Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The Crown applied to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Raoul Saucier, in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown argued the evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction against K.D. was relevant to consent and the exploitation of vulnerable victims, highlighting similarities in the accused's conduct.

The court, applying the Handy test, found the asserted similarities between the prior conviction and the current allegations to be generic and lacking sufficient cogency to establish an objective improbability of coincidence.

Despite the judge-alone trial, the court found a significant risk of moral prejudice, concluding that the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The application was dismissed, rendering the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

The Crown applied to admit presumptively inadmissible evidence as similar fact evidence in a criminal trial for sexual offences against a youth.

The Crown sought to introduce facts from the accused's prior sexual interference conviction.

The defence argued that the facts the Crown sought to rely upon were not fully admitted by the accused during the 2009 plea.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the alleged similar facts were not strongly proven by the 2009 transcript and that the defence would be unable to fairly respond to the allegations.

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of sexual assault and choking.

At sentencing, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which prohibited conditional sentences for sexual assault.

The court found the provision violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force and effect.

Applying Gladue principles, the court considered the offender's severe childhood trauma, intergenerational trauma, and alcoholism, which reduced his moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a blended sentence of a 2-year less a day conditional sentence for the sexual assault and a concurrent 90-day intermittent jail sentence for the choking.

The applicant, charged with offences related to a home invasion, brought an application alleging that the arresting officer used excessive force by smashing his head into the ground five times, in breach of his rights under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings or a reduction in sentence.

The court found that the applicant embellished his injuries and the degree of force used, and that the medical evidence did not support his claims.

The court concluded that the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable in the exigent circumstances of the arrest.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following convictions for aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and extortion.

The offences involved the offender confining and repeatedly cutting a victim over a drug debt.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal history, which included numerous violent offences and a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.

The court found the criteria for a dangerous offender designation were met under s. 753(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court concluded that the risk could be managed in the community after a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 12.5 years, leaving 4 years and 164 days to serve after pre-sentence credit, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting statements made in the breath room, that the trial judge was biased, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation regarding the breath room statements, no evidence of judicial bias, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court preferred the evidence of trial counsel over the appellant regarding the circumstances surrounding the agreed statement of facts and trial strategy.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought a motion for directions to determine whether Facebook messages exchanged with the complainant constituted a 'record' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to use the messages during cross-examination but argued they were not subject to the s. 278.92 admissibility regime because the complainant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in them.

The court adopted a procedure allowing the judge to review the messages without disclosing them to the Crown.

The court concluded that the complainant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-sexual messages sent to the accused, considering the content, the manner of communication, the adversarial nature of their current relationship, and the policy implications.

Consequently, the messages were not deemed a 'record,' and the accused was not required to bring an application under s. 278.93 before using them at trial.

The applicant sought access to manually manipulate her seized cell phone, arguing that the forensic extractions provided by the Crown might be incomplete.

The Crown had provided digital and forensic copies of the extraction but refused manual access without strict conditions, arguing that access is governed by s. 605 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if an independent right to access existed outside s. 605, the applicant failed to show an air of reality or provide evidence beyond mere speculation that the forensic extractions were deficient.

The accused, charged with kidnapping and human trafficking, brought a Charter application challenging production orders for their cell phone records.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence of the offences, as there was no evidence they possessed or used cell phones during the alleged offences.

The court agreed, finding the ITO relied on mere suspicion rather than credibly-based probability, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

A subsequent hearing will determine if the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

Kristopher Rothery was found guilty of criminal negligence and aggravated assault of his seven-week-old son, Jackson Rothery.

The offences occurred when Jackson was in the defendant's sole care, resulting in severe injuries including rib fractures, subdural hemorrhages, and brain injury.

The court considered sentencing principles under the Criminal Code, including denunciation and deterrence, and aggravating factors such as offences against children and abuse of trust.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's age, lack of criminal record, and mental health challenges.

The Crown sought 3-5 years imprisonment, while defence counsel suggested 2 years plus probation.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of three years for aggravated assault and eighteen months for criminal negligence, along with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and other offenses stemming from a 1990 home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on DNA evidence from a T-shirt and a photographic lineup identification by the victim.

The court found the DNA evidence unreliable due to a lack of proven link between the T-shirt and the crime, noting multiple other semen samples on the bedsheet that excluded the accused.

The photographic lineup was deemed fatally flawed due to procedural defects, including the distinctive appearance of the accused's photograph and the victim's reliance on intuition.

Emphasizing the duty to prevent wrongful convictions, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, as both pieces of evidence lacked reliability and could not cumulatively establish guilt.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The defendant, Emanuele Tesfai, was found guilty of two counts of conspiring to traffic marijuana and cocaine.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The Crown sought 18 months incarceration, while the defence advocated for a conditional sentence.

The court considered the defendant's background, including a dated criminal record, significant personal crises (divorce and brother's suicide), and subsequent rehabilitation efforts.

Applying sentencing principles, the court determined that a conditional sentence of two years less a day, to be served in the community, followed by two years probation, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a DNA order, would adequately address denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation without endangering community safety.

On a Crown application in a criminal jury proceeding, the court ruled on the admissibility of Somali language translation evidence relating to intercepted private communications forming a critical part of the prosecution case.

Applying the expert-opinion admissibility framework under Mohan, as informed by Abbey, the court held that the proposed witness was qualified by experience to provide opinion evidence translating the Somali portions of the recordings.

The court found that the defence objections concerning training, methodology, dialect knowledge, and objectivity went primarily to weight rather than admissibility.

The probative value of the opinions substantially exceeded any prejudicial effect, and the evidence was admitted with procedural directions governing how the recordings, transcripts, and viva voce translations would be presented to the jury.

Three federal inmates applied for a declaration that they remained eligible for accelerated parole review under the pre-repeal Corrections and Conditional Release Act because their offences were committed before the Abolition of Early Parole Act came into force.

The court held that retrospective elimination of accelerated parole review delayed liberty and formed part of the applicants' punishment for purposes of s. 11(i) of the Charter.

Relying on the reasoning in Whaling and agreeing with prior Ontario and British Columbia authorities favouring the inmates, the court concluded the applicants were entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment in force when their offences were committed.

The application was allowed and a declaration issued that they were eligible for accelerated parole review at one-sixth of their sentences.

During a criminal prosecution for sexual assault, the accused applied for an order requiring a Yoruba interpreter for pre‑trial proceedings and trial.

The court considered the scope of the right to interpreter assistance under s. 14 of the Charter and the evidentiary burden required to establish that an accused does not understand or speak the language of the proceedings.

Evidence showed the accused had been educated in English, communicated with officials and police in English, and previously participated in legal and immigration proceedings without an interpreter.

The court concluded the accused failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that interpreter assistance was necessary.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting during a struggle in a hotel room.

The sentencing judge considered competing theories regarding who brought the firearm and whether the killing occurred during a robbery, self‑defence, or provocation.

The court found it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender brought the gun to commit a robbery, concluding instead that the deceased likely brought the firearm and that the offender gained control of it during an ambush and struggle.

While the killing was unlawful, the offender lacked the state of mind for murder.

Balancing denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, the offender’s youth and background, and aggravating factors including a prior record and probation status, the court imposed an eight‑year penitentiary sentence with credit for pre‑trial custody.

The accused were charged with production of marihuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity after arriving at a residence containing a grow operation.

The police arrested them immediately upon their arrival without reasonable grounds, and failed to properly communicate their Charter rights due to language barriers.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the evidence obtained, including a house key and a garage door opener, under s. 24(2).

Even if the evidence were admitted, the court found the circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused were found not guilty.

The four accused were charged with aggravated assault following an altercation with another inmate at a correctional centre.

The incident began as a consensual fight between one accused and the victim, but moved behind a partition out of view of surveillance cameras, where the victim sustained severe, life-threatening head injuries.

The Crown relied on surveillance video and the testimony of another inmate, but did not call the victim or other eyewitnesses.

The court found the inmate witness unreliable and the video insufficient to identify two of the accused.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove who inflicted the injuries or that there was a common intention to assault the victim.

All four accused were found not guilty.

The accused, an acting operations supervisor at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was charged with multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust by a public officer.

She participated in a joint enterprise with an immigration consultant to expedite and favorably process immigration applications in exchange for money and benefits.

The court found that the accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of her office by disclosing confidential information, providing preferential treatment, and accepting benefits.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one count of bribery.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown applied to qualify a police detective as an expert on Toronto street gangs.

The defence brought parallel applications seeking further disclosure of police records, including confidential informant databases, debriefing notes, training presentations, and wiretap intercepts from other investigations.

The court ordered redacted disclosure of the debriefing notes and presentations but denied access to the informant database and the massive wiretap files, finding the latter to be third-party records that did not meet the threshold for likely relevance.

The court qualified the detective as an expert but strictly limited the scope of his permissible opinion evidence to prevent him from usurping the jury's fact-finding function, particularly regarding whether specific individuals were gang members or whether a 'gang war' existed.