Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

Canada Bread Company Limited pleaded guilty to four counts of price-fixing under the Competition Act.

The offences involved agreements with Weston Food Canada Inc. to increase wholesale fresh commercial bread prices, impacting millions of consumers.

The court accepted a joint submission for a total fine of $50 million, allocated across the four counts.

The decision considered aggravating factors such as high planning and coordination, and mitigating factors including the company's cooperation with the Competition Bureau, change in ownership, and implementation of a compliance program.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, ensuring the fine was significant enough to eliminate profit and not merely a "cost of doing business."

Bronson Lake pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his girlfriend, Kim Gagne.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 16 years, while the defence argued for a lower end of the range, emphasizing the guilty plea.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the brutality of the domestic violence and lack of clear mental illness, and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The judge imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility, finding the brutality of the murder warranted a strong denunciatory sentence.

This criminal trial concerned a home invasion where the defendant, Bin Chen, was charged with aggravated assault (later reduced to assault causing bodily harm), robbery with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and break and enter with intent to commit robbery.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence and the common purpose doctrine under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, as the complainants could not identify the intruders.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a home invasion occurred and that the alleged offences were committed.

Based on video surveillance, DNA evidence linking co-accused, and the defendant's presence at a planning meeting and the scene, the court inferred that the defendant was actively engaged in the home invasion as one of four intruders.

The defendant was found guilty on all four counts.

Manuel Maric appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a breath demand, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding judicial notice of duty counsel advice, consideration of his Covid-19 fear as a reasonable excuse, handling of his Charter application, and limitations on cross-examination.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the finding that Covid-19 fear was not a genuine excuse, and the proper disposition of Charter issues and control over cross-examination.

The offenders were convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police found nearly half a kilogram of cocaine and over $5,000 in cash in their vehicle.

The Crown sought 4 to 5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought conditional sentences or 8 to 12 months imprisonment.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for commercial drug trafficking and sentenced both offenders to 3.5 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The defendant applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized from his car and home pursuant to search warrants.

The defendant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misrepresentations and omitted material facts, specifically a failed undercover drug buy.

The court found the affiant's misrepresentation of surveillance events was egregious and not in good faith.

After excising the inaccurate information and amplifying the ITO with the omitted facts, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the warrants, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the police conduct and the significant impact on the defendant's privacy interests.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge ordered the NCR assessment without any evidentiary basis.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Superior Court of Justice held the proviso did not apply because the error was not harmless and the evidence of NCR was not overwhelming without the improperly ordered assessment.

The NCR finding was set aside, convictions were entered, and the appellant was sentenced to one day in jail, having already spent nine years in custody.

The offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after striking two cyclists on the shoulder of the road.

The court found the offender engaged in a prolonged pattern of dangerous driving, including speeding, tailgating, and driving while prohibited.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to four years' imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently, along with a lifetime driving prohibition.

During a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference, the accused brought a Corbett application to exclude his prior criminal record if he chose to testify.

The accused's record consisted of eight convictions between 1992 and 2011, including assault and drug possession.

The court applied the Corbett factors and found that the defence had attacked the character and credibility of the Crown witnesses, making the accused's record relevant to provide a balanced picture to the jury.

The application was dismissed, allowing the Crown to cross-examine the accused on his record if he testifies.

The accused, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after causing a catastrophic highway collision.

The court found the accused drove on insufficient sleep, falsified log books, and was distracted by his cell phone.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors, including the extraordinary harm caused, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a prior criminal record and employer pressure.

The accused was sentenced to a total of 8 years imprisonment, a 10-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude drugs and money seized from her apartment during a police search.

The police obtained a warrant based on information from confidential informants targeting two other individuals, believing one of them lived with the applicant.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) did not disclose reasonable grounds to believe the target lived at the applicant's address, rendering the warrant invalid and the search a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Additionally, the police seriously breached the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to facilitate contact with her lawyer despite her repeated requests.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the serious, multiple Charter breaches and their significant impact on the applicant's privacy and security interests warranted the exclusion of the evidence.

The accused, Scotland Crompton, was charged with aggravated assault.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the assailant.

The court considered direct and circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony, surveillance footage, post-offence conduct such as changing hair colour and making false statements to police, and the unreliability of the accused's father's testimony.

Applying the principles of reasonable doubt and the holistic assessment of circumstantial evidence, the court found the accused's guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired care and control and 'over 80'.

At trial, the judge relied on the evidence of two security guards to dismiss the appellant's Charter application, despite an explicit agreement between counsel that their testimony would only apply to the trial proper and not the voir dire.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's use of this evidence denied the appellant procedural fairness and a fair trial.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference against a 15-year-old victim.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to conditionally stay the sexual assault charge, finding both offences arose from the same transaction.

Following coordinate decisions, the court held the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual interference was of no force or effect.

The offender was sentenced to 9 months' incarceration and 18 months' probation, with the court declining to impose a broad s. 161 prohibition order due to the isolated nature of the offence and low risk to children generally.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a trial judge's refusal to issue a publication ban protecting the identity of a doctor who testified at the accused's trial for disrupting an abortion clinic.

The Superior Court found the trial judge made a jurisdictional error by applying the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test instead of the statutory test under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code.

Although the trial judge was functus officio following the accused's conviction, the Superior Court invoked its inherent jurisdiction to grant the publication ban, finding a real and substantial risk of harm to the doctor.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and improperly applied the self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient when read in the overall context of the case and submissions, allowing for meaningful appellate review.

The court affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that while the appellant may have subjectively believed his mother was threatened, there were no objective grounds to support that belief, thereby negating the self-defence claim.

The Crown applied to admit expert opinion evidence from a dog track handler (Sgt. deRuiter) and a forensic toxicologist (Dr. Langille) in a criminal trial for impaired driving causing bodily harm and fail to remain.

The respondent objected to the scope and admissibility of the expert evidence.

The court applied the two-step inquiry for expert evidence admissibility, considering the Mohan criteria and the cost-benefit analysis from R. v. Abbey.

The court found both expert opinions relevant, necessary, and not subject to exclusionary rules, with qualified experts.

The probative value of the evidence, particularly given the lack of eyewitnesses and the injured party's memory loss, was deemed to outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The Crown's application was granted for both experts.

The applicant, charged with child pornography and luring offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay was approximately 43 months.

After deducting defence delay and discrete events, the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, applying the transitional exceptional circumstances framework, the court found the delay was justified under the previous Morin guidelines.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to prove his counsel pressured him or acted incompetently.

The court concluded the appellant's claim was merely 'buyer's remorse' and that his counsel's advice to plead guilty was reasonable given the evidence and the favourable joint submission for a suspended sentence.

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the stabbing death of his former intimate partner.

The accused conceded that he unlawfully caused the victim's death but argued that the offence should be reduced to manslaughter due to provocation and intoxication.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.D. and the legal test for provocation, finding that the accused's actions were deliberate rather than sudden.

The court rejected the defences of provocation and intoxication, finding the accused guilty of second degree murder.