Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

Trevor Clarke pleaded guilty to manslaughter for punching Paul Tonna, who subsequently died from a head injury.

The Crown sought a sentence of seven to nine years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a suspended or conditional sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, victim impact, and the offender's background, including his Indigenous heritage and significant rehabilitative efforts.

Applying Gladue principles, the court found that while denunciation and deterrence were primary, rehabilitation was a significant objective.

The court imposed a sentence of 28 months' imprisonment, reduced from 30 months due to harsh pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, followed by two years of probation.

A conditional sentence was deemed unavailable as a penitentiary sentence was required.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in an unprovoked and fatal beating of a stranger.

Patrick Smith was convicted of second degree murder and assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Matthew Moreira was convicted of manslaughter and robbery, and was sentenced to a total of 13 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the offenders' backgrounds, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The applicant, identifying as Grand Chief of the Kinakwii indigenous people, brought a habeas corpus application seeking to stay ongoing Criminal Code proceedings and discharge his bail recognizance.

He argued that due to a broader indigenous land claim, he is not subject to the laws of Canada.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the pending land claim does not negate the jurisdiction of the Criminal Code over alleged criminal activity in Canada, and the Crown met its onus to prove the deprivation of liberty was lawful.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application requesting that the Court call two third-party suspects as witnesses, or alternatively, permit the defence to call and cross-examine them.

The court declined to call the witnesses itself, finding it unnecessary and potentially disruptive to the adversarial process.

However, the court exercised its common law discretion to permit the defence to cross-examine the witnesses on specific topics, noting that the provisions of section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act were inadequate for this situation.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, brought a Garofoli application to exclude the seized evidence.

Prior to step five of the application, they sought to amplify the Information to Obtain (ITO) based on cross-examination of the affiant and an email.

The court allowed certain amplifications to correct good-faith errors in the ITO, but declined to add omitted information, noting that omissions could still be raised during the substantive argument on the warrant's validity.

The representative plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion in a class action on behalf of seriously mentally ill inmates placed in administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries.

The court found that administrative segregation is a form of solitary confinement that causes severe psychological harm to mentally ill inmates.

The court held that the Federal Government breached section 7 of the Charter due to an inadequate review process, and breached sections 7 and 12 by subjecting mentally ill inmates to prolonged administrative segregation (over 30 days involuntary or 60 days voluntary).

The court awarded $20 million in aggregate Charter damages for vindication and deterrence, to be used for structural changes or additional mental health resources.

The offender was convicted of attempting to possess a firearm and transferring ammunition, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

The court found the offender was a mid-level marijuana dealer and was actively engaged in a business enterprise of supplying illegal firearms and ammunition for profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and 9 months, less 5 months credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, leaving 4 years and 4 months to serve.

The accused were convicted of trafficking cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, with some offences committed in association with the 'Ndrangheta criminal organization.

The Crown relied on evidence from a paid police agent who recorded conversations with the accused detailing plans to import large quantities of cocaine.

The court sentenced the first accused to 11.5 years and the second accused to 9 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale cocaine importation schemes.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking an order for the jury and the court to take a view of the food processing facility where the deceased was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose during an incident of horseplay.

The Crown sought the view primarily to allow the jury to hear the sound of the air hose.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the facility had undergone significant changes since the incident, the exact conditions could not be recreated, and the jury would have access to high-quality video and audio evidence.

The court concluded that the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the limited probative value of the view.

The applicant, charged with 13 counts of fraud over $5,000, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 54.5 months.

Applying the transitional framework and the Jordan principles, the court deducted 25 months and 1 week of delay attributable to the defence, bringing the net delay to 29 months and 1 week, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The court dismissed the application, finding the defence failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder of his son, brought an application to exclude a video found on his cell phone.

The police searched the phone incident to arrest without a warrant.

The court found the search violated section 8 of the Charter because there was no urgency to justify searching the phone before obtaining a warrant.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was minor, the privacy intrusion was minimal, and the video was highly reliable and crucial to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The court also dismissed the argument that the video's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence in a pre-trial motion that the accused failed to report an altercation to the police, arguing it was relevant to rebut their anticipated claim of self-defence.

The accused argued that admitting such evidence would violate their common law and constitutional right to silence, which arises the moment events occur that could give rise to a criminal charge.

The court agreed with the accused, holding that the right to silence precedes any interaction with police and that the accused, being both suspects and victims, were entitled to remain silent.

The Crown's motion to lead the evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for 'over 80', arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications under s. 10(b) and s. 11(b).

The appellant claimed his right to counsel was violated because police did not offer a Spanish interpreter, and that his trial was unreasonably delayed beyond the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no 'special circumstances' required police to offer an interpreter as the appellant communicated effectively in English.

The court also upheld the s. 11(b) ruling, agreeing that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, primarily the gross underestimation of trial time and the expanding defence witness list.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence, arguing that the search warrant was invalid due to deliberate misrepresentations and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court found that the affiant deliberately misled the issuing justice regarding the confidential informant's criminal history, motivation, and the corroborative police observations.

After excising the inaccurate information, the court concluded that the remaining ITO was not sufficiently reliable to support the warrant, resulting in a breach of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the serious nature of the police misconduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, misapprehended his evidence, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference, there was no misapprehension of evidence, and the trial judge's approach to the complainant's inconsistencies was measured and fair.

The court also found no reversal of the burden of proof regarding the Agreed Statement of Fact.

The applicant, charged with fraud-related offences involving two different complainants in proximate periods of time, brought an application to sever the counts under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed the severance, arguing the events were intertwined.

The court applied the factors from R. v. Last and found that the factual nexus between the counts was negligible and that joinder created a risk of prohibited propensity reasoning.

The application for severance was granted to protect the applicant's right to a fair trial.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, finding a net delay of 31.25 months, which slightly exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

However, the court identified a transitional exceptional circumstance, noting the applicant's significant delay in filing the stay application after the release of Jordan, indicating reliance on pre-Jordan principles.

Additionally, a Morin analysis was conducted, attributing substantial periods of delay to the defence's conduct, particularly regarding counsel retainer issues.

The institutional delay was found to be well within acceptable guidelines.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration, arguing that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown an adjournment to call a toxicologist in reply to defence evidence of bolus drinking, thereby improperly splitting its case.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly permitted the Crown to call reply evidence.

The court found that the Crown was legitimately surprised by the defence's bolus drinking evidence, which was not anticipated from the initial alcohol influence report.

This evidence was deemed proper reply, not case-splitting, and the appellant suffered no prejudice as he was afforded an opportunity for surrebuttal.

A.R. was charged on a ten-count indictment with three counts of assault, two counts of uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, and six counts of sexual assault, all in relation to his former spouse, L.R., their baby, C.R., and L.R.'s mother, J.S. The trial involved extensive testimony from the complainants and examination of text messages.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of L.R.'s evidence, citing issues with disclosure of text messages, timing of allegations, and perceived exaggeration.

The court carefully assessed the credibility of L.R. and J.S., finding their evidence credible and reliable despite some defence arguments.

The court found the accused guilty on all ten counts, concluding that the Crown proved the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Joshua Lenhardt was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered sentencing principles, including proportionality and parity, and gave particular attention to the offender's aboriginal background under Gladue principles.

Aggravating factors included the commercial purpose of trafficking and the highly addictive nature of cocaine.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, a difficult childhood, rehabilitative efforts, stable employment, and family plans.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 12 months, comprising 6 months of house arrest and 6 months of curfew, to be served concurrently for all counts, along with a 10-year firearm prohibition and forfeiture orders.