Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The Applicant, Althea Reyes, sought certiorari in aid of prohibition to challenge a trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure and the introduction of her prior criminal record.

The Crown moved for summary dismissal of Reyes' application.

The court found that the alleged errors by the trial judge were not jurisdictional in nature, but rather discretionary matters within the trial judge's purview (e.g., length of adjournment for disclosure review, recall of witnesses, abuse of process, or mistrial applications).

The court emphasized that extraordinary remedies like certiorari are reserved for jurisdictional errors, not mere alleged errors reviewable on appeal.

Consequently, the court summarily dismissed Reyes' application, finding it manifestly frivolous as it was "obviously doomed to fail."

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision for carrying a concealed weapon, arguing the trial judge erred by sentencing him as if he committed a "use" offence rather than a "possession" offence, and by overstating the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge.

The appeal court found no error in principle, stating the trial judge properly considered all circumstances, including the potential for harm, and that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the discharge of a juror during a sexual assault trial.

The trial judge received multiple notes from a single juror and the jury foreperson, indicating the juror was engaging in discriminatory thinking, speculating on matters not in evidence, misapprehending the law, and refusing to collaborate.

Despite the defence's request for a mistrial, the judge discharged the juror under section 644(1) of the Criminal Code, finding the juror's conduct prevented proper deliberation.

The remaining jury subsequently returned verdicts of not guilty on one count and guilty on two counts.

This anti-SLAPP motion sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim by Iron Horse Corporation and Robin St. Martin in the "Yates Action" and a separate action (the "St. Martin Action") for malicious prosecution and defamation against Robin Yates and Larry Yates.

The court found that the Yates' expressions related to matters of public interest, including gendered harassment by a powerful individual and the functioning of the justice system.

While the defamation counterclaim in the Yates Action was found to have substantial merit and was not dismissed due to the ongoing litigation, the St. Martin Action was dismissed.

The court concluded that the St. Martin Action lacked substantial merit, particularly the malicious prosecution claims, and was primarily strategic, with the public interest favoring its dismissal.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with dangerous driving causing death after his vehicle struck multiple objects and a bus, killing his passenger.

The defence argued that the accused was experiencing a seizure at the time of the collision, rendering his actions involuntary and negating the requisite mens rea.

The Crown contended that the accused was conscious and driving recklessly, or alternatively, that his decision to drive despite a history of possible seizures constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was experiencing a seizure during the erratic driving.

Furthermore, the court held that the accused's decision to drive was not a marked departure from the standard of care, as he had previously been advised by a neurologist that he could continue driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for his role in a fatal shooting.

The court found that the offender was aware of the presence of a firearm and was a party to the offence under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, against mitigating factors, such as harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and rehabilitative potential, the court determined an appropriate sentence of 113.5 months.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, the offender was sentenced to 58 months' imprisonment.

Byron Carr, charged with mischief, obstructing police, and failure to obey a court order related to the "freedom convoy" occupation, brought a s. 520 bail review.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances.

The court granted bail, finding that the tertiary ground for detention was inapplicable given the mass nature of the alleged crimes and varying degrees of culpability.

The applicant satisfied the primary and secondary grounds for release with a new, robust plan, including two sureties (one a retired police officer), a $3500 bond, and strict conditions on social media, communication with organizers, and travel to Ottawa.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a delayed trial date and a new diagnosis of bipolar disorder constituted material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded the material changes but opposed release on the secondary ground due to the applicant's history of multiple charges and breaches.

The court found that the proposed surety plan, combined with the fact that the applicant's pre-trial custody would soon exceed the likely sentence for his initial charges, sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

The applicant was released on strict conditions.

The accused was tried on sexual assault and sexual touching counts involving two 15-year-old complainants arising from separate incidents at the same apartment during the same summer.

The court admitted the evidence of each complainant as similar fact evidence on the other counts, applying the Handy framework and finding substantial similarities, strong probative value, and no air of reality to allegations of collusion.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused’s testimony as incredible and found both complainants credible, internally consistent, and corroborated by surrounding evidence, including expert medical evidence respecting healed genital injury to one complainant.

Convictions were entered on all remaining counts.

Following convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from repeated sexual touching of a child by the mother's partner in the family home, the court applied the rule against multiple convictions and conditionally stayed the sexual interference count.

On sentence, the court relied on the Supreme Court's framework in Friesen emphasizing proportionality, the protection of children, and the primacy of denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

Aggravating factors included the complainant's young age, multiple incidents, breach of trust as caregiver, and continuing emotional and psychological harm reflected in victim impact evidence.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of prior record and employment history, but collateral immigration and pandemic consequences did not justify a reduced sentence.

A penitentiary term of five and one-half years was imposed together with SOIRA, DNA, weapons prohibition, residence restriction, and communication orders.

The court sentenced the accused for incest and sexual assault against his daughter, committed over approximately five years beginning when the complainant was 16.

Applying the sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, including the primacy of denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code and the guidance in Friesen, the court treated the prolonged abuse, parental breach of trust, grooming, vulnerability, and resulting pregnancy as major aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s lack of criminal record, pro-social history, low apparent risk of reoffending, absence of violence, and advanced age.

A penitentiary sentence of 10 years on the incest count and 7 years concurrent on the sexual assault count was imposed, together with ancillary orders.

Sentencing for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving repeated sexualized touching of a child over a period of years in a family-friend setting.

The court emphasized the primacy of denunciation and deterrence in child sexual offence sentencing, citing contemporary appellate guidance that such offences are violent crimes causing profound and lasting harm.

Despite finding high moral culpability and recognizing that jail would ordinarily be required, the court treated the pandemic, the offender's age, and significant health conditions as exceptional circumstances justifying a conditional sentence.

A sentence of two years less one day to be served in the community under house arrest, together with probation and multiple ancillary protective orders, was imposed.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual touching of a person under 14 for a sexual purpose, and assault arising from alleged historic abuse of his stepdaughter.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework, reviewed the law governing proof beyond a reasonable doubt, child witness evidence, and impermissible myths and stereotypes in sexual assault cases.

Although the complainant testified in a straightforward manner, the court found significant inconsistencies and gaps in the Crown’s evidence, while finding the accused’s denial internally consistent and plausible.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt on all counts and acquitted the accused.

On a section 525 bail detention review, the accused sought release by advancing a new surety plan after detention on secondary and tertiary grounds at the original hearing.

The court held that the availability of a surety constituted a material change in circumstances and also found two errors of law in the original decision: misapprehension of the secondary ground as turning solely on substantial likelihood of further offending, and failure to make a sufficient finding on the strength of the Crown's case.

Applying the proper bail principles, the court found the prosecution case to be of medium strength, accepted that the allegations were serious, and concluded that a surety-supervised house arrest plan adequately addressed both secondary and tertiary concerns.

Release was ordered on a recognizance with sureties and strict conditions.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought a Charter challenge against ss. 278.92, 278.93, and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

These provisions required the defence to disclose private records to the complainant and permitted the complainant to participate in the admissibility hearing.

The court found that the overbreadth of s. 278.92, the mandated disclosure of the accused's defence to the complainant, and the complainant's participation in the evidentiary process significantly impaired the accused's right to a fair trial and undermined the Crown's constitutional role.

The court declared ss. 278.92, 278.94(2), and 278.94(3) unconstitutional and of no force and effect under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to sexual interference involving a 14-year-old complainant and two breaches of bail prohibiting contact with the complainant.

After a Gardiner hearing, the court found the sexual interference occurred without the complainant’s actual consent and treated the offence as a highly invasive, cruel, and exploitative act marked by significant psychological harm, abuse of a friendship-based trust relationship, and aggravating post-offence threats and contact.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence against the offender’s youth, lack of prior record, some remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

A penitentiary sentence of 46 months less enhanced credit for pre-trial custody resulted in a final sentence of 44 months, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

In a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the Crown alleged that the accused exploited a 17-year-old complainant in connection with sex trade activity, online advertisements, and related offences.

The trial judge rejected the complainant's evidence that she had entered the sex trade unwillingly, finding instead that she participated voluntarily, which defeated the human trafficking and procuring theories.

The court nevertheless found that one accused actively managed the communications, advertisements, pricing, and operational aspects of the sex trade activity, knew the complainant was under 18, and thereby influenced her movements for the purpose of facilitating the provision of sexual services for consideration.

That accused was convicted of influencing a minor contrary to s. 286.3(2), advertising sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and possessing and distributing child pornography; the co-accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused stood trial on charges of sexual assault, sexual touching of a child under 16, and uttering threats arising from repeated intra-familial abuse of a young complainant over several years.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and the governing principles for assessing child witnesses and delayed disclosure in sexual offence cases, the court accepted the complainant’s evidence as credible and reliable despite incremental disclosure and some imprecision in detail.

Expert pediatric evidence was relied on to explain why the absence of physical findings did not undermine the allegations.

The accused’s denials were rejected, and the court found the Crown proved all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought a Rowbotham order directing the Attorney General or Legal Aid Ontario to fund counsel for pending criminal prosecutions involving multiple marijuana production and trafficking charges, or alternatively a stay of proceedings until funding was provided.

Legal Aid had refused coverage on financial grounds.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he lacked the means to retain private counsel, noting inconsistencies in his financial disclosure, undisclosed joint bank accounts, and evidence suggesting a potential interest in property owned by a person with whom he maintained a close relationship.

The court further held that the applicant had not demonstrated that representation by counsel was essential to a fair trial.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.