Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The Crown brought an application to remove the defendant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendant and a co-accused were jointly charged with terrorism-related offences.

The counsel of record had previously represented or consulted with the co-accused, the defendant's family members, and potential witnesses in related matters.

The court found a realistic and significant risk of a future conflict of interest that could impair the counsel's duty of loyalty and effective assistance.

The application was granted, and the counsel was removed from the record.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, who had special needs, alongside testimony from other witnesses.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and implausibility in the complainant's account, both internally and when compared to other evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion for a forfeiture order under s. 3 of the Civil Remedies Act for $79,220 in Canadian currency.

The funds were seized from the residence of an individual associated with drug trafficking and other criminal activity.

The court found, on a balance of probabilities, that the money constituted proceeds of illegal activity, citing various indicia such as the manner of bundling, the individual's criminal record, and his identification as a drug dealer.

No one came forward to claim the funds, and the court determined that forfeiture was in the interest of justice.

The motion for forfeiture was granted.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit evidence of similar acts and prior discreditable conduct of the accused in a domestic violence case involving multiple assault charges.

The defence opposed the admission, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and presumptively inadmissible.

The court, applying the principles from *R. v. Z.W.C.*, denied the Crown's application.

It found that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect, as it largely constituted hearsay or vague observations not directly describing Criminal Code offences, and would risk impermissible bad character reasoning.

Shahim Shokouh, charged with child pornography offences, brought two pre-trial Charter applications: one alleging a violation of his right to counsel (s. 10(b)) and another alleging an unreasonable search or seizure (s. 8).

The court dismissed both applications.

It found no re-triggering of the right to counsel upon arrest as there was no significant change in legal jeopardy, and police acted in good faith.

Even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to the minor nature of the breach, minimal impact on the accused's rights, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court also upheld the validity of the production order (s. 487.014 Criminal Code) and search warrant (s. 487(1)(b) Criminal Code), finding sufficient grounds and rejecting arguments of overbreadth regarding electronic devices.

Mark Holland was convicted of sexual assault from 2008.

The sentencing was significantly delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought 16 months imprisonment, while the defence sought "time served" or a conditional sentence.

The court addressed the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which precludes conditional sentences for sexual assault prosecuted by indictment.

The judge found this section to infringe ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and declared it of no force or effect, following R. v. R.S. and R. v. Sharma.

Considering aggravating and mitigating factors, including the extraordinary delay, the court imposed an eight-month conditional sentence, to be served in the community, along with other standard orders (DNA, SOIRA, weapons prohibition).

The applicant, who was 15 years old and had cognitive limitations at the time of the offences, sought an extension of time to appeal a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) verdict entered 12 years prior.

The applicant argued that he only recently understood the indefinite nature of the NCR disposition and raised several grounds of appeal, including a flawed plea process and fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting he was not NCR.

The court granted the extension, finding that in cases involving youthful offenders with cognitive deficits, the merit of the appeal is the central factor, and the applicant had demonstrated sufficient merit to justify the extension.

The accused was charged with possession of a restricted firearm, occupying a motor vehicle with a firearm, and breaching prohibition orders after a loaded handgun was found in a hidden compartment in the centre console of his leased vehicle.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance of the accused driving the vehicle and the nature of the hidden compartment.

The court found the accused guilty of constructive possession and one count of breaching a prohibition order, concluding that the only reasonable inference was that he had knowledge and control of the firearm.

However, the accused was acquitted of occupying a motor vehicle with a firearm, as the Crown could not prove he was in the vehicle at the exact time the firearm was present.

The offender was convicted of sexually abusing his stepdaughter between the ages of four and twelve.

The Crown sought a seven-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or reformatory term, citing the offender's mental health issues, lack of criminal record, and the historical nature of the offences.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The court sentenced the offender to five years' imprisonment, balancing the profound harm caused to the victim against the offender's mental illness and rehabilitative efforts.

The accused was charged with robbery and second-degree murder after forcefully kicking the victim during a robbery, causing the victim to fall and strike his head on the pavement, resulting in fatal brain injuries.

The trial proceeded by judge alone on an agreed statement of facts.

The sole issue was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for second-degree murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the accused had the subjective intent to cause bodily harm, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had subjective knowledge that the harm was likely to result in death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter and robbery.

The accused brought an application for a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, seeking to vacate a detention order and be released on strict conditions, including house arrest with a surety and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the threshold for a de novo review was met due to errors by the Justice of the Peace and material changes in circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic and the availability of free electronic monitoring.

However, the court ultimately dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to satisfy the reverse onus under s. 524.

The court held that the proposed release plan was insufficient to mitigate the significant primary and secondary ground concerns, given the accused's extensive criminal record, history of fleeing police, and untreated substance abuse issues.

The offender, a 19-year-old international student, was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for second-degree murder.

The offender returned to the victim's home after an initial altercation and assaulted the victim, causing a fatal rupture of the victim's vertebral artery.

The court found the assault was a planned and premeditated ambush in the victim's home, elevating the moral blameworthiness of the offence.

After weighing the aggravating factors against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and rehabilitative prospects, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, reduced to 53 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, applied for state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist with his appeal.

The court found that while the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel, he failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal regarding alleged misapprehension of evidence and trial judge bias.

The application was dismissed as the applicant was also deemed capable of representing himself.

The offender was convicted of twelve counts of fraud over $5000 for operating a large-scale Ponzi scheme disguised as a currency trading business.

He defrauded investors of approximately $15.6 million by misrepresenting his trading success, diverting funds for personal use, and using new investor money to pay earlier investors.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 years in prison, ordered restitution of $14.4 million, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $15.6 million, and issued a lifetime prohibition order preventing him from having authority over the money or property of others.

The applicant municipality sought an order of mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a mistrial declared by a Justice of the Peace in a careless driving trial.

The respondent defendant had appeared by agent and remained outside the courtroom during the prosecution's case, prompting a nonsuit motion on the issue of identity.

The Justice of the Peace refused to allow the prosecution to file a certificate of offence to prove identity alongside viva voce evidence and declared a mistrial.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace committed a jurisdictional error by declaring a mistrial instead of ruling on the nonsuit motion, and erred in law by refusing to admit the certificate of offence.

The application was allowed, the mistrial quashed, and mandamus issued directing the trial to continue.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to stop a motor vehicle for police contrary to s. 249.1(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly consider expert testimony concerning line of sight during a police pursuit.

The appellant contended that roadway configuration and intermittent loss of visual contact meant he could not have known police were pursuing him.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to give little or no weight to the defence expert’s opinion regarding what the parties could have seen during the pursuit and that the officer’s evidence supported the findings regarding the appellant’s knowledge and conduct.

Applying the standard of palpable and overriding error, the court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that the appellant knowingly failed to stop for police.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

During a trial for attempted murder and robbery, the Crown applied to admit two prior statements of a recanting co-accused for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The first statement was an Agreed Statement of Facts from the co-accused's guilty plea, and the second was a video-taped police interview.

The court dismissed the application regarding the Agreed Statement of Facts, finding it lacked threshold reliability as the co-accused had not personally assented to it and pleaded guilty solely to be released.

However, the court granted the application to admit the video-taped interview, finding that the ability to observe demeanour, the availability of cross-examination, and corroborating evidence established threshold reliability.

The accused brought a successive application seeking declarations that certain police-intercepted communications were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court reviewed audio recordings of intercepted telephone sessions and the supporting affidavit filed under seal.

It held that most of the communications involved discussions between the accused and his solicitor within the context of a professional retainer and therefore attracted solicitor-client privilege.

However, two intercepted sessions consisting only of a solicitor leaving voicemail messages requesting a return call did not contain privileged legal communications.

The court declared privilege over the substantive communications and ordered the supporting affidavit sealed to protect the privilege.