, sexual assault, and threatening, all committed against his then-girlfriend, ZK, on June 25, 2018.

The court found the complainant credible, with physical evidence corroborating her account.

The court considered Dillon’s significant mental health issues, including a history of psychosis and schizophrenia, as a mitigating factor, but not a major one.

The sentence imposed was three years’ imprisonment for sexual assault, with concurrent sentences for assault and threatening, and a recommendation for treatment in a specialized correctional facility.

The court also imposed ancillary orders, including probation, DNA, and weapons prohibitions.

The applicants, all lawyers previously retained by Jenny Tran, sought an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring Ms. Tran a vexatious litigant.

The court reviewed Ms. Tran’s extensive litigation history, including repeated and meritless proceedings, appeals, and actions against former counsel and judicial officers.

The court found that Ms. Tran displayed all hallmarks of a vexatious litigant and granted the application, prohibiting her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

The court also fixed costs against Ms. Tran.

The plaintiff, Damodar Arapakota, brought a motion to cure an administrative error by the court, to note the defendant, Haji Makki, in default, and for leave to bring a motion for default judgment.

The court found that the defendant was in default as of August 14, 2023, but due to an administrative error, the default was not recorded.

The court granted the motion to note the defendant in default but immediately set aside the noting in default, finding that the defendant had an arguable defence, the delay was not unreasonable, and there was no non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The matter was ordered to proceed on its merits.

The appellant pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his domestic partner and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit, based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued for a further sentence reduction due to harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the sentence was based on a joint submission by experienced counsel and was entirely fit.

The plaintiff, Home Trust Company, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Adrian Campbell and Louise Miner, seeking payment of an outstanding debt, possession of a property, leave to issue a writ of possession, post-judgment interest, dismissal of the counterclaim, and costs.

The court found the defendants in default, granted the plaintiff’s motion, dismissed the counterclaim as frivolous and vexatious, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The court considered a motion under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an application as frivolous and vexatious.

The registrar referred the matter to the judge following a request from counsel for FP Canada.

The court ordered that the applicant be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before any dismissal, stayed the application pending the written hearing, and directed the registrar regarding service and filings.

The judge remained seized of the matter.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion to amend a temporary parenting order, seeking supervised parenting time for the father due to his alleged incitement of the children to make abuse allegations against her and her new husband.

The court found the matter urgent, determined that the father's conduct constituted emotional harm to the children, and ordered supervised in-person and virtual parenting time for the father, with the mother retaining decision-making responsibility.

The court also ordered disclosure of police and CAS records and set out a process for further proceedings and costs.

The court dismissed the applicant mother's motion for interim release of her share of net sale proceeds from the former family residence, finding insufficient evidence to justify the request.

The decision criticizes the parties' lack of progress toward a final order, the repeated use of interim motions, and the inefficiency this causes in the family court system.

The court schedules a Trial Scheduling Conference and emphasizes the need for final resolution rather than continued piecemeal litigation.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked by the Law Society Tribunal in 2020.

After exhausting all appeals up to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice seeking Charter declarations and reinstatement of his license.

The motion judge dismissed the application as an impermissible collateral attack on the revocation decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant could not use section 24(1) of the Charter to seek a fresh hearing after exhausting statutory remedies, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1.

The Divisional Court had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal found it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank's claim for amounts due on a credit card and two lines of credit.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the bank discovered the claim when she first missed minimum monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the credit agreements created demand obligations, meaning the limitation period only began to run when the bank cancelled the accounts and demanded full repayment.

As the action was commenced within two years of the earliest cancellation date, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order dismissing his application for a declaration regarding the allocation of surplus funds from a power of sale.

The application had been dismissed without prejudice to the appellant's right to bring a fresh application with proper notice and evidence.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order determined no substantive rights and was therefore interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed.