Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The applicant, Noah Hope, brought a motion seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle and backpack, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The vehicle was involved in a single-car accident.

Police entered the vehicle without permission after a tow truck driver noted items left inside.

A gun was found, leading to the applicant's arrest and further searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents, primarily because he was not the lawful owner and had no legal right to control access, effectively being a trespasser.

D.G. was convicted by a jury of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing.

The court determined the facts for sentencing, finding that D.G. engaged in penetrative vaginal intercourse with the complainant while she was intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the vulnerability of the victim, the opportunistic nature of the assault, and the significant psychological harm to the complainant.

Mitigating factors included D.G. being a first-time offender with prosocial antecedents and potential immigration consequences.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, consistent with the established range for similar offences.

The accused, Cameron Ortis, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act, arguing that non-disclosure of highly classified information by the Crown compromised his right to a fair trial and full answer and defence.

The court dismissed counts 5 to 8 of the indictment, finding that the prohibited classified information was of immense importance to Ortis's defence regarding the mens rea element of those charges, making the national security interests and fair trial rights irreconcilable.

However, the court denied the stay for counts 1 to 4, 9, and 10, determining that the non-disclosure did not sufficiently impact Ortis's ability to present his defence for those charges.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, challenging the trial judge's decision to admit breath test evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and the admissibility of a qualified technician's certificate.

The appellant argued errors in assessing the seriousness and impact of Charter breaches (s.8, 9, 10(b), and a newly raised s.10(a) issue) and in balancing the factors for exclusion.

She also argued that the certificate contained inadmissible hearsay regarding the alcohol standard solution.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s.24(2) analysis, finding no error in the assessment of the seriousness or impact of the breaches, nor in the balancing of factors.

The court refused to allow the appellant to raise the s.10(a) and hearsay issues for the first time on appeal, citing an insufficient evidentiary record, presumed tactical omission, and no resulting miscarriage of justice.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and various firearms offences after shooting a man during a drug deal.

The accused testified that he attended the apartment to sell drugs, but the victim pulled a gun and attempted to rob him.

A struggle ensued, the accused gained control of the gun, and shot the victim as he lunged at him.

The court found the accused's version of events plausible and held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder and related assault charges, but convicted of firearms offences for possessing the restricted weapon after fleeing the scene.

A police officer was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide the necessaries of life after an Indigenous woman died in his custody from a methamphetamine-induced heart attack.

The officer failed to obtain medical assistance and lied to other officers about her condition.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the breach of trust and the victim's vulnerability.

The officer was sentenced to 12 months in custody, with the necessaries of life conviction conditionally stayed.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to cross-examine a Crown witness on out-of-court exculpatory statements made by the accused.

The defence argued the statements were not tendered for the truth of their contents, but to test the witness's credibility and reliability.

The Crown objected to the use of these statements.

The court ruled that generally, out-of-court exculpatory utterances of an accused cannot be introduced through a non-accused witness to challenge credibility, as this offends the rules against hearsay and prior consistent statements.

The court permitted the defence to cross-examine the witness on one specific pre-offence statement to test her recollection, but prohibited questioning on another statement that appeared to be based on hearsay from other individuals.

The accused, a police officer, was committed to stand trial on charges of obstructing justice and fabricating evidence, but discharged on two other counts of fabricating evidence following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown subsequently added two counts of forgery to the indictment based on the same evidence, pursuant to section 574(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought an application to quash the two new counts.

The court dismissed the application regarding one count, finding sufficient evidence of a false notebook entry, but granted the application to quash the second count, concluding that the evidence regarding the condition of a Provincial Offence Notice was too speculative to support a forgery charge.

The moving party, charged with historical sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 34.5 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found that an 8.5-month delay caused by the complainant's unexpected pregnancy and resulting stress constituted a 'discrete event' and an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Deducting this delay brought the remaining time below the presumptive ceiling.

The court concluded the moving party failed to show the remaining delay was markedly in excess of what was reasonably required.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal criminal convictions entered following guilty pleas, arguing he was unaware that the convictions would trigger deportation proceedings under immigration law.

Applying the factors governing extensions of time for criminal appeals, the court considered whether the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal, whether the delay was adequately explained, and whether the proposed appeal had merit.

The court found that the applicant only became aware of the immigration consequences months after the conviction and reasonably formed an intention to appeal once informed of the risk of deportation.

Although the applicant initially benefited from the plea and some factors weighed against relief, the court concluded that the potential deportation consequences and possible issues with the voluntariness and unequivocal nature of the plea raised an arguable appeal.

The extension of time to file a notice of appeal was granted.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failing to comply with his recognizance after stabbing a stranger in the neck at a public library.

The offender, who was homeless and suffered from schizophrenia, attacked the victim without provocation.

The court weighed the severe injuries to the victim and the unprovoked nature of the attack against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and mental health issues.

The court sentenced the offender to 6 years in custody, less 2 years credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered drugs hidden in his car seat during a roadside stop.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing that the police lacked reasonable grounds for his detention and arrest, thereby violating his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The court found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to detain and subsequently arrest the accused based on a confidential informant's tip and their own observations.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding the arrest and searches were lawful, and held that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements overheard by a border officer while the accused was speaking on a cell phone in an airport baggage area.

The defence argued that admission of the statements would infringe the accused’s privacy rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court reviewed jurisprudence on expectations of privacy and investigative practices at border crossings.

It held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell phone in a public airport area where the conversation could be overheard.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

The accused was charged with robbery and possession of an imitation firearm arising from a robbery at a cellular phone store.

The Crown relied primarily on fingerprint evidence consisting of a partial palm print located on a glass shelf inside a display case from which phones were taken during the robbery.

Applying the principles governing circumstantial evidence and fingerprint evidence from appellate authorities, the court considered whether the inference that the accused left the print during the robbery was the only reasonable inference.

The court found there was no evidence supporting any alternative explanation for the presence of the print in a secured vendor area behind the display case.

The accused was convicted of robbery but acquitted on the charge of possession of an imitation firearm due to lack of evidence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and unlawful confinement arising from an incident involving the complainant.

At trial the complainant testified she could not recall the events but affirmed that her preliminary inquiry testimony was truthful.

The Crown sought to rely on the preliminary inquiry transcript after a voir dire establishing necessity and reliability.

The court found the complainant’s trial memory loss was deliberate and motivated by a desire to reconcile with the accused, and accepted the preliminary inquiry evidence as reliable.

The accused was convicted of assault and sexual assault but acquitted of unlawful confinement due to reasonable doubt on whether the complainant’s liberty had been restrained.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the Crown failed to establish that the accused understood the breath demand made by the arresting officer, a prerequisite for the admission of breath test evidence.

The court held that while evidence established that a demand was made and complied with, there was no evidence that the accused understood the nature of the demand.

Without evidence satisfying the informational component required for lawful breath demands, the statutory preconditions for admitting the breath certificate were not met.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were breached during a traffic stop.

The trial judge had found the evidence of the appellant and the arresting officer equally credible, concluding the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to find both witnesses equally credible, provided sufficient reasons for her decision, and made findings of fact supported by the evidence.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to call a former co-accused as a witness and cross-examine him.

The co-accused had previously pled guilty to manslaughter, and the Crown had decided not to call him as a witness.

The defence argued that cross-examination was necessary to challenge the co-accused's earlier statements to police, which implicated the accused as the primary attacker.

The court granted the application, finding that restricting the defence to standard rules for challenging one's own witness would undermine the accused's right to make full answer and defence, particularly given the leading nature of the police interview with the co-accused.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and breach of recognizance following an altercation at a gas station.

The victim suffered a severe brain hemorrhage after being punched and tackled.

The accused claimed self-defence, arguing the victim was the aggressor.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding he sucker-punched the victim and engaged in a two-on-one assault with his cousin.

The accused was found guilty of aggravated assault and breach of recognizance.

At the commencement of his sexual assault trial, the accused applied under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code for disclosure of Toronto Police Service occurrence reports relating to the complainant.

The accused argued the records, which included a 2009 finding that the complainant was not criminally responsible in an unrelated matter, were relevant to her credibility and reliability.

The court dismissed the application, finding the records were sought solely for impermissible impeachment purposes, lacked a temporal nexus to the alleged assault, and did not meet the threshold of likely relevance required for production.