Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

This is a mandatory 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court addresses the onus at such reviews, distinguishing between cases where an initial bail hearing was held (no onus on either party) and where none was held (onus reverts to Crown/accused as per s. 515).

The court also clarifies the appropriate procedures and scope of s. 525 reviews, emphasizing they are not de novo bail hearings and that the Palmer/St-Cloud due diligence and relevance criteria for new evidence still apply.

The applicant sought release based on a new surety plan, but the court found it did not constitute a material change in circumstances and dismissed the application, finding continued detention justified.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The applicant argued that the preliminary hearing judge exceeded her jurisdiction by failing to consider exculpatory evidence regarding the mens rea element of the offence.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary hearing judge properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the exculpatory statement, and correctly applied the test for committal based on circumstantial evidence of mens rea derived from surveillance video.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to stand trial.

A.C. was charged with two counts of sexual assault and brought an application for a directed verdict, arguing that the Crown's evidence was manifestly unreliable.

The Crown contended that the evidence, if believed, could support guilty verdicts and that the court should not assess reliability or credibility at this stage.

The court, bound by R. v. Tomlinson, dismissed the application, holding that where direct evidence is presented on each essential element of the offence, the reliability and credibility assessment is for the trier of fact, not the judge on a directed verdict application.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from his cell phones, arguing that the search warrant was issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on a search conducted by French police without verifying its legality.

The court found that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence, including corroborative information from the French authorities, to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The court held that an affiant is not required to establish foreign law compliance as a precondition for a search warrant in Canada.

The application to exclude evidence under section 8 of the Charter was dismissed.

The accused, A.C., brought an application under section 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit emails exchanged with the complainant for cross-examination in a sexual assault trial.

The emails concerned the breakdown of their marriage, separation agreement negotiations, and the complainant's sentiments.

The court found the emails to be "records" and admissible for the limited purpose of cross-examining the complainant on issues of animus and reliability, provided they are used intelligently and do not infer "twin myths" or delve into irrelevant matters.

The court emphasized the importance of context and a holistic review of the emails.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The applicant, charged with driving with a hand-held communication device, sought a stay of proceedings and an order for certiorari to compel the disclosure of the charging officer's disciplinary records.

A Justice of the Peace had previously denied the disclosure request.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that certiorari is rarely available for pre-trial rulings and the refusal did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

Furthermore, the court held that the disciplinary records were not obviously relevant to the charge and should be sought through an O'Connor application rather than as first-party disclosure.

During a second trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied under section 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the prior trial testimony of a key witness who had left Canada for Ghana just before the trial commenced.

The court reviewed the principles from R. v. Potvin and subsequent jurisprudence regarding the principled approach to hearsay and the Crown's obligation to make reasonable efforts to secure testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to establish necessity as it had not pursued alternatives like commission evidence or offered to fund the witness's return, and that admitting the evidence would operate unfairly against the accused.

The applicants, charged with offences under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging their s. 11(b) Charter rights to be tried within a reasonable time were infringed.

The total delay from charges to the anticipated end of trial was 44 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework, confirming a 30-month presumptive ceiling for matters proceeding by preferred indictment in the Superior Court.

After deducting defence delay and time attributed to the extradition process as a discrete event (minus a period for Crown lack of diligence), the net delay was calculated at 27 months for one applicant and 26 months and 3 weeks for the other.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling and the case was particularly complex, the court dismissed the stay applications.

The applicant, facing charges related to child pornography, brought a s. 8 Charter application (voir dire) to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, raising seven objections.

The court found two breaches of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights: the police obtained subscriber data without prior judicial authorization (a Spencer breach), and the search warrant was facially defective due to the absence of a judicially authorized appendix listing the items to be seized.

The court dismissed the remaining five objections, including arguments regarding the privacy interest in GUIDs, the adequacy of the ITO's explanation of GUIDs, the sufficiency of subscriber information to establish reasonable grounds, the misleading nature of the ITO, and the necessity of a second warrant for computer searches under R. v. Vu.

The matter was set for s. 24(2) submissions to determine the admissibility of the seized evidence.

The defendant, Jacqueline Simone, faced charges including attempting to export cocaine and conspiracy.

During the trial, the defence brought two applications: to exclude telephone records from a co-conspirator's cell phone and to prevent the testimony of an officer regarding retrieved deleted messages from the defendant's phone.

The court dismissed both applications.

The first application was dismissed as the defence failed to establish that the co-conspirator hearsay evidence lacked necessity and reliability, applying the "rare cases" exception from R. v. Mapara.

The second application was dismissed, finding the officer's testimony factual, not expert opinion, and the evidence of deleted messages was probative as post-offence conduct, outweighing any potential prejudice.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.

The Crown had obtained a direct indictment, moving the trial to the Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicants argued the 18-month presumptive ceiling from Jordan should apply because they were denied a preliminary inquiry.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the 30-month ceiling applies to all cases tried in the Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry actually occurs.

As the anticipated delay was 28 months, falling below the 30-month ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The defence in a first-degree murder trial brought a pre-trial application requesting that the jury be permitted to take a view of the crime scene.

The Crown consented to the view, but an issue arose regarding whether the accused could waive his right to attend under s. 652(3) of the Criminal Code.

Declining to follow conflicting Ontario jurisprudence, the court held that s. 652(3) must be read in conjunction with s. 650(2)(b), permitting the accused to waive his attendance.

The application was granted with specific logistical conditions to protect the integrity of the trial.

The applicant pleaded guilty to robbery and firearm offences and awaited sentencing.

He brought a constitutional challenge against the bail misconduct exclusion in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, which restricts pre-sentence custody credit to a 1:1 ratio for offenders whose bail was cancelled due to misconduct.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the provision engages the liberty interest and is overbroad, as it captures individuals whose misconduct does not render them a threat to public safety.

The Crown conceded the infringement could not be saved under s. 1.

The court declared the bail misconduct prong of s. 719(3.1) of no force and effect.

This ruling addresses the admissibility and use of association evidence as circumstantial evidence of identity in a multi-accused criminal trial involving charges of theft, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Crown sought to use evidence of association between the accused and others, combined with cell phone proximity data, to establish identity in joint enterprise crimes.

The accused argued against this, citing concerns about 'guilt by association.' The court permitted the use of certain categories of association evidence (phone contact, contact information, surveillance observations, witness testimony) for the limited purpose of considering cell phone patterns in the context of joint enterprise crimes, provided careful jury instructions were given to prevent 'guilt by association.' However, the court disallowed the use of 'mirrored phone movements' across different counts and the circumstances of collective arrests as association evidence, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault, assault, and forcible confinement against his former intimate partner.

He broke into her apartment, assaulted her, choked her to unconsciousness twice, and sexually assaulted her while recording it.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 7-8 years.

The court considered the offender's bipolar disorder, substance abuse, and exceptional rehabilitation efforts while in pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a total sentence of 5.5 years (3.5 years pre-sentence credit and 2 years less a day going forward) to allow the offender to serve the remainder of his sentence at the provincial detention centre, followed by 3 years of probation.

In a pre-trial similar fact application in a historical sexual assault prosecution, the Crown sought to admit the accused's prior sexual offence convictions involving teenage stepdaughters.

Applying the framework in Handy, the court held that the prior conduct and the charged conduct shared sufficient circumstantial similarities, including familial relationships, positions of trust, private settings, and exploitation of vulnerable teenage girls.

The court rejected collusion concerns, found the temporal gap did not materially undermine admissibility given the later-occurring convictions, and concluded that limiting instructions would adequately address moral and reasoning prejudice.

The application was granted and the prior conviction evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

The young person was serving the community supervision portion of a youth sentence for manslaughter when he was arrested and charged with trafficking heroin and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

His conditional supervision order was suspended, and the matter was referred to the youth justice court under s. 108 of the YCJA.

The court reviewed the suspension under s. 109 of the YCJA.

Acknowledging the young person's progress in education and employment, but emphasizing the seriousness of the deliberate and repeated breaches involving drug trafficking, the court ordered the suspension of the conditional supervision to be continued for four months, after which the young person may be released on the original conditions.

The applicant, an inmate serving a sentence in administrative segregation at a maximum-security penitentiary in Ontario, applied for habeas corpus to prevent his involuntary transfer to the general population of a maximum-security penitentiary in British Columbia.

He argued the transfer would deprive him of his residual liberty by separating him from his family, medical support, and legal counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that a transfer from segregation to the general population within the same security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

Furthermore, the court held that the transfer decision was reasonable and lawful, as the correctional authorities had properly considered their statutory duties.

During a trial for immigration fraud, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the prior inconsistent statements of a hostile witness, specifically his guilty pleas and an Agreed Statement of Facts from his own related trial.

The witness had been uncooperative and claimed memory loss regarding the respondent's involvement.

The court found that the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability were met on a balance of probabilities.

The application was granted, and the statements were admitted to prove the truth of their contents, although the court ultimately assigned them virtually no weight.