Ontario Court of Justice - Summary Conviction Offences - SCJ

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an over-80 charge after the trial judge excluded breathalyzer readings based on multiple alleged s. 10(b) Charter breaches.

The appeal court held that the right to counsel was temporarily suspended during the roadside screening stage, rejected findings of pre-ASD and re-consultation breaches, and found that only a 16-minute post-arrest delay in re-reading the right to counsel remained.

Applying the Grant framework afresh, the court concluded that the single informational breach did not warrant exclusion of highly reliable breath evidence.

The acquittal was set aside, a conviction was entered on the over-80 count, and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed.

The appellant appealed a 20-year driving prohibition imposed in 2009 following guilty pleas to care and control over 80mg and breach of probation.

The appellant had an extensive record of drinking and driving offences spanning over 40 years.

The appeal was brought over five years after sentencing.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no palpable or overriding error by the sentencing judge, noting the appellant's record and the fact that he had been convicted of another impaired driving offence in 2014 while the appeal was pending.

The appeal was dismissed.

Summary conviction appeal from an impaired driving conviction under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the investigating officer arbitrarily detained him and unlawfully searched him when the officer stopped his vehicle while looking for another individual suspected of trespass and driving under suspension.

The appeal court held the officer had articulable cause and reasonable grounds to detain and question the driver based on the specific location, vehicle description, and surrounding circumstances, and that the subsequent arrest for impaired driving was supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

No breach of ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter was established, and the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) in any event.

Summary conviction appeal arising from a road rage incident involving convictions for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in the findings of guilt and in refusing to stay the charges after finding a s. 7 Charter breach based on excessive force by an off-duty police officer.

The appeal court held that the trial judge misstated and misapplied the W.(D.) framework and failed to properly address the Crown's burden to disprove self-defence on the assault count.

Because the appellant's roadside state of mind was linked to the driving conduct, the court ordered a new trial on both counts rather than a limited retrial.

The stay issue was left to the trial judge if the Crown proceeds on the new trial.

On a summary conviction sentence appeal arising from a road rage assault, the appellant challenged a no-weapons probation condition and a five-year firearms prohibition imposed after a conditional discharge.

The court admitted fresh evidence concerning the appellant’s competitive shooting activities, firearm ownership, training, and post-sentence completion of anger management, applying the Palmer framework flexibly in the interests of justice.

The court held the sentencing judge applied the proper public safety test under s. 110 of the Criminal Code and that both the probation term and firearms prohibition remained reasonable despite the fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, except that the appellant was given 30 days to lawfully transfer or surrender firearms and ammunition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding the standard of proof for a s. 8 Charter breach, the lawfulness of the police officer entering his driveway, the timing of the breath tests, and the failure to find arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer was lawfully on the driveway under an implied invitation, the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and although the trial judge erred in inferring the reasons for the appellant's continued detention, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence.

The appellant contended the trial judge gave insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding the officers' reasonable grounds for the breath demand, and erred in the section 24(2) analysis.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officers had reasonable grounds based on the appellant's driving, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding his alcohol consumption and in finding that the roadside screening demand was made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also held that the 13-minute delay for the arrival of the screening device was reasonable, and even if a section 10(b) Charter breach occurred, the breath sample evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2).

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest him for impaired driving and make a breath demand, asserting the officer only had a suspicion.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officer's observations of the appellant's driving, behaviour, and physical symptoms provided an objectively reasonable basis to believe his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were breached during a traffic stop.

The trial judge had found the evidence of the appellant and the arresting officer equally credible, concluding the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to find both witnesses equally credible, provided sufficient reasons for her decision, and made findings of fact supported by the evidence.