Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The Crown sought an order for the complainant in a criminal trial (assault and sexual assault charges) to testify remotely from her home via Zoom, citing fear of the accused, medical conditions, and childcare issues.

The defence opposed, arguing the application fell under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code, requiring exceptional circumstances, rather than s. 486.2.

The court determined s. 714.1 applied, requiring exceptional circumstances, especially given credibility was a key issue.

The court found the complainant's circumstances, including medical conditions and childcare, did not meet the threshold of exceptional circumstances, particularly considering prior in-person interactions with the accused and the uncontrolled nature of home testimony.

The Crown's motion was dismissed, requiring the complainant to testify in person.

The accused, Andrew Douglas, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a first-degree murder charge at the close of the Crown's case.

The application was opposed by the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the first-degree murder charge, particularly regarding planning and deliberation.

The case was allowed to proceed to the jury on the first-degree murder charge.

In a historical sexual abuse prosecution involving multiple child complainants and a similar fact witness, the court considered allegations of gross indecency, indecent assault, and intercourse said to have occurred between 1969 and 1976.

The trial judge found significant credibility concerns in one complainant's evidence when viewed in isolation, but accepted the independent evidence of the other complainants and the similar fact witness and relied on the marked similarities among the allegations to reject coincidence and the accused's blanket denial.

Applying the W.D. framework and the law governing similar fact evidence, the court convicted on counts of gross indecency and indecent assault but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that intercourse had been proven on one count.

A publication ban under s. 486.4 applied.

The Crown brought an application before the Superior Court of Justice to quash subpoenas issued by the defendant for three witnesses in an ongoing Provincial Offences Act trial.

The court confirmed that a Justice of the Peace lacks jurisdiction to quash a subpoena, which must be done via certiorari in the Superior Court, though a trial justice may excuse a witness whose evidence is irrelevant.

Applying the test of whether the witnesses were likely to give material evidence, the court quashed the subpoenas for the conservation authority's head and solicitor, finding their proposed evidence irrelevant or a fishing expedition.

The court declined to quash the subpoena for the hydrology expert who had already testified, leaving it to the trial justice to manage his recall and document production.

During a trial for robbery, forcible confinement, and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application to cross-examine the accused on the underlying facts of his prior convictions for three suffocation murders.

The court had previously dismissed a similar fact application to admit this evidence.

However, after the accused indicated he would testify that he did not understand the deadliness of a plastic bag fastened over someone's head, the Crown sought to revisit the ruling.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused's anticipated testimony constituted a material change in circumstances and that the defence could not use the prior exclusionary ruling as a sword to mislead the jury.

The accused was charged with trafficking fentanyl and tendering forged prescriptions after someone using his identity picked up fentanyl from a pharmacy.

The defence brought an alternate suspect application, arguing the accused's brother or another associate committed the offences using the accused's identification.

The Crown opposed the application on the basis of insufficient notice.

The court allowed the alternate suspect evidence, finding that formal application notice is not strictly required when the evidentiary foundation is clear and relevant.

Ultimately, the court found the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt due to the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the plausible involvement of the alternate suspects.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged after opening a business account in the name of a legitimate investment company and depositing two misdirected cheques totalling more than $141,000.

He claimed he believed the funds were repayment of a debt orchestrated by another individual, but the court rejected that evidence as inconsistent with the bank records, his representations to bank employees, and his rapid dissipation of the funds through multiple branch transactions.

Applying the law of fraud and the doctrine of wilful blindness, the court found that the accused intentionally misled the bank to gain access to stolen funds, or alternatively deliberately avoided confirming what he strongly suspected.

The court entered convictions on all counts.

The offender was convicted of fraud over $5,000, uttering a forged document, and defrauding the public after holding himself out as a lawyer and defrauding multiple victims, including his employer.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record for offences of dishonesty and committed the index offences while serving a conditional sentence.

The court sentenced the offender to 3 years in the penitentiary, less pre-sentence credit, and ordered restitution to the victims.

The appellant appealed his conviction for committing an indecent act in a public place.

The appellant had masturbated in his workplace after hours, believing he was alone.

The trial judge convicted him on the basis of wilful blindness, finding he had a positive obligation to verify no one was present.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the W.D. framework to assess the appellant's testimony, which negated a finding of wilful blindness.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, charged with trafficking methamphetamine, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

The court found that the Crown's decision to prosecute the applicant jointly with other co-accused in a larger investigation unnecessarily complicated and delayed his straightforward case.

Applying the frameworks from both Morin and Jordan, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable and directed a stay of proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter and, during the sentencing hearing, sought to bring a Charter application for declaratory relief and damages under s. 24(1) due to his treatment in pre-trial solitary confinement.

The court declined to hear the application, ruling that a criminal sentencing hearing is not the appropriate forum for a complex civil damages claim, which should instead be pursued in the civil courts.

The Crown applied for a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code after the accused, who suffered from schizophrenia, was found unfit to stand trial.

The judge declined to make the order because the accused did not consent to treatment, preferring the civil provincial regime.

The Crown sought certiorari to quash the decision.

The Superior Court found that while the judge erred in law by allowing the accused's lack of consent to override the statutory purpose of the treatment order, the error was not jurisdictional.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for impairment and failed to consider evidence consistent with non-impairment.

The appellant had been pulled over for driving 138 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence and that any degree of impairment is sufficient for a conviction.

The accused struck a pedestrian with his vehicle in a strip mall parking lot following a verbal altercation and drove away without stopping.

He was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and breach of recognizance.

The court found the accused guilty of failing to stop and breach of recognizance, but acquitted him of the assault and dangerous driving charges, finding reasonable doubt as to whether the collision was intentional or if the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence in a cocaine trafficking investigation.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain contained misleading information and failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged drug trafficking activities and the residence searched.

The court found that surveillance, intercepted communications, and investigative observations provided a reasonable basis to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be located at the residence.

The court further held that even if a Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would have been admitted under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, having been convicted of impaired driving and driving over 80, sought a stay of his two-year driving prohibition pending his appeal.

He argued that the prohibition caused significant hardship to his businesses and personal life.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the appeal had borderline merit but the applicant failed to demonstrate real hardship, as opposed to mere inconvenience, and that the public interest weighed against granting the stay.

The applicant, a police officer facing a four-count indictment for breach of trust and obstructing justice, brought an application to sever counts 1 and 2 from counts 3 and 4.

The first two counts related to her conduct as a civilian witness in a domestic violence trial, while the latter two related to an undercover 'integrity scenario' investigation.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court found a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, noting that severing them would remove necessary context for the jury.

The application for severance was dismissed.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application to stay the proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the pre-Jordan Morin framework, the court found a total delay of thirty-one months, with approximately eight and one-half months attributable to Crown disclosure failures and case management shortcomings, and approximately fourteen and one-half months attributable to institutional delay.

The case was not complex, none of the delay was attributable to the accused, and some prejudice was established, particularly to security interests.

Balancing the accused's Charter interests against the societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable and stayed the proceedings.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a telewarrant at his residence.

The court found that the police officer who swore the information to obtain the warrant was negligent and breached his duty to provide full and frank disclosure, including relying on non-existent surveillance and failing to disclose discrepancies in the confidential informant's information.

After excising the erroneous information and amplifying the record, the court concluded the remaining information was insufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the warrant, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

Applying s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding the officer's conduct reckless and that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Following an encounter in apartment building elevators and hallways, the accused was tried on charges of robbery, aggravated sexual assault by wounding, aggravated assault by wounding, and forcible confinement.

The court held the taking of the complainant's phone did not involve more than incidental contact and therefore did not amount to robbery, but did constitute theft.

Applying the objective sexual-assault analysis, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the stairwell interaction established a sexual or carnal context, and it rejected the aggravated sexual assault charge.

The facial bite injuries did not amount to wounding in law, but supported a conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown also failed to prove forcible confinement beyond a reasonable doubt.