Self-represented

The appellants, registered owners of an Oakville property, sought to extend the time to appeal and stay a summary judgment order granting the respondent mortgage lender possession of the property.

The appellants had defaulted on their mortgage obligations and were facing eviction.

They claimed they did not understand the mortgage documents and were manipulated into signing them, and that the electronically signed documents were invalid.

The motion judge found no evidence of fraud or unconscionable conduct and granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the motion to extend time and the motion to stay, finding no serious grounds of appeal and insufficient evidence of irreparable harm.

The court noted that loss of a home due to mortgage default does not automatically constitute irreparable harm, particularly where the parties agreed to the mortgage terms.

Appeal from a trial judgment resolving divorce issues between parties married in September 2021 and separated in July 2022, with one child born in April 2022.

The appellant sought permission to relocate with the child to Montréal, while the respondent opposed relocation and sought increased parenting time and decision-making authority.

The trial judge denied the relocation request and increased the respondent's parenting time.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the statutory burden of proof under section 16.93(2) of the Divorce Act, instead evaluating relocation against the status quo.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed an error of law by failing to apply the presumption that relocation is in the child's best interests when the relocating parent is the predominant primary caregiver.

The relocation order was set aside and remitted for reconsideration.

All other relief sought by both parties was dismissed.

The defendant Dr. Akhravi brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action was commenced on December 22, 2017, almost eight years prior to the motion.

The plaintiffs, who were self-represented, had failed to properly serve Dr. Akhravi with an issued pleading and had taken no steps to advance the action.

The court found that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial to the defendant, and granted the motion to dismiss.

The court also awarded costs of $5,000 all inclusive to Dr. Akhravi.

A condominium developer brought an application under section 134(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998, seeking a declaration that unit owners had breached sections 117(2) and 119(4) of the Act by causing excessive noise that interfered with other owners' enjoyment of their property.

The applicant sought a cease and desist order and costs.

The respondents owned a residential unit where occupants were playing loud music at all hours.

Despite numerous verbal warnings, written notices, and Rules Infraction Notices issued over several months, the noise continued unabated.

The court found the respondents in breach and granted the requested orders, awarding costs of $7,500 on a scale between partial and full indemnity.

The applicants sought directions on whether Shannon Durno, the named estate trustee, should be removed or passed over, and whether Aleksandr Bolotenko should be appointed as the succeeding estate trustee.

The estate trustee was unwilling to continue acting.

One respondent opposed the appointment of Bolotenko on the basis of alleged conflict of interest.

The court found that Durno had intermeddled with the estate and could not renounce her position, and therefore removed her.

The court found no disqualifying conflict of interest and appointed Bolotenko as the succeeding estate trustee.

The plaintiffs moved without notice for a Norwich Order and Mareva Injunction against Benjamin Allan Ward, the former CEO of Wayland Group Corp., in connection with a proposed investors' class action under the Ontario Securities Act.

Ward had been noted in default and evaded service.

The court found evidence of Ward's history of securities fraud, improper conduct, evasion of service, and removal of assets to multiple jurisdictions.

The court granted the Mareva Injunction to prevent asset dissipation pending a default judgment motion scheduled for March 10, 2026, where damages exceeding $49 million are sought on behalf of the proposed class.

The appellant, a dangerous offender with an extensive history of child sexual offences, appealed his sentence of 20 months imposed for breaching a long-term supervision order and prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code.

The breach occurred when he attended a religious service in a church in the presence of numerous children, merely 30 days after being released to a community correctional centre.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) entitlement to sentence credit for the period between suspension of his long-term supervision order and the laying of charges; (2) the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit at a ratio of 1:1.3 instead of 1:1.5 and the denial of a Duncan credit; and (3) that the sentence was imposed to ensure federal detention for treatment purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence fit and imposed without error.

Vestacon Limited commenced an action against the defendants for unpaid invoices totalling $449,819.31 for labour and materials for the renovation of three units of a commercial condominium project.

The defendants were noted in default and deemed to admit all allegations in the statement of claim.

At trial, the court found that the defendant company breached its contract by failing to pay the invoices when rendered and awarded judgment in that amount plus prejudgment interest.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act against the individual defendants, finding insufficient evidence that the defendant company received funds specifically designated for financing the improvement.

The court also awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The applicant sought a divorce, parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and ongoing and retroactive child support for their seven-year-old child.

The parties were married in 2016 and separated in 2017.

The applicant has been the primary caregiver since the child's birth in Ontario, while the respondent initially remained in Quebec and later relocated to Texas.

The court granted the applicant's application, awarding sole decision-making responsibility to the applicant, parenting time to the respondent consisting of weekly virtual calls and monthly in-person visits within Ontario, and retroactive and ongoing child support based on imputed income for periods of intentional underemployment and the respondent's current earnings.

An appeal from a trial judge's order setting aside a separation agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and section 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The trial judge had set aside the agreement in its entirety and recalculated spousal support.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in setting aside the entire agreement under section 56(4), the spousal support terms did not comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act under the Miglin analysis.

The court allowed the appeal in part, maintaining the separation agreement but modifying the spousal support provisions to remove the cohabitation clause and make support indefinite, while preserving the original quantum of $28,800 annually.

This costs endorsement follows an 8-day trial in a family law matter concerning parenting, decision-making, child support arrears, and equalization.

The applicant was substantially successful on the most important issues, including parenting capacity and the date of separation, but was unsuccessful on imputed income and equalization claims.

The respondent's unreasonable conduct, unstable personal circumstances, and unrealistic positions significantly complicated the proceedings.

The court awarded costs to the successful applicant but reduced the claimed amount due to excessive hourly rates charged by Toronto counsel and applied to an Ottawa matter.

Damages claims for family violence were rejected as inappropriate and unsettled in law.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE spot check and an officer made a breath demand under section 320.27(1)(b) of the Criminal Code based on reasonable suspicion.

The officer's grounds for suspicion were insufficient to meet the objective standard.

The Crown sought to rely on section 320.27(2) (mandatory alcohol screening) at trial, which does not require reasonable suspicion.

The court found that the two subsections are not mutually exclusive and that an officer need not subjectively rely on section 320.27(2) for a demand to be valid under that provision.

The court upheld the lawfulness of the breath demand and dismissed the Charter application.

The applicant sought an order striking the respondent's Notice of Appearance in consolidated estate proceedings involving two estates.

The respondent, who was named as estate trustee in both wills, had persistently failed to comply with multiple court orders requiring disclosure, accounting, mediation attendance, and cooperation with an Estate Trustee During Litigation.

The court found clear and deliberate breaches of numerous interlocutory orders, including peremptory orders, coupled with conduct that demonstrated the futility of granting further opportunities to comply.

The respondent's defences were repetitive, unsworn, and uncorroborated.

The court struck the Notice of Appearance and ordered the applications to proceed as unopposed, finding that the respondent's conduct had caused extraordinary expense and delay in administering a modest estate.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a motion judge's decision striking her amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim alleged breach of confidence arising from the disclosure of a settlement email to the Crown, which led to the withdrawal of criminal sexual assault charges against her former business partner.

The motion judge found the email contained unambiguous impropriety as it offered to withdraw criminal charges in exchange for money, was not protected by settlement privilege, and caused no compensable harm.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The appellant sought a stay of execution of a possession order pending appeal of a summary judgment decision.

The property was mortgaged to Equitable Bank for $610,000.

The appellant defaulted on payments in September 2023 and failed to comply with a forbearance agreement.

The lower court granted summary judgment for possession and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for stay, finding no serious issue to be tried on appeal, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the stay.

The appellant had admitted default and the mortgage terms clearly permitted the lender to demand full payment and take possession.

The applicant father brought an "emergency" motion seeking to proceed before a case conference to obtain decision-making responsibility and parenting time for a five-year-old child.

The respondent mother was served by email approximately one hour before the motion materials were submitted to the judge in chambers, providing no meaningful opportunity to respond.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the matter did not meet the threshold for urgency under Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules and that the new "Emergency Motion Request Form" procedure was fundamentally flawed as it allowed judicial determinations affecting parties' rights based solely on one-sided evidence without opportunity for the responding party to be heard.

The appellant appealed his guilty pleas to operation of a vehicle while disqualified and obstruction of an officer, as well as his sentence of 18 months in custody.

The appellant sought to strike his plea on the basis that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for allowing the conviction appeal, noting that the appellant acknowledged understanding the Crown's position and the consequences during the plea inquiry, and provided no fresh evidence to support his claim.

The court also found no error in the sentence, given the appellant's twenty prior similar convictions.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal the sentence was allowed but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellants appealed a peace bond order issued under section 810 of the Criminal Code requiring them to enter into a recognizance.

The respondent had alleged the appellants engaged in various unlawful acts threatening his family's safety and property, including leaving fires unattended, cutting trees, building an illegal dock, burying garbage, setting up a shooting range, and carrying weapons in a threatening manner.

The appellants denied these allegations.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal and quashed the peace bond, finding that the justice of the peace's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The justice of the peace failed to explain why she preferred the respondent's evidence over the appellants' evidence on key disputed points, particularly regarding the nature and dangerousness of the appellants' conduct.

The applicant law firm brought a motion seeking a declaration that the respondent abandoned her motion to challenge the retainer agreement in an assessment proceeding concerning unpaid legal fees.

The respondent served a notice of motion in May 2023 but failed to file it with the court or book a hearing date for over two years, despite repeated follow-up communications from the applicant.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct was deleterious, she did not demonstrate an intention to abandon the motion.

The court granted the respondent a final opportunity to file and serve her motion record with a return date by November 21, 2025, with the warning that failure to do so would result in the motion being deemed abandoned.

The court awarded costs of $12,000 to the applicant.