Superior Court of Justice

The offender was found guilty of multiple drug trafficking offences, including possession of 21 kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court rejected the offender's argument that he believed the fentanyl was cocaine, finding he was operating a high-level commercial enterprise.

Weighing the severe aggravating factors of the quantity and nature of the drugs against mitigating factors including restrictive bail conditions and pandemic-related pre-trial custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years, reduced to 14 years and 9.5 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The respondent father brought a motion to have the applicant removed as trustee of his deceased partner's life insurance policy, which was intended for the benefit of their children.

The applicant and her former counsel, who had been previously removed from the record for a conflict of interest, engaged in obstructive behavior and ongoing litigation against the respondent.

The court found that the applicant had lost focus on the best interests of the beneficiaries and ordered her removed as trustee under the Trustee Act.

The court directed the insurance proceeds to be paid into court and administered by the Public Guardian and Trustee, and issued a non-communication order against the applicant's former counsel.

The father brought a motion to compel the mother to return to Ottawa with their two children or, alternatively, for primary residence.

The mother had relocated to Smith Falls without notice or consent, citing domestic violence and safety concerns.

The mother brought a cross-motion to remain in Smith Falls and reduce the father's parenting time.

The court found the mother was justified in moving without notice due to credible threats to her safety, exempting her from the notice requirements under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court ordered that the children's primary residence remain with the mother in Smith Falls, but dismissed the mother's request to reduce the father's weekend parenting time, maintaining the status quo.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of a $14,000,000 settlement in a medical negligence action involving a minor who suffered catastrophic brain damage.

The court approved the settlement, the allocation of damages, and the proposed contingency fees for plaintiffs' counsel, finding them fair and reasonable given the significant risks and complexity of the litigation.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for a sealing order, holding that it was contrary to the open court principle and that no compelling interest justified sealing the materials.

The plaintiff was struck by a TTC bus and awarded damages for past loss of income at trial.

The defendants brought a motion to deduct the non-earner benefits (NEBs) the plaintiff received under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule from the tort award for income loss, arguing that recent case law and legislative changes placed NEBs in the 'income loss silo'.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that it remained bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in Walker v. Ritchie, which established that NEBs compensate for loss of enjoyment of life and are not deductible from income loss awards.

The court found that obiter comments in a subsequent Court of Appeal decision did not overturn this established principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while impaired by drug, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, continuity issues with a urine sample, and improper use of compelled statements.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by treating the COVID-19 pandemic as an automatic deduction for delay without analyzing the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure.

The net delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on statements made to a Drug Recognition Evaluator without first holding a voir dire to prove voluntariness.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The plaintiff, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for a company involved in a Ponzi scheme, sought to recover $121,845.37 in payments made to the defendant in the year prior to bankruptcy.

The trustee argued these were preferential payments made while the company was insolvent.

The court found that the defendant, who was the nephew of the company's founder and worked for the company, was not dealing at arm's length with the insolvent company.

The court ordered the defendant to reimburse the full amount to the trustee.

The parents in an active child protection proceeding brought a motion to vary a temporary supervision order to permit the mother and children to relocate to Alberta to reside with the father, or alternatively, to transfer the proceeding to an Alberta court.

The father had moved to Alberta for employment after being charged with serious sexual offences involving a former foster child, which had prompted the initial supervision order requiring him to be supervised around the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father's voluntary move did not constitute a compelling change in circumstances justifying relocation prior to trial, and that the parents failed to provide evidence that the Alberta child welfare agency had been served or consented to a transfer.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and several firearms offences after shooting his long-term domestic partner in the face with a homemade firearm.

The court considered the offender's prior record for domestic violence and the devastating, permanent injuries suffered by the victim as aggravating factors, while the late guilty pleas and pandemic-related pre-sentence custody were mitigating.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years' imprisonment, reduced to 30 months net after crediting 4 years for pre-sentence custody.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for interim disbursements, the respondent sought costs of $41,598.46 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant proposed costs of $7,199 payable in the cause.

The court found the respondent's costs excessive, reduced the hours claimed, and determined that the respondent's offer to settle did not attract Rule 18 consequences.

Costs were fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable within 30 days.

The estate trustee for the deceased respondent brought a motion seeking to represent the estate in her personal capacity without legal counsel.

The court held that an estate trustee acts in a representative capacity and is therefore required by Rule 15.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to be represented by a lawyer.

The motion was dismissed, and the estate trustee was ordered to retain counsel.

The Crown applied under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code to adduce the preliminary inquiry testimony of a key witness who was deemed too ill to testify at trial due to severe mental health challenges triggered by her previous testimony.

The accused opposed the application, arguing lack of full opportunity to cross-examine and trial unfairness due to new evidence.

The court found the witness was too ill to testify, the defence had a full opportunity to cross-examine her at the preliminary inquiry, and the admission of the evidence would not render the trial unfair.

The application was granted, and the transcripts were admitted as substantive evidence.

Following a trial under the Simplified Procedure regarding a construction contract dispute, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the defendants were the more successful parties, their recovery was mitigated by their lack of success on certain counterclaims and their unwavering position that the contract was fixed-price.

The court also found that neither party's offer to settle met the strict requirements of Rule 49.10.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $47,382.86.

The plaintiff brought an unopposed motion under Rule 49.09 to enforce a settlement agreement reached in a mortgage enforcement action.

The parties had agreed to all essential terms, including a payment of $725,000 by the defendant, but the defendant and her father subsequently failed to sign the finalized documents.

The court found the settlement clear, unambiguous, and not unconscionable, and granted the motion to enforce the settlement with costs.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

He faced numerous charges including human trafficking, procuring, and breaching court orders.

The court found no errors of law in the justice of the peace's initial detention order.

Although a material change in circumstances warranted a de novo review, the court concluded the applicant failed to meet his reverse onus.

Detention was deemed necessary on the secondary ground due to a substantial likelihood of reoffending, given his history of breaching orders and lack of credibility, and on the tertiary ground due to the gravity of the offences and strength of the Crown's case.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' professional negligence action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs retained the defendant in 2011, but the defendant failed to advance the action, leading to its administrative dismissal in 2012.

The plaintiffs discovered the defendant's negligence by the summer of 2016 but delayed commencing an action until November 2019, partly to pursue a Law Society complaint.

The court held that the limitation period began to run in the summer of 2016 when the plaintiffs had a plausible inference of liability, and that pursuing a regulatory complaint did not suspend the limitation period.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Mohamad Barkhadle, who is charged with first-degree murder involving strangulation during a sexual assault.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of three prior incidents where Mr. Barkhadle allegedly choked women in sexual circumstances.

The court analyzed the admissibility of this evidence, focusing on its relevance to the nature of the actus reus, motive, and identification.

The court found a "striking similarity" in Mr. Barkhadle's "peculiar and distinctive method" of using a choke hold to overcome resistance to sexual activity, deeming it a "signature." Balancing the high probative value against the potential for moral and reasoning prejudice, the court ruled the similar fact evidence admissible.

Following a successful motion by the defendant to compel the self-represented plaintiff to attend an examination for discovery in person, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's vexatious conduct, including filing voluminous irrelevant materials and making unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and criminal conduct against counsel.

The court agreed that the plaintiff's conduct was reprehensible and unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings.

The defendant was awarded substantial indemnity costs in the amount of $9,290.97.

The child protection agency brought a motion regarding the care of two young children during an adjournment period.

The agency initially sought a supervision order placing the children with the father, but the court found that a supervision order would not adequately protect the children due to recent breaches of safety plans, domestic violence, and substance abuse concerns.

The court ordered that the children be placed in the temporary care and custody of the agency on a without prejudice basis.

The applicants, non-unionized employees of the City of Hamilton, challenged the termination provisions of the City's mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy under the Charter.

After the application was commenced, the City suspended the termination provisions indefinitely and brought a motion to dismiss the application for mootness.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed because the provisions were suspended and no applicants had suffered adverse consequences.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, citing judicial economy and the hypothetical nature of any ruling on a suspended policy.