Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, brought a motion for directions seeking to close case management hearings in an extradition case to the public and impose a publication ban.

The applicant argued that rules governing judicial pre-trial and case supervision conferences, which mandate confidentiality, should apply.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that as a case management judge, its role was akin to a trial judge exercising trial management powers, which are generally open to the public, and that the open court principle was not displaced.

Nicholas Poku was convicted of possessing 1.347 kg of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years, citing Mr. Poku's first-time offender status and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality, balancing the gravity of the offence (large quantity of heroin, sophisticated scheme) against Mr. Poku's personal circumstances (first-time offender, strong community support, no prior criminal record).

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding Mr. Poku's role more significant than a mere facilitator.

Ultimately, a penitentiary sentence of six years was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders, falling at the lower end of the range for similar offences due to mitigating personal factors.

S.S.S. was found guilty of sexual assault and inviting a person under 14 to touch him for a sexual purpose, committed against a child complainant (2-4 years old) on three occasions in 2003-2004.

The court considered aggravating factors including abuse of trust, multiple incidents in the victim's home, and profound harm to the complainant.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, continuous employment, and family support.

The court rejected a conditional sentence as unfit, citing R. v. Friesen for the need for denunciation and deterrence in child sexual assault cases.

A sentence of three years imprisonment was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on "over 80" charges, where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach due to police delay in taking samples "as soon as practicable." The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by holding that s. 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code imposes a Charter-protected requirement for samples to be taken "as soon as practicable." The court clarified that this phrase relates to an evidentiary shortcut, not a Charter right.

Even if such a requirement existed, the police complied.

The court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis insufficient and incorrect, concluding that the seriousness of the state conduct was low, the impact on the accused's Charter rights was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (a handgun and statements) obtained during a police investigation.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the accused and unlawfully seized and searched his satchel, violating his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court rejected the claim of racial profiling but found the police conduct to be overzealous and egregious.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the charges.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including sexual assault and assault against an intimate partner, applied for release from custody after his trial had commenced but was adjourned due to a conflict of interest issue involving his defence counsel.

The accused argued that his continued detention was unjustified and sought a review under sections 520, 523, and 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that section 525 did not apply because the trial had commenced, and section 520 did not apply for the same reason.

However, the court assumed jurisdiction under section 523(2)(a) to consider vacating the previous detention order.

Applying the framework from St-Cloud, the court found no error of law in the initial detention order and concluded that there was no material change in circumstances.

The court held that the proposed release plan did not sufficiently mitigate the substantial likelihood that the accused would re-offend or interfere with the administration of justice, and dismissed the application for release.

The 73-year-old accused was convicted of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old victim who was sleeping at his home after consuming alcohol.

The Crown sought a sentence of two to three years' incarceration, while the accused sought a conditional sentence, relying on his Indigenous heritage and Gladue factors.

The court found insufficient evidence of Gladue factors to warrant an alternative sanction and emphasized the need for denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against adolescents, applying the principles from Friesen.

The accused was sentenced to 12 months' incarceration, less pre-sentence custody credit, followed by 12 months' probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 9-year-old complainant.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge committed a 'Miller error' in applying the W. (D.) framework for assessing credibility by allegedly ignoring evidence that was neither accepted nor rejected.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and did not err in his credibility assessment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, failed to properly consider expert toxicology evidence regarding the complainant's intoxication and capacity to consent, and erred in relying on equivocal post-offence conduct.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to explain her pathway to concluding the complainant was unconscious and incapable of consenting, failed to address gaps in the expert evidence, and improperly jumped to an inference of guilt based on post-offence conduct.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and weapons offences following a traffic stop initiated based on a tip from a confidential informant.

During the stop, the accused was arrested for possession of a prohibited weapon and subsequently subjected to a roadside strip search, which yielded cocaine.

The accused brought an application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) rights.

The court found that while the initial detention and arrest were lawful, the roadside strip search violated s. 8, and the police breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to promptly advise the accused of the reasons for his detention and delaying his access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded, and the accused was acquitted.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and one count of simple assault.

After crashing his vehicle into a gate at high speed, injuring two passengers, the offender panicked, moved a passenger with a broken back against his wishes, and attempted to hide from a passing motorist.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of his post-accident conduct against his youthful first-offender status, strong community support, and positive pre-sentence report.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation and a two-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with offering to transfer a firearm and offering to traffic in cocaine based on intercepted telephone calls and text messages.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony on coded language to argue the accused made genuine offers.

The court found the Crown failed to prove the jurisdictional averment that the offences occurred in Ontario.

Furthermore, the court held the intercepted communications only showed the accused acting as a conduit for information, not making a genuine offer to transfer a firearm or sell cocaine.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including aggravated assault against a three-month-old infant and assault with a weapon against his girlfriend, following a domestic dispute.

The Crown relied heavily on the girlfriend's videotaped police statement, which she recanted at trial.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the accused guilty of simple assault for intentionally dropping the infant's bassinette and for placing a pillow over his girlfriend's face.

However, the court acquitted the accused of aggravated assault and uttering threats, finding reasonable doubt regarding the cause of the infant's severe head injuries and the exact words spoken during the pillow incident.

Sentencing following conviction for sexual interference involving the prolonged sexual abuse of a child stepdaughter between ages 10 and 12 by an offender in a position of trust.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society were the primary sentencing objectives under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, and treated the victim’s age, vulnerability, grooming, oral sex, persistence of abuse, and breach of trust as significant aggravating factors.

Although the offender had no prior record and had suffered collateral personal consequences, the court found a penitentiary sentence was required.

A sentence of four years’ imprisonment was imposed, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, child-contact prohibition, SOIRA, and custodial no-contact orders.

Sentencing for sexual assault and two counts of sexual exploitation arising from repeated intrafamilial sexual abuse by a parental figure against a young person over more than five years.

The court rejected a Kienapple argument, holding that sexual exploitation under s. 153 contains the additional guilt element of trust or authority and therefore supports separate convictions from sexual assault.

Applying the sentencing objectives in ss. 718, 718.1, 718.2 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence while still accounting for the offender's lack of record, family support, and lengthy restrictive bail conditions.

A fit sentence was two years less one day imprisonment followed by one year probation, with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

Sentencing following convictions after trial for sexual assault and assault arising from a prolonged, invasive attack against a physically vulnerable complainant at an assisted living residence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, treating as aggravating the complainant's mobility limitations, the additional force used to subdue and control her, the pain and injury inflicted, the offender's criminal record, and his substance abuse while offending.

The court held that the three-to-five-year appellate range for serious sexual assault applied and that authorities outside that range were distinguishable.

A global sentence at the high end of the range was imposed together with ancillary criminal orders.

The accused brought a voir dire challenging the voluntariness of statements made during a video-recorded police interview in a prosecution for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The accused argued that the interviewing officer improperly induced cooperation by suggesting possible release, undermined legal advice to remain silent, and reversed the onus by presenting a narrative and inviting correction.

Applying the contextual voluntariness analysis from the confessions rule, the court held that the accused was aware of his rights, had consulted counsel, and maintained his right to silence when confronted with incriminating allegations.

The court concluded that the questioning was not oppressive and did not overbear the accused’s will.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from an RCMP reverse‑sting operation.

Before arraignment, the accused sought stays of proceedings alleging violations of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay and s. 7 based on abuse of process, including allegations that police misled superiors in obtaining authorization and intentionally withheld disclosure.

The court conducted an extensive analysis of the delay from arrest in 1997 through retrial in 2014, finding that most delay was attributable to the accused, inherent time requirements, or periods when the accused was outside the jurisdiction.

The court rejected allegations that police misconduct or nondisclosure amounted to an abuse of process and concluded the reverse‑sting operation was properly authorized and executed.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was convicted.

The applicant sought relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter to quash search warrants executed against his computers and hard drives before any charges had been laid.

Because the applicant was a lawyer, the devices had been sealed pending a Lavallee procedure to protect solicitor‑client privilege, leaving the investigation at a pre‑charge stage.

The court considered whether the restrictive collateral‑attack framework from R. v. Wilson applied or whether the Garofoli regime governing Charter challenges to search warrants applied.

The court held that Charter‑based challenges to the legality of searches are governed by Garofoli rather than the stricter Wilson test, particularly where solicitor‑client privilege concerns justify hearing the challenge before any potential trial.

The applicant was entitled to disclosure of materials referenced in the Information to Obtain, and the issue of leave to cross‑examine would be determined after disclosure.

During a murder trial, the prosecution sought to admit rap lyrics recorded by the accused while in custody and later posted online.

The Crown argued the lyrics demonstrated adherence to a “code of silence” relevant to motive for the killing of a witness who had previously testified against the accused.

The defence objected on the grounds that the lyrics constituted prejudicial bad character evidence and that the evidence was introduced too late in the trial.

The court held that the lyrics were relevant and had probative value as a potential admission against interest and as evidence supporting the Crown’s motive theory.

The court concluded the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and ruled the lyrics admissible.