Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent for an alleged false tax refund scheme.

The respondent was arrested at the airport on a provisional arrest warrant while attempting to board a flight to Russia.

The respondent applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the affidavit supporting the warrant contained material omissions and misrepresentations that falsely portrayed him as a flight risk, amounting to an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the omitted facts were not material to the issuing judge's decision and that the authorities did not attempt to mislead the court.

The court concluded that the conduct did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.

The offender, a 19-year-old Black male with no prior criminal record, was convicted of break and enter and assault following a home invasion.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of less than two years.

The court considered the offender's difficult upbringing, experiences with racism, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

Applying the restraint principle and considering the systemic over-incarceration of young Black offenders, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The offender, a homeless Black man, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after striking another homeless man with a skateboard following a series of altercations.

The victim had directed racial slurs at the offender prior to the assault.

The court considered the offender's background, including the impact of anti-Black racism, childhood abuse, and undiagnosed schizophrenia, as detailed in an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report.

The court imposed an effective sentence of 5 years and 6 months, which was reduced to 17 months of further custody and 18 months of probation after accounting for pre-trial custody and harsh conditions.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit statements made by the accused during a nine-month undercover police investigation involving a police agent and an undercover officer.

The accused was charged with three homicides, a bank robbery, and a car bombing.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Hart and found that the statements met the threshold for reliability, their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect, and the police conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including human trafficking, procuring, withholding travel documents, and fraud, relating to his involvement with an 18-year-old complainant in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the accused exercised coercive influence over the complainant's movements, took her earnings under the guise of a fraudulent condo investment scheme, and withheld her identification documents to maintain control.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as implausible and accepted the complainant's testimony.

The court found that the accused preyed on the complainant's vulnerabilities and exploited her for financial gain.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

In a trial for first-degree murder involving three co-accused, the Crown and one co-accused sought to admit text messages and prior convictions of another co-accused to establish a drug dealer-purchaser relationship and a disposition for violence and firearms.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in supporting the co-accused's defence of lack of intent outweighed the prejudicial effect.

The court provided mid-trial and final limiting instructions to the jury regarding the permissible and impermissible uses of the disposition evidence.

The applicant sought a variation of his judicial interim release terms, specifically to add his wife as a surety and delete the non-contact term related to her.

This application was based on an alleged material change in circumstances, primarily the withdrawal of a previous assault charge against his wife.

The Crown opposed, citing a new, albeit unproven, assault allegation involving the wife.

The court found a material change in circumstances, noting the wife's consistent denial of the alleged assaults and the circumstantial nature of the Crown's case on the new charge.

The application was allowed, modifying the bail conditions to include the wife as an additional surety, remove the non-contact term, increase one surety's pledge, and maintain house arrest and a driving prohibition.

At a judicial pre-trial, the court addressed several procedural issues for a self-represented accused facing a jury trial.

The Crown was directed to bring its application to appoint counsel for cross-examination of the complainant in writing.

The court also ordered the Crown to provide the entire disclosure package to the accused and remanded the matter to allow the accused to decide whether to bring applications under s. 11(b) of the Charter or s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted of possession of fentanyl and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At the time of the offences, the accused was on full parole for prior drug trafficking convictions.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence sought 7 years.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the accused's criminal record and parole status against mitigating factors, including strong family support, rehabilitative efforts, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment, less 777 days of pre-sentence custody credit.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and uttering threats against his estranged wife, brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of Toronto Children's Aid Society records relating to the complainant's care of their children.

The applicant argued the records were relevant to the complainant's credibility and a motive to fabricate related to child custody.

The court found the first-stage test for likely relevance was met and reviewed the records.

At the second stage, the court largely dismissed the application, finding the undisclosed portions had a high privacy interest and lacked probative value, though it ordered the disclosure of a limited category of unredacted information.

The applicant brought a s. 11(b) Charter motion alleging unreasonable delay in his criminal trial for shooting-related offences.

The total delay was 43 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The primary factual dispute was whether the initial trial adjournment was due to Crown/police disclosure delays or the pandemic.

The court found the adjournment was due to the Covid-19 pandemic, deducting the associated delay.

The resulting net delay was well below the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" or that the defence took "meaningful steps" to expedite proceedings, particularly regarding a questionable s. 8 Charter motion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police did not inform him he could consult duty counsel in his native language, Vietnamese, despite objective signs of his limited English comprehension.

The Superior Court of Justice found that 'special circumstances' existed, triggering an obligation for police to inform the appellant of his right to access counsel in his language of choice.

The failure to do so constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for cases tried by indictment.

The court deducted a period of defence delay, bringing the net delay to 27 months.

The court found that the case did not take markedly longer than it should have, considering local conditions in the Toronto Region.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought an application under ss. 8, 9, 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found in a satchel when he was arrested.

The court found that the police did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him based on a confidential informant tip and ambiguous surveillance, resulting in a s. 9 breach.

The subsequent search of his person and satchel was therefore unlawful, breaching s. 8.

The police also delayed implementing his right to counsel for over four hours, breaching s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine.

The court applied the co-actor's exception to the hearsay rule (Carter test) to admit intercepted communications.

The court found a common unlawful design to traffic cocaine and that the accused was a participant based on direct and inferential evidence, including surveillance and phone communications.

The accused's arguments regarding the necessity of calling a co-actor witness and the credibility of a police agent were rejected.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple counts of failing to comply with probation and a non-communication order by repeatedly contacting his former partner while in custody and on parole.

The court emphasized denunciation and specific deterrence given the offender's history of domestic violence and blatant disregard for court orders.

The offender was sentenced to one day in jail, after receiving 22 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdown conditions, followed by three years of probation with strict non-contact conditions.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter for his participation in a group attack that resulted in the victim's death by blunt force trauma.

The sentencing judge determined the facts of the offence, finding that the offender used a branch as a weapon and participated in beating the defenceless victim.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the brutal nature of the attack, against mitigating factors such as the offender's supportive family and lack of premeditation, the court imposed a sentence of 6.5 years.

The offender received 399 days of credit for pre-sentence custody, lockdown conditions, and strict bail conditions, leaving a remaining sentence of 5 years and 149 days.

The offender, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pled guilty to aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and breaching bail after a violent, unprovoked attack on his intimate partner.

The court sentenced him to 12 months in custody for the aggravated assault, focusing on denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging his rehabilitative prospects.

The court granted 1.5 days credit for pre-sentence custody, plus enhanced credit for strict house arrest bail and harsh pre-sentence detention conditions, including frequent lockdowns and isolation from family.

After applying 375 days of total credit, the offender was sentenced to 1 day in jail followed by 24 months of probation.

The defendant, Diego Alcaraz, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing his boyfriend, David Valencia, during a domestic dispute.

The central issue at trial was whether Alcaraz acted in self-defence.

The court considered the conflicting testimonies of Alcaraz and Valencia, Alcaraz's immediate 911 calls, and a toxicology report for Valencia.

The court found Alcaraz's account of Valencia's escalating jealousy and physical aggression more plausible, supported by Valencia's own admissions and the consistency of Alcaraz's statements with the physical evidence.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Alcaraz did not have reasonable grounds to believe force was being used against him or that he did not stab Valencia for self-protection.

Alcaraz was acquitted of both charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, threatening death, unlawful confinement, and mischief over $5,000 following a prolonged attack on his former intimate partner in her home.

The court accepted a joint submission, sentencing the accused to two years in the penitentiary in addition to three years and 64 days of pre-sentence custody credit, followed by three years of probation.