Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

Rajvinder Singh appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol.

At trial, he was acquitted of the over 80 mg charge due to a Charter violation (s. 10(b) right to counsel in Punjabi).

On appeal, Singh argued the trial judge erred in finding him impaired, primarily by challenging credibility assessments of witnesses and alleging misapprehension of evidence, including video recordings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were reasonable and well-supported by the evidence, and that no palpable or overriding errors in credibility findings or factual assessments were demonstrated.

The court reiterated the high standard for appellate intervention on factual findings and credibility.

The accused was charged with one count of sexual assault following an encounter on his boat.

The accused admitted to the sexual activity but maintained it was consensual.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found the accused's evidence to be straightforward and reliable, while noting factual gaps and inconsistencies in the complainant's narrative.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including human trafficking, assault, theft of a motor vehicle, and firearms offences.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of a single complainant, a sex trade worker with a severe cocaine addiction.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be riddled with internal and external inconsistencies, largely due to her admitted drug intoxication and trauma.

Text messages between the complainant and the accused contradicted her claims of fear and control.

Consequently, the court found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and reliability, resulting in an acquittal on all counts.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutional validity of a search warrant executed at their residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

As part of the Garofoli procedure, the accused sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant on various alleged misstatements, omissions, and unsubstantiated claims.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on limited grounds, including the affiant's failure to maintain a proper investigative file, a specific reference to a police occurrence report, and the basis for the night entry request.

Leave was denied for the remaining proposed areas of cross-examination as they were deemed irrelevant or unlikely to elicit testimony discrediting the preconditions for the warrant's issuance.

The accused pleaded guilty to simple possession of hydromorphone.

He was originally prescribed the drug for chronic pain from workplace injuries and a car accident, which led to an addiction.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the accused sought a suspended sentence.

The court considered the accused's lack of a prior criminal record, his steady employment, and his significant rehabilitative efforts, including 18 years of treatment for opiate dependency and recent success in tapering his methadone dose.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 24 months of probation, finding a custodial sentence unwarranted.

The offender was sentenced for his role in a violent nighttime robbery of two victims in a public park.

The offender and his co-accused used an imitation firearm and a cleaver-like knife to threaten the victims, who were also subjected to gratuitous physical violence including being pistol-whipped, kicked, and punched.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the unprovoked violence and the offender's prior record against his rehabilitative potential.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years' incarceration, less 15 months of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a further 33 months to serve.

During a trial for child pornography offences, the accused brought a mistrial application after the Crown introduced an unannounced in-court demonstration by a police technical analyst to rebut evidence elicited during the cross-examination of the Crown's computer forensics expert.

The accused argued the analyst gave unqualified expert evidence and the demonstration constituted trial by ambush.

The court held that the analyst's testimony was factual, not expert opinion, but ruled the demonstration inadmissible due to the lack of prior disclosure.

The mistrial application was dismissed, with the court finding that excluding the demonstration and allowing the defence to recall witnesses or call their own expert was a sufficient remedy.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered during a strip search incident to arrest.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 8 and 9.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds for the warrantless arrest, relying on uncorroborated confidential informant information, violating s. 9.

Furthermore, the strip search violated s. 8 as it lacked sufficient grounds and was conducted in a highly unreasonable and degrading manner, leaving the accused fully naked for 15 minutes.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) and dismissed the charge.

The Crown applied under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code for publication bans to protect the identities of three witnesses (J.D., M.S., B.S.) in a murder re-trial.

The Crown argued that non-publication was necessary to prevent harm to the witnesses' reputations and rehabilitation efforts, and to encourage participation in the justice system.

The respondents opposed, asserting the paramountcy of the open court principle and the lack of an adequate evidentiary record.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown's unsworn statements were insufficient to displace the presumption of openness, and that purely personal interests like emotional distress or embarrassment do not satisfy the necessity test for a publication ban.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the Crown relied on a certificate of a qualified technician, which required proving the breath sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The trial judge inferred the time of the accident based on the location, traffic volume, and prompt emergency response.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this inference amounted to speculation rather than a rational conclusion, as probabilities are insufficient to establish the statutory condition precedent.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

Following a judge-alone sexual assault trial, the central issue was whether the complainant consented to admitted sexual touching.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, scrutinized inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and considered deleted WhatsApp messages, a torn bra, missing glasses, and post-incident communications.

Although the complainant had deleted some messages and denied doing so, the court found the corroborative features of her account more consistent with a non-consensual assault than with the accused’s version.

The Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court considered disputed counts arising from an accused's conduct while subject to a long term supervision order at a community correctional centre.

The Crown proved that the accused used multiple cell phones and text-message deception to impersonate a real person known to the complainant, thereby inducing her to agree to sexual intercourse she would not otherwise have permitted.

The court also accepted the complainant's evidence that she was drugged and sexually assaulted in a hotel room, and that additional non-consensual sexual touching occurred during a later arranged sexual encounter whose scope had been strictly limited.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and the principle that delayed disclosure does not undermine credibility, the court convicted on the disputed counts and confirmed guilt on the conceded supervision-order breaches.

The applicant, a police officer, was convicted of attempted murder after shooting a person on a streetcar.

He brought a constitutional challenge against the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder with a restricted firearm under s. 239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the high moral blameworthiness of the applicant's conduct, nor was it overbroad in its application to police officers.

In a criminal fraud prosecution arising from alleged payroll manipulation and diversion of employee funds, the court determined the admissibility of electronic payroll records generated through a third-party payroll service.

Because the Crown had not complied with the statutory business-record procedure under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act for the ADP records, it relied on the common law hearsay exception.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the common law business-records criteria, and a prima facie authentication threshold, the court held the electronic payroll records were sufficiently authenticated and inherently trustworthy to be admitted as prima facie proof.

The court also allowed the Crown to re-open the voir dire to call additional evidence on the bank records and admitted both the bank records and the ADP records.

The applicant sought to quash a common law peace bond imposed by a provincial court judge during a preliminary inquiry.

After the complainant recanted her allegations, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence for committal.

The judge, on his own motion, initiated a peace bond hearing based on the complainant's testimony regarding a history of domestic violence.

The applicant consented to the peace bond and was subsequently discharged on the criminal charges.

On review, the Superior Court held that a provincial court judge, acting in their capacity as a justice of the peace, retains the inherent common law jurisdiction to impose a peace bond in a separate proceeding, regardless of the statutory limitations of a preliminary inquiry.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s order granting judicial interim release to three accused charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown argued that the justice erred in assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10).

The reviewing judge held that although the case involved serious allegations including possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers, a silencer, and drugs, the justice of the peace did not commit an error in law or principle.

The strength of the prosecution’s case was uncertain due to potential Charter issues concerning warrantless access to a safe and evidentiary concerns linking some accused to the seized items.

The Crown’s request to substitute detention orders was dismissed, though several release conditions were modified to address inconsistencies and strengthen supervision.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for the release of restrained assets to fund legal representation for pending drug charges involving large-scale marijuana grow operations.

The accused’s legal aid certificate had been cancelled after Legal Aid concluded he failed to fully disclose his financial circumstances.

The court found on a balance of probabilities that the accused had no available assets apart from property already restrained by court order and that he possessed a proprietary interest in those assets.

After considering the legal aid tariff and the anticipated length and complexity of the trial, the court authorized the release of restrained funds to pay reasonable legal expenses at the legal aid rate.

The alternative Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was dismissed as unnecessary.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on charges of attempted murder and overcoming resistance to the commission of an offence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, particularly regarding the specific intent to kill, such as the nature of the weapon, the vital area of the stab wound, and the respondent's actions after the stabbing.

The application was granted, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to commit the respondent for trial on those charges.

The accused was charged with drug offences after police found crack cocaine in his pocket during a search incident to arrest.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the initial pat down search was justified for officer safety reasons, and the subsequent arrest for possession of cocaine was based on reasonable and probable grounds.

Although a s. 10(b) breach occurred, it did not lead to the discovery of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The offenders were convicted of multiple counts of mortgage fraud involving 11 properties and 27 mortgages over a 7-year period.

They used stolen identities, forged documents, and false powers of attorney to obtain mortgage financing, resulting in over $1 million in losses to financial institutions and the CMHC.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds.

Each offender was sentenced to 4 years in a penitentiary.

The court also ordered fines in lieu of forfeiture totaling $495,535.04 and a joint and several restitution order in the same amount payable to the CMHC.