Sean Lawler

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to set aside a judgment obtained by the plaintiff litigation lender.

The judgment had been granted based on Minutes of Settlement executed by the parties after the defendants defaulted on a settlement agreement.

The defendant argued the judgment was incorrect, failed to acknowledge past payments, and was obtained using forged affidavits of service.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the judgment was a consent judgment, not a default judgment, and the defendant failed to establish any valid grounds such as fraud or mistake to set aside the underlying agreement.

The court also noted the defendant's significant delay in bringing the motion.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her husband's children and the lawyers who acted for him in prior divorce proceedings, alleging conspiracy, abuse of process, and other torts.

The defendants moved to strike or dismiss the claims under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the claims against the adverse lawyers, finding no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff.

The court also dismissed the tort claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, and intentional interference with economic relations as an abuse of process by relitigation, as they sought to undermine the final settlement reached in the divorce proceedings.

The defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering claims were struck with leave to amend.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant lawyer for professional negligence after a previous court decision set aside the transfer of an elderly man's home to the plaintiffs due to their undue influence.

The defendant lawyer admitted he breached the standard of care by failing to ensure the elderly man had separate legal representation.

However, the court dismissed the action, finding that the lawyer's breach did not cause the plaintiffs' damages, as independent legal advice would have simply prevented the fraudulent transaction from occurring in the first place.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing a fraudulent conveyance and knowing assistance action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action arose from efforts to enforce a substantial divorce judgment where assets were allegedly transferred through corporate structures to defeat execution.

The court held that the material facts underlying the claims were not discoverable until an equitable receiver, appointed in aid of execution, obtained corporate records in 2010 that had previously been withheld.

The action commenced in 2012 was therefore within the limitation period.

The court also ruled that the defendant named as estate trustee of a deceased individual was not in fact the estate trustee but appointed her as litigation administrator of the estate under Rule 9.03(2).

The applicants obtained a $1.5 million judgment against the respondent and sought to enforce a $350,000 mortgage he had placed on a property to secure the debt.

The respondent held the property as an estate trustee for his mother's estate, with himself and his two brothers as equal beneficiaries.

One brother brought a counter-application claiming sole ownership of the property based on an oral agreement with their late mother.

The court dismissed the counter-application, finding the oral agreement void under the Statute of Frauds and that the property interests had vested in the three brothers.

The court held the mortgage was valid but only enforceable against the respondent's one-third interest in the property, and granted the applicants the right to seek partition and sale.