Superior Court of Justice

The applicant step-father sought costs following a successful motion to resume contact with the child.

He sought full recovery costs of $26,570.27 based on an offer to settle.

The respondent mother argued for reduced costs due to partial success, financial hardship, and trauma-based motivations.

The court found the applicant was entirely successful on the core issue of resuming contact and that his costs were proportional.

The court fixed costs at $20,000, to be paid at a rate of $200 per month set off against the applicant's ongoing child support obligations.

A class member brought an unopposed motion to extend the opt-out period in a certified class action regarding the alleged use of surveillance cameras at a medical clinic.

The class member had always intended to pursue an individual action and had commenced one prior to the certification of the class proceeding, but failed to submit an opt-out form by the deadline.

The court granted the motion, noting its jurisdiction to extend the time for opting out to preserve the legal rights of those wishing to exercise them outside the class action.

The moving party requested an urgent Case Conference but filed a 16-page, single-spaced brief with improper attachments, breaching the Practice Direction.

The court refused to proceed with the conference on the documents filed, emphasizing that counsel must follow the Rules and Practice Directions and that chronic inattention to them is unacceptable.

The matter was adjourned to allow for the filing of corrected briefs.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a corporate entity that had ceased operations and had no assets.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing impecuniosity and that its claim for breach of contract had a high probability of success.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to meet the high evidentiary threshold to prove impecuniosity, as it did not provide sufficient evidence regarding the financial ability of its shareholders to fund the litigation.

The court also found the merits of the claim to be a neutral factor.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post $85,000 in security for costs, payable in four installments.

The defendant daughter brought a motion to discharge certificates of pending litigation (CPL) registered against two properties by the plaintiff father.

The father had obtained the CPL on an ex parte motion, claiming beneficial ownership of a condo registered in the daughter's name, the proceeds of which were allegedly used to purchase the properties.

The court found that while the father had a reasonable claim to an interest in land, he failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts on the ex parte motion, including the source of the down payment and a letter stating the funds were a gift.

Balancing the equities, including the non-disclosure and the availability of damages as a remedy, the court discharged the CPL without security.

The applicant developer sought to enforce a cost sharing provision in a 1975 subdivision agreement against the respondent municipality, arguing the municipality was required to collect a proportionate share of servicing costs from a new adjacent development.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the cost sharing obligation was only triggered if the new development connected to or benefited from the installed services, which it did not.

The court also dismissed the applicant's alternative claim for unjust enrichment, holding that the subdivision agreement provided a juristic reason for the municipality's benefit.

The applicant father commenced family law proceedings but failed to take any steps to move the matter forward.

The respondent mother was granted leave to proceed by way of an uncontested trial.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and the ability to travel without the father's consent.

The father was ordered to pay ongoing child support, arrears for section 7 expenses, and a proportionate share of prospective section 7 expenses.

A divorce was also granted.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss the respondent's appeal for delay, and the respondent brought a cross-motion to extend the time to perfect her appeal.

The respondent was appealing a summary judgment order that found the child in need of protection, placed the child in extended society care, and denied her access.

The court applied the test for extending time to perfect an appeal and found that the respondent provided no explanation for the delay, there was prejudice to the child in further delay, and the evidentiary record supported the motion judge's conclusions.

The respondent's motion to extend time was dismissed, and the applicant's motion to dismiss the appeal for delay was granted.

The applicant sought leave to bring an application for judicial review of an adjudicator's interim determination under the Construction Act, which ordered him to pay the respondent contractor $119,314.

The applicant argued the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction because the contract had been terminated and thus 'ceased to exist', and that the adjudication conflicted with an existing lien action where security had been posted.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that a terminated contract does not 'cease to exist' for the purposes of the Act, the jurisdictional issue was not raised before the adjudicator, and the Act expressly permits concurrent adjudication and lien proceedings.

The applicant, Cash Cloud Inc., sought an urgent interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent, BitAccess Inc., from terminating a Master Purchase Agreement, deactivating cloud-based software used for cryptocurrency kiosks, and deleting customer data.

The court found it had jurisdiction to grant interim relief despite a mandatory arbitration clause.

The court granted a 60-day order preserving the customer data to allow the applicant to download it.

However, the court dismissed the injunction to restrain the software deactivation because the applicant failed to provide the mandatory undertaking as to damages required by Rule 40.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The accused, having been convicted of drug trafficking offences, applied to reopen his trial prior to sentencing to adduce fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence related to findings in a separate proceeding that a police officer had deliberately misled another officer to obtain search warrants.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The court concluded that the application was an attempt to reverse a tactical decision made by defence counsel at trial, who had chosen to challenge a different warrant rather than pursue the missing video evidence.

The third party, Onward, moved to permanently stay the main action based on a release containing a no-claims-over clause that the plaintiff had signed in its favour.

The defendant, Enercare, had commenced a third-party claim against Onward for contribution and indemnity.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had expressly waived its right to recover any damages attributable to Onward's fault in its amended statement of claim.

Applying the principle from Taylor v. Canada, the court held that this waiver eliminated any viable claim-over by Enercare against Onward, meaning the main action was not a prohibited proceeding under the release.

The mother was previously found in contempt of court for breaching parenting orders and alienating the child from the father.

At the penalty hearing, the court found the mother had not purged her contempt and continued to act unilaterally.

The court declined to change the child's primary residence or impose a jail sentence, finding a motion to change was the appropriate vehicle for custody issues.

Instead, the court ordered the mother to pay a $2,000 fine, reimburse the father $4,725 for reunification counselling, complete a high-conflict parenting course, and pay full indemnity costs of $16,314.38.

The applicant sought an equitable remedy to allocate the payment of a mortgage and a costs award from the proceeds of sale of a property (Osprey) that had been fraudulently conveyed to her, rather than from an adjacent lot.

The respondent university, a judgment creditor of the applicant's former partner, opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that previous court orders had nullified the applicant's interest in Osprey and granted the university enforcement rights against it.

The court also held that the mortgagee was entitled to pursue its remedy against the adjacent lot, and that the equitable doctrine of marshalling would have compelled this result to protect the university's unsecured interest.

The moving party was successful on a motion to compel the estate trustee to pass accounts and sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The estate trustee argued that costs should be deferred or reduced due to unresolved issues in the main application, including whether there would be sufficient residue to pay legacies.

The court found that while the moving party was entitled to costs, the determination of the scale, amount, and who should pay (the estate or the trustee personally) was best deferred to the judge hearing the main application.

Following a motion to strike where success was equally divided, the parties submitted written arguments on costs.

The moving parties had successfully struck personal claims against the individual defendants but failed to strike the oppression remedy claim.

The responding party had to amend its pleadings to save the oppression claim.

The court found neither party was substantially successful and fixed costs at $40,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable in the cause.

Following a motion to strike where personal claims against the individual defendants were struck but the oppression remedy claim survived, the court held a case management conference to settle the terms of the order.

The court issued a file direction settling the order and providing procedural directions for the delivery of a fresh as amended statement of claim, subsequent pleadings, and discovery.

Following a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal where the plaintiff was awarded $149,662.50 in damages, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought full indemnity costs or, alternatively, partial indemnity to the date of a Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The court rejected full indemnity costs as the defendant's conduct in the litigation was not reprehensible.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff costs on a blended scale totalling $38,156.25 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the plaintiff's efficient use of a single senior lawyer compared to the defendant's heavily staffed file.

The plaintiffs initiated a class action against numerous governmental and international entities, including Pope Francis and Queen Elizabeth II, alleging harms from COVID-19 protocols and constitutional infringements.

Several defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the statement of claim to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to its rambling nature, irrelevant historical allegations, and lack of specific legal basis for claims.

The action was dismissed in its entirety against all defendants, with no costs awarded.

The children's aid society brought a status review application seeking to place a four-year-old child in Extended Society Care.

The child had been in care for over two years due to the mother's severe substance abuse and unstable lifestyle.

Although the mother had made significant progress in addressing her addiction and mental health issues over the past year, the court found she was not yet capable of parenting the child unsupervised on a full-time basis.

Given the child's need for permanency, the court ordered Extended Society Care but granted ongoing access, designating both the mother and the child as access holders.