Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused was charged with extortion, simple assault, and aggravated assault against a vulnerable complainant with schizophrenia.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the complainant's eyewitness identification of the accused as the perpetrator, a man who regularly attended his apartment.

The defence argued mistaken identity, presenting evidence that the accused was known by a different name and that another man matching the description existed.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant's identification unreliable due to substance use, inconsistencies, and cross-racial identification frailties.

The court also noted a failure by police to investigate an alternative suspect linked to DNA at the scene.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The offender, a 23-year-old first-time offender, was found guilty of possession of a loaded restricted firearm, careless storage of ammunition, and possession of fentanyl and crack cocaine.

The court considered the offender's background, including the impact of systemic anti-black racism, his positive rehabilitative steps, and his lengthy period on strict bail.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the arresting officer's grounds for arrest and observations of the appellant's driving.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the officer's testimony about tire tracks, the appellant's belligerent behaviour, and information from civilian callers.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and properly resolved inconsistencies in the testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought Charter applications under ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a residence and a pat-down search.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) based on a confidential informant's tip.

The court found the judicial summary sufficient for the accused to make full answer and defence and upheld the search warrant's validity.

The court also dismissed the s. 10(a) and 10(b) claims, finding the brief delay in advising the accused of his right to counsel during a pat-down search was justified by officer safety, and the delay in implementing the right to counsel was reasonable given the circumstances.

The applications were dismissed.

The offender, a drug dealer, was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon against two female drug addicts, one of whom was his intimate partner.

The Crown sought a two-year sentence, while the defence sought a sentence of time served and probation.

The court denied pre-trial custody credit for time the offender spent serving an unrelated federal sentence.

However, the court granted 247 days of credit for the exceptionally stringent bail conditions (house arrest) the offender endured.

The offender was sentenced to 17 months' incarceration, reduced by the 247-day credit to 270 days to serve, followed by three years of probation.

The accused was tried for the second-degree murder of his mother.

The court previously found that the accused committed the act that caused her death.

The Crown sought to prove that the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Based on uncontested expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that the accused suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia and was experiencing Capgras delusions and command hallucinations at the time of the offence.

The court concluded that the accused was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were morally wrong, and found him not criminally responsible.

The self-represented appellant applied under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of state-funded counsel to assist with his appeal of convictions for assault causing bodily harm and assault of a peace officer.

The convictions arose from an altercation with correctional officers while the appellant was an inmate.

The court found that the appeal raised arguable issues regarding the officers' use of force, self-defence, and potential Charter breaches.

Concluding that the appeal involved complex legal issues that the court would be better able to determine with the assistance of counsel, the application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The defendant, Kristopher Vaughan, was found guilty of sexually assaulting Cheryl Wright and was before the court for sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, the location of the assault, the degree of invasiveness, the prolonged nature of the incident, and the significant emotional impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of a prior criminal record, his military service, health challenges (depression, alcohol/anti-depressant mix), family support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court also factored in the harsher conditions of incarceration due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Vaughan was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, followed by 18 months of probation with specific conditions, and several ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition and sex offender registration.

The applicant sought a review of his continued detention under s. 525 of the Criminal Code, arguing the original bail hearing was flawed and that delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic warranted release.

The court found no new evidence and upheld the Justice of the Peace's decision to detain on secondary grounds, citing the applicant's extensive criminal record, the violent nature of the alleged home invasion, and the unsuitability of the proposed sureties.

The application was dismissed, but a renewed application was permitted by October 30, 2020, to reassess the impact of pandemic-related delays.

The defendant, Ho Ting Char, was charged with conspiracy, unlawful production of methamphetamine, and unlawful production of ketamine.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial video surveillance evidence of the defendant's non-verbal conduct at various locations associated with clandestine drug laboratories.

The court found the evidence, while suspicious, did not unequivocally prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was participating in drug production or was part of a conspiracy, as innocent explanations for his conduct could not be excluded.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted on all counts.

T.L. brought a bail review application after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds following a shooting incident.

The initial bail hearing before a Justice of the Peace was flawed due to a misapprehension of evidence regarding a proposed surety.

The Superior Court conducted a *de novo* hearing, considering a new supervision plan involving house arrest with grandparents as sureties, electronic monitoring, and the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the accused satisfied the onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, emphasizing the strength of the supervision plan and the elevated risks of detention during the pandemic.

T.L. was released on strict conditions.

The Crown applied to admit a recanting witness's prior videotaped statement to police for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness, who had been arrested for the same drug trafficking offences as the accused but released without charges, refused to adopt her statement during cross-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding the statement lacked threshold reliability due to the absence of procedural safeguards, such as an oath, warning, or opportunity to consult counsel.

The court also held that the substantive reliability of the statement, though corroborated by police observations, did not meet the high standard set out in Bradshaw.

Alternatively, the court would have excluded the statement under its residual discretion.

The accused was charged with break and enter, sexual assault, and breach of probation following a night of heavy drinking and drug use with the complainant and others.

The complainant alleged she woke up partially undressed and believed the accused had assaulted her while she was passed out, though she admitted to severe memory loss.

The accused testified that they had consensual sexual intercourse.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to extreme intoxication, memory loss, and inconsistencies in her statements about being choked.

Furthermore, DNA from an unknown male was found on the complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused, convicted of 12 counts of fraud in a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme, brought a motion alleging the Crown failed to make timely disclosure and failed to preserve evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that while there were some minor oversights in disclosure, they did not impact the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court also found no duty on the police to preserve irrelevant emails and noted a lack of due diligence by the accused in requesting disclosure.

The disclosure application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving an eight-year-old child.

At trial, an agreed statement of fact containing the evidence of the complainant's father was filed as an exhibit but was subsequently lost and could not be recreated.

The trial judge had relied on this missing exhibit as independent evidence of the complainant's post-event emotional state to confirm her testimony and reject the appellant's denial.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the incomplete appellate record made it impossible to determine if the trial judge erred in his reliance on the father's statement.

Finding a serious possibility that the missing exhibit deprived the appellant of a ground of appeal, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Crown brought an application for forfeiture of a $100,000 recognizance after the accused breached his bail conditions by leaving his residence without his designated surety.

The surety, the accused's common-law wife, testified that she believed the accused was at work and was unaware he was meeting his ex-girlfriend.

The court found the surety was not complicit and that her financial circumstances had deteriorated significantly since the pledge.

Applying the factors from Horvath, the court exercised its discretion to excuse the surety from the pledge due to extreme hardship, but held the accused liable for the full amount.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder following a fatal stabbing, applied for bail.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the proposed release plan, involving three sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring, addressed secondary ground concerns.

On the tertiary ground, the court noted the Crown's case for first degree murder was non-existent and the case for second degree murder was mediocre, while the case for manslaughter was strong.

Given the applicant's youth, lack of criminal record, and the weakness of the murder charge, the court granted bail with a $300,000 pledge.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following his convictions for multiple serious personal injury offences, including forcible confinement, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault, all committed against his intimate partner.

The offender had a history of severe domestic violence and had previously refused treatment while incarcerated.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code, as he demonstrated a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing severe injury to future intimate partners.

Finding no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order by failing to report to his probation officer.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant based on a failure to notify of a change of address, an offence with which he was not charged.

Furthermore, there was no admissible evidence that the appellant knew he was required to report upon his release from custody, as the evidence relied upon was hearsay.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in admitting an exemplification of the probation order without notice, as it is admissible at common law.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court considered the appropriate sentence.

The offender played a secondary role in a buy‑bust operation involving approximately one ounce of cocaine and had limited criminal history, strong family support, and demonstrated rehabilitation since the offence.

The court rejected the argument that the Kienapple rule barred multiple convictions, finding trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking constituted distinct criminal wrongs.

After reviewing authorities on conditional sentences in drug trafficking cases and considering the principles of deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation, and parity with a co‑accused, the court concluded that the offender did not pose a danger to the community.

A conditional sentence served in the community was imposed with strict conditions.