Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

This document indicates that the reasons for the decision in R. v. Lahens, 2024 ONSC 3610, are not available at this time.

Therefore, the specific nature of the proceedings (e.g., trial, sentencing, appeal) and the outcome cannot be determined from the provided content.

The full reasons for this decision are not available at this time.

This entry serves as a placeholder for a future release of the judgment.

This record indicates a case file for R. v. Blake, but the full reasons for the decision are not available at this time.

This sentencing decision addresses whether "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-trial custody conditions can reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum, specifically for robbery with a firearm.

The court found that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. Hilbach* undermined the rationale for applying Duncan credit to reduce mandatory minimum sentences.

The court distinguished Duncan credit as a mitigating factor from "Summers credit" (statutory pre-sentence custody credit), concluding that mitigating factors cannot reduce a sentence below a constitutional mandatory minimum.

The defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years imprisonment for robbery with a firearm, with credit for pre-trial custody.

Police executed a search warrant using a "hard entry" at the defendant's home, seizing cocaine, phenacetin, and cash.

The defendant applied to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure due to hard entry) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found a serious s. 8 breach due to the officer's lack of understanding of the knock-and-announce rule and arbitrary decision-making.

The s. 10(b) breach was not found.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court excluded the evidence, leading to the defendant's acquittal on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The defendant, Enrique Humberto Martinez-Reynosa, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on a sexual assault count at the close of the Crown's case.

The defence argued insufficient circumstantial evidence of lack of consent or capacity to consent.

The Crown contended the evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the complainant's prior disinterest in the accused, her high level of intoxication leading to a blackout, her post-event confusion and distress, and the accused's own statements, to allow the jury to consider the count.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The applicant, Terrell Als, sought a stay of charges under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The total time from arrest to the scheduled completion of trial was 1505 days, exceeding the 910-day presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing significant portions to defence delay (due to change of counsel and counsel's calendar unavailability) and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 court closures, Crown counsel's family emergency, and unforeseen judicial unavailability).

The court found that the Crown and court made reasonable efforts to mitigate delays.

Ultimately, the application was dismissed, as the net delay, after accounting for defence delay and exceptional circumstances, did not exceed the Jordan threshold.

The applicant, J.P., sought a stay of criminal proceedings due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

This was a retrial after a previous stay was overturned on appeal.

The court found that the constitutional clock reset to zero upon remittance from the Court of Appeal, and the 30-month Jordan ceiling applied.

Despite the net delay being below the ceiling, the court conducted a contextual analysis, finding that the Crown's inconsistent positions and failures regarding disclosure of the applicant's cellphone caused significant and unreasonable delay, necessitating the defence to bring additional applications.

The court concluded that the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, while the Crown did not, leading to the delay markedly exceeding what was reasonable.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused was tried on a 5-count indictment involving his former intimate partner, including charges of sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, intimidation, and breach of probation.

The court applied the W.(D.) test to assess credibility, finding the accused's evidence unreliable and contrived.

While the court acquitted the accused of sexual assault due to reasonable doubt arising from inconsistencies and lack of detail in the complainant's evidence, it convicted him on the remaining counts.

The court found the accused frequently physically assaulted the complainant, engaged in threatening conduct that reasonably caused her fear, and attempted to intimidate her by threatening to call immigration authorities to have her deported.

The Crown brought an application to designate the respondent a Dangerous Offender following his conviction for aggravated assault.

The respondent had brutally attacked the victim with a hammer, causing catastrophic and permanent injuries.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, history of substance abuse, and diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and delusional disorder.

Applying the two-stage framework, the court found the respondent met the criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation due to his intractable pattern of violent behaviour.

Concluding there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, the court imposed an indeterminate penitentiary sentence.

The offender was sentenced for multiple offences, including aggravated assault and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, after trespassing on the victim's property and repeatedly attacking him with an ATV.

The unprovoked attack left the victim with catastrophic, life-altering injuries, including a traumatic brain injury.

Considering the offender's extensive criminal record and the devastating impact on the victim, the court imposed a total sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, along with a 15-year driving prohibition and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The appellant, a massage therapist, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a client.

He argued the trial judge erred by not considering the defence of accident, by drawing a negative credibility inference from his failure to ask about the allegations when confronted by the complainant's husband, and by dismissing the husband's evidence as irrelevant to the extortion theory.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of accident, that the credibility findings were reasonable, and that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the extortion theory.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The offender, a transgender refugee claimant from Guatemala, was convicted of arson causing damage to property after setting a fire in her Toronto Community Housing apartment.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while the defence sought a sentence of six months less a day to preserve the offender's right to appeal a potential deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court held that while collateral immigration consequences must be considered, they cannot artificially skew a sentence below the appropriate range.

The court imposed a 12-month sentence (satisfied by pre-sentence custody), two years of probation, and a restitution order of $15,809.11.

The applicant was charged with possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a traffic stop.

The police stopped the taxi the applicant was in while responding to a 911 gun call.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention under s. 9 and unreasonable search under s. 8.

The court found the investigative detention and initial pat-down search were lawful.

However, the subsequent search of the applicant's knapsack in the vehicle violated s. 8, as immediate safety concerns had been alleviated.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court admitted the drug evidence, finding the police acted in good faith and society's interest favoured admission.

The accused, Nicholas Goodchild, brought an application to sever Count 1 (aggravated sexual assault involving complainant Lindsay Glass) from the indictment, which also included three other counts of aggravated sexual assault.

The court considered factors from R. v. Last, including prejudice to the accused, factual and legal nexus, complexity of evidence, similar fact evidence, multiplicity of proceedings, inconsistent verdicts, length of trial, right to be tried within a reasonable time, and the accused's intention to testify.

Despite some factors favouring a joint trial (e.g., multiplicity of proceedings), the court found that the unique facts and potential legal defence related to Count 1, coupled with the accused's intention to testify only on that count and his waiver of his s. 11(b) rights, cumulatively favoured severance.

The application to sever Count 1 was granted.

The applicant, charged with drug offences in two separate cases, applied for the release of seized funds to pay for his legal defence under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded he was denied legal aid, had no other means, and owned the seized funds, but argued the cases were not complex enough to warrant two lawyers at private rates.

The court found the second case, involving multiple confidential informants, was sufficiently complex to justify two lawyers (a senior and a junior) and approved the requested hourly rates of $400 and $200.

The court ordered the release of $250,000 from the seized funds to cover legal expenses for both cases.

During a criminal jury trial for assault causing bodily harm, the Crown brought an application to admit part of a witness’s prior written statement under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness had prepared a statement within days of the incident but, at trial nearly three years later, lacked present memory of the accused’s detailed participation in the assault.

The court applied the criteria articulated in appellate jurisprudence requiring a reliable record, timeliness, absence of current memory, and the witness’s present confirmation of the statement’s accuracy.

Finding that the witness personally prepared the statement shortly after the event, had been sober, and vouched for its accuracy despite memory loss at trial, the court held the evidentiary requirements were satisfied.

The probative value of the statement was found to outweigh any prejudice, which could be mitigated through jury instructions and cross‑examination.