Superior Court of Justice

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought a stay of proceedings due to a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

While both the Crown and defence contributed to the delay through inaction, the court found the Crown bore a higher onus to ensure the case stayed on track, especially after preferring a direct indictment.

Despite the defence's failure to bring the application in a timely manner, the court attributed the greater portion of the delay to the Crown, finding the ceiling breached, and reluctantly stayed the proceedings.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal and stay of proceedings against the respondent, Michael Lemieux, who was charged with assaulting a police officer.

The trial judge had acquitted Lemieux, finding doubt regarding his intent (reflexive action) and, alternatively, applying the doctrine of *de minimis non curat lex*.

The Crown also appealed the trial judge's findings on Charter violations.

The appellate court found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the police vehicle's location and erred in applying *de minimis non curat lex*.

However, these legal errors were deemed not to have impacted the trial judge's fundamental doubt about the respondent's intent for assault.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the acquittal.

The appellate court declined to review the Charter findings due to the trial judge's unclear factual findings.

The corporate defendant, Medical Respiratory Care Inc. (MRC), brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike the action against it, arguing the Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action due to "conjunctive-disjunctive" pleading regarding the contract parties (Mr. Tiltack and/or MRC).

The plaintiff argued there was a live issue as to who the contracting party was.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the pleadings were not flawed given the ambiguity of the contract parties and that the motion was tactical.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking an interim order to change the primary residence and school of her eight-year-old son, Nathan, from the father to her.

This motion was brought despite a 10-day trial on the same issue being scheduled in three months.

The child had been primarily residing with the father for two years following serious mental health issues in the mother's household.

The mother argued the father engaged in "self-help" by not returning the child and sought to rely on certain factual findings from an OCL report.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding insufficient compelling evidence to justify disrupting the two-year status quo, especially given the imminent trial where all evidence could be fully tested.

The decision emphasized the child's need for stability and the importance of maintaining a successful status quo in interim parenting orders.

The Tenant (Augusta Studios Inc.) brought an application seeking declarations that its commercial lease was not properly terminated by the Landlord (8699011 Canada Inc.), that the lease was in effect until July 31, 2027, and that it was not in default.

The Landlord alleged breaches related to subletting the second floor without consent and subletting the basement, which it claimed was not part of the leased premises.

The court found that the basement was included in the lease, consent was not required for the second-floor sublease, and the Landlord failed to provide proper notice of default.

The court concluded the Landlord's termination was unlawful and granted the Tenant the declarations sought, also stating that relief from forfeiture would be granted if the Tenant were found in breach.

The plaintiff brought a consent motion to certify a class proceeding against Haventree Bank for settlement purposes.

The action alleged that the bank breached legislation and contract terms by automatically renewing mortgages at higher interest rates, leading to additional costs for class members.

The court granted the certification, finding that all criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met, including disclosure of a cause of action, an identifiable class, common issues, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, especially in the context of a settlement.

The court also approved the notice plan and the appointment of a Claims Administrator.

Lugano View Limited (owner) brought a motion to lift a consent stay order and dismiss a lien action by Bank-Strox Renovation Inc. (general contractor) for delay, under section 47 of the old Construction Act.

The parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute after the lien action commenced, leading to a stay of the action, but the arbitration did not proceed for several years.

The court dismissed Lugano's motion, finding that in an arbitration agreed upon after a civil action, both parties bear responsibility for advancing the arbitration, especially the defendant who has not pleaded.

Lugano failed to explain its own inaction, including not seeking court intervention to appoint an arbitrator under section 10 of the Arbitration Act.

The court found no evidence of actual prejudice to Lugano or that a fair hearing could not take place, despite the delay.

The court also criticized Bank-Strox's conduct but maintained its decision.

The plaintiff brought an action against a police officer and the police services board for intrusion upon seclusion, harassment, and bullying.

The officer, who was the ex-spouse of the plaintiff's boyfriend, had conducted brief, unauthorized searches of the plaintiff's name in a police database for personal reasons.

The court dismissed the intrusion upon seclusion claim, finding the searches were a minimal invasion of privacy that a reasonable person would not consider highly offensive.

The court also dismissed the harassment claims, concluding the officer's communications were not outrageous or threatening, and found no basis for vicarious liability against the police services board.

The plaintiff developer entered into agreements of purchase and sale with the defendant for commercial properties, which included a mutual lease condition for a leaseback arrangement.

As the condition deadline approached, the defendant assured the plaintiff it would continue negotiating the leases but secretly sought board approval to sell the properties to a third party.

The defendant then terminated the agreements.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of good faith and honest performance, and was liable for negligent misrepresentation.

Applying promissory estoppel, the court held the defendant could not rely on its strict contractual rights to terminate.

The plaintiff was awarded $15.5 million in damages for lost profits.

The appellant, D.K.S., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellate court found that the trial judge made material errors in assessing the complainant's evidence, specifically regarding a significant inconsistency in her testimony about the duration of the alleged touching, and misapprehended evidence from a defence witness regarding the complainant's time outside the building.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to apply proper care when assessing the appellant's credibility, given his language difficulties, and erroneously discounted his good character evidence.

The offender was found guilty of trafficking fentanyl and cocaine in association with a criminal organization.

The offender directed lower-level members, including youth, to transport and sell drugs in a vulnerable northern community.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of targeting a vulnerable population and involving youth against mitigating factors including harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and the offender's background.

The court imposed a total sentence of 13 years imprisonment, with an order that half the sentence on the criminal organization count be served before parole eligibility.

The appellant appealed a sentence for impaired driving, arguing the sentencing judge erred by departing from a joint submission.

The original sentence was a 6-month conditional sentence and a 12-month driving prohibition, while the joint submission proposed a $2000 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge applied the incorrect "fitness test" instead of the "public interest" test from R. v. Anthony-Cook for rejecting joint submissions.

The court determined that the joint submission was not "so unhinged" as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering mitigating factors like an early plea, lack of prior record, and the importance of certainty in resolutions.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to the originally proposed $2000 fine and 12-month driving prohibition.

This endorsement concerns the penalty phase of a civil contempt hearing.

The respondent, Vijai Ramkisson, was found in contempt for repeatedly refusing to attend an examination in aid of execution.

Despite having purged his contempt by eventually attending the examination and paying the judgment amount, the court found a need for denunciation and deterrence due to the blatant, deliberate, and wilful nature of his disobedience.

The applicants sought a fine of no less than $5000 and substantial indemnity costs.

The court imposed a fine of $2500 and awarded substantial indemnity costs of $27,500, emphasizing that a contemnor cannot unilaterally decide to disobey a court order.

The Applicant sought an order extending the deadline to apply for an openness order under s. 196(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, relying on the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.

The motion was brought due to a procedural error where the application was served but not issued within the statutory 30-day limit.

The Children's Aid Society consented, while the Office of the Children's Lawyer did not oppose the exercise of parens patriae but required the legal test to be met.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no unintentional legislative gap in the Act and concluding that exercising parens patriae jurisdiction was not necessary to protect the child's best interests, as the child had already filed their own timely openness application.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to section 14 of the Security of Information Act, which criminalizes the unauthorized communication of special operational information by persons permanently bound to secrecy.

The challenge argued that the term "without authority" was unconstitutionally vague, violating section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the term was not vague when interpreted in its statutory context, particularly for the specific class of individuals to whom it applies.

It clarified that "without authority" pertains to the actus reus of the offence, meaning the power or right to act, derived from one's official position or a superior's grant of authority.

The defendants, Liquor Control Board of Ontario and Trillium Supply Chain Inc., brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for disclosing no cause of action and being frivolous/vexatious.

The plaintiff, 1923968 Ontario Ltd. o/a as Phyxiat Courier, opposed the motion.

The court largely dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the claim pleaded sufficient facts to establish proximity and a duty of care for negligence, and disclosed a germ of a claim for conspiracy and intentional interference with contractual relations.

However, the court struck certain paragraphs related to allegations against the Ontario government and overly broad negligence claims, granting the plaintiff leave to amend.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, brought a motion to re-open a pre-trial Charter application, seeking to exclude evidence of his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The basis for the motion was an alleged material change in circumstances, specifically that the arresting officer, PC Shannon Swiderski, had embellished her testimony at trial regarding the odour of alcohol, thereby undermining her credibility and the lawfulness of the initial arrest and subsequent breath demand.

The court found that while the officer's trial testimony was indeed an embellishment, it did not constitute a material change that would have likely altered the original finding that she had honest, subjective, and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

Consequently, the motion to re-open the Charter application was dismissed.

The respondent corporation, through its self-represented principal, brought a motion seeking the recusal of the judge for bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias, or alternatively, an adjournment of the reference ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The motion was based on the judge's conduct during the trial of an issue, including an inquiry into whether the principal had complied with a production order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of bias and that the production order and subsequent inquiries were justified.

The court then proceeded with the reference, finding that the respondent owed the applicant $354,197.58 from the proceeds of the sale of her property.

The Carp Agricultural Society (CAS) revoked Laurie Dillon's membership, alleging conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty related to her family's involvement in the sale of an estate property where CAS was a beneficiary.

Dillon sought an order to nullify the decision and reinstate her membership.

CAS brought a cross-application to declare breaches of duty.

The court found that the CAS Board breached natural justice rules in its investigation and decision-making process, including procedural flaws and lack of proper reasons.

The court also determined that Dillon was not in a conflict of interest as defined by the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, nor did she breach her fiduciary duties, as the transactions did not involve the CAS directly but rather the Estate Trustee.

The court set aside the revocation of membership and dismissed the CAS's cross-application.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action served new expert reports very late, just prior to the third scheduled trial date.

The defendants objected to their admissibility due to non-compliance with the court-ordered timetable and the inability to secure responding reports.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for the delay unreasonable, noting the issue of potential conflict with the original experts (retained through a company owned by the former solicitor's husband) was known since 2016 and highlighted by a recent mistrial decision.

The judge deemed the late reports presumptively inadmissible but deferred the final determination of admissibility to the trial judge.