Superior Court of Justice

The parties, who cohabited for 15 months and had one child, separated in January 2021.

The applicant sought sole decision-making, relocation, and significant child and spousal support, alleging the respondent earned $900,000 annually from drug dealing.

The court ordered joint decision-making and denied the relocation, imposing a 10km geographic restriction.

The court imputed a high income to the respondent for 2021 based on lavish spending but declined to impute illegal income prospectively, setting his 2022/2023 income at minimum wage.

The applicant's income was imputed significantly higher for 2022/2023 based on bank deposits.

Spousal support was awarded for 2021 only.

After crediting the respondent for condo carrying costs and support overpayments, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $54,472.88.

The applicants sought an assessment of the legal accounts rendered by the respondent criminal defence law firm, alleging overcharging and breach of fixed-price and maximum-price retainer agreements.

The court found no fixed-price agreement existed for the preliminary inquiry and that the firm did not overcharge under the maximum-price contract for the trial phase.

The court also held that allegations of deficient legal services were barred by issue estoppel, having been dismissed in prior criminal proceedings.

Finding no special circumstances to justify an assessment outside the statutory limitation period, the application was dismissed.

This decision provides an update on an ongoing child protection application, detailing the progress of the Durham Children's Aid Society and respondent father A.V. in implementing previous court orders regarding the child J.'s care, schooling, and counselling.

It notes less positive developments with respondent parents D.F. and C.S., including a new child's removal and potential file transfer from another jurisdiction.

The court addressed an informal request by the maternal great grandparents for party status, directing them to bring a formal motion with evidence and legal submissions.

The decision also sets out a schedule for costs submissions from A.V. against the Society and adjourns the matter for further attendance.

J.C. was found guilty after trial of two counts of sexual interference and one count of accessing child pornography.

The sexual assault counts were stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen to increase sentences for child sexual offences, imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years in custody.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the young age and vulnerability of the victims (his 2-year-old daughter and 9-year-old niece), the abuse of trust, and the location of the offences.

Mitigating factors included J.C.'s lack of criminal record, stable employment history, and community support.

The court also addressed the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for accessing child pornography, finding it unconstitutional based on R. v. John.

Ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA registration, and various prohibitions were also imposed.

The respondent mother brought a motion to set aside the child support provisions of the parties' Minutes of Settlement, or alternatively the entire agreement, alleging the applicant father failed to disclose significant assets and income.

The father consented to setting aside the child support and section 7 expenses provisions.

The court declined to set aside the entire agreement on a motion, finding genuine issues of fact regarding financial disclosure that require a trial.

The court ordered temporary child support based on the father's agreed income, leaving the issue of imputing income and retroactive support for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against its former president and sole director, alleging he engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving excessive or non-existent expenses and forged signatures.

The plaintiff relied heavily on a forensic accountant's report, but failed to provide direct evidence from individuals with knowledge of the facts underlying the accountant's assumptions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff's evidentiary record insufficient to establish that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the alleged misrepresentations and fraud.

Following the dismissal of a proposed class action regarding systemic abuse in the Canadian Hockey League, the plaintiffs brought a motion under section 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to approve a plan to transition the proceeding into multiple joinder actions.

The court reviewed the competing Section 7 Plans submitted by the plaintiffs and defendants and found both to be procedurally flawed and overreaching.

The court proposed its own Draft Section 7 Plan designed to facilitate the commencement of up to 60 joinder actions while respecting the court's jurisdictional limits and the parties' procedural rights.

The motion was adjourned to a second phase for the parties to revise and discuss the court's draft plan.

The defendants brought motions seeking to remove the plaintiffs' counsel, Julian Falconer and Falconers LLP, and for the production of portions of their file concerning advice given to plaintiff Bradley Blair regarding a complaint to the Ombudsman and a related judicial review application.

The defendants argued that counsel was a potential witness, an "unsworn witness" or had a conflict of interest based on a duty of loyalty, and that solicitor-client privilege had been waived.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no deemed waiver of privilege, no likelihood of counsel being a material witness, no "unsworn witness" concern given the nature of prior interactions, and no duty of loyalty conflict.

The appellant tenant sought a stay of an eviction order issued by the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) due to non-payment of rent.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal, considering whether there was a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience.

The court found that the appellant failed to raise a serious issue on a question of law, as her grounds of appeal primarily involved questions of fact (misapprehension of evidence, novation).

Furthermore, the appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish irreparable harm beyond the inherent loss of a home in tenancy cases.

Considering the protracted nature of the dispute and the landlord's entitlement to resolution, the court dismissed the motion for a stay, concluding that it was not in the interests of justice to grant it.

The Plaintiff sought repayment of a $100,000 loan from the Defendant.

The Defendant argued the loan was conditional on the sale of certain assembled properties and counterclaimed for $2 million in damages, alleging breach of a partnership agreement related to a land assembly project.

The court found no evidence that the loan was conditional and held it was due.

Furthermore, the court determined that no enforceable partnership agreement existed between the parties regarding the land development or sale, as essential terms were never settled or formalized in writing as intended.

The Plaintiff's action for the loan repayment was allowed, and the Defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment and to dismiss the action on the basis that the individual plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt and lacked capacity to sue or direct the corporate plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to remove the defendants' counsel, arguing he was in a conflict of interest and a potential witness.

The court dismissed the motion to remove counsel, finding no substantial risk to the administration of justice.

The court granted the motion to set aside the default judgment, noting the plaintiff failed to disclose her bankruptcy when obtaining it.

Finally, the court dismissed the action as a nullity and an abuse of process, as an undischarged bankrupt cannot commence an action or act as a corporate director under the Business Corporations Act.

Roger Foley, the plaintiff, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to disqualify Neil Searles as counsel for the Centre for Independent Living in Toronto (CILT).

Foley alleged conflict of interest, divided loyalty, and that Searles would be a necessary witness due to a 1996 article he authored on physician-assisted suicide.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the motion as frivolous or vexatious.

The court found the motion frivolous, noting that CILT opposed the removal of its counsel, that accepting a binding Supreme Court decision (Carter) is not a basis for disqualification, and that Foley's attempt to call Searles as a witness was unlikely to be permitted at trial.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Cary Beazley, sued 27 physicians and Queensway Carleton Hospital for medical malpractice, alleging delayed diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease.

Three motions for summary judgment were heard: one by the defendant physicians, one by the Hospital, and a cross-motion by the plaintiff seeking a finding of liability in his favour.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against all defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide admissible expert evidence to support his claims in negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to file a second expert affidavit and to be qualified as an expert.

A 17-year-old student, Josh Alexander, sought to appeal suspension and exclusion decisions by his school principal to the Renfrew County Catholic District School Board.

The Education Act requires a parent or guardian to appeal for a student of his age unless the student has withdrawn from parental control.

Josh asserted he had withdrawn from parental control, a position supported by his parents, but the School Board refused him standing, citing insufficient objective evidence.

The court found that Josh Alexander had indeed withdrawn from parental control as of December 22, 2022, and therefore had the necessary standing to advance his appeals to the School Board.

The decision clarified that financial independence is not a prerequisite for withdrawal from parental control, especially when parents voluntarily continue to support their independent adult children.

The defendant, Zhu Xi Shen, applied for judicial interim release following his conviction for sexual assault, after his initial bail was vacated due to flight risk concerns.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, including a new release plan with an additional residential surety, a significant increase in the pledged bail amount, and the proposed use of ankle monitoring.

The defendant also intended to bring a Charter application to reopen the trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that despite the enhanced release plan, the defendant remained a significant flight risk due to the serious nature of the offence, the lengthy sentence sought by the Crown, his means to abscond, and the limitations of electronic monitoring in preventing flight.

Following a successful cross-motion by the respondent mother in a family law proceeding, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found the applicant father's litigation conduct to be unreasonable and abusive, justifying costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

After reducing the claimed amount due to duplication of work by the mother's counsel, the court awarded the mother $17,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused during the examination for discovery of the defendant Rosy Moses.

The underlying litigation involves a family dispute over the ownership and control of corporate entities, with claims based on proprietary estoppel.

The motion addressed the relevance of questions concerning Rosy Moses's testamentary intentions, the production of accountant and will drafting files, and transfers of assets to Rachel Moses.

A significant portion of the motion also dealt with the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document.

The court ruled on the relevance of various questions, compelling some answers related to asset equalization and family dynamics, while upholding refusals for others, particularly those concerning inadvertently disclosed privileged documents.

The court found a mixed success rate for both parties and ordered no costs.

The moving defendants sought an order staying the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process due to the plaintiff's alleged failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with other defendants (Catlin Canada Inc., The Regional Municipality of York, and The Regional Municipality of Durham).

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for leave to amend its Statement of Claim to reflect the settlement and limit claims against non-settling defendants to their several share of liability.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, finding that the partial settlement did not entirely change the litigation landscape in a way that significantly altered the dynamics, and that the disclosure made was sufficient given the circumstances.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to amend was granted.

The applicants sought a declaration that a residential property transferred by their late mother/grandmother to three of her children was held in trust for the benefit of other family members.

The respondents claimed the transfer was a gift.

The court found that the applicants' claim for an oral inter vivos trust failed because it violated the writing requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

However, the court held that the respondents failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust arising from the gratuitous transfer.

Consequently, the property was declared to be held in resulting trust for the deceased's estate.

Claims for partition and sale and for passing of accounts were dismissed.

Two actions arose from a construction project where Kelson subcontracted Amar for sheet metal work, and Amar sub-subcontracted Sjostrom for labour.

Sjostrom walked off the job due to non-payment by Amar.

Kelson then directly engaged Sjostrom to complete the work and issued a change order reducing Amar's contract price.

Sjostrom claimed unpaid amounts from Kelson, while Amar claimed the unpaid balance of its subcontract.

The court found that Kelson and Sjostrom formed a direct oral contract, but Sjostrom failed to prove its claimed hours and its action was dismissed.

The court also found that the change order removed the remaining labour from Amar's scope of work, and Kelson breached its subcontract with Amar by non-payment.

Amar was awarded $209,737.88.