Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused, a father and his common-law partner, were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to a six-year-old child, and the partner was additionally charged with aggravated assault.

The child sustained severe burns to her buttocks from hot water while in the care of the accused.

The court found that the partner intentionally caused the burns in an angry outburst and that both accused failed to seek timely medical attention, which constituted a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent parent or caregiver.

Both accused were found guilty of failing to provide the necessaries of life, and the partner was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with nine offences arising from multiple incidents of intimate partner violence against his former partner, including assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

The incidents occurred in the context of severe drug addiction and trafficking.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's denials and accepting the complainant's evidence despite her history of drug use and memory gaps.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, a personal support worker at a hospital, was charged with sexually assaulting two female patients.

For the first complainant, the court found that while the accused initiated a sexual relationship while caring for her, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was induced to consent by his abuse of a position of trust.

For the second complainant, the court found her evidence unreliable due to her severe confusion and hallucinations during her hospital admission.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

Following a judge-alone conviction for sexual assault, the applicant sought a mistrial based on late disclosure of the Information to Obtain for a warrant authorizing the search of seized electronic devices and on an alleged unconstitutional search of his iPhone.

The court held that prior defence counsel had not exercised due diligence in requesting that the sealed ITO be unsealed and disclosed, and further held that any alleged prejudice could be addressed by hearing the s. 8 application on its merits.

Applying the governing principles for computer and cell phone searches, the court found that the warrant authorized the impugned search, that the full extraction created a forensic container without itself intruding on privacy, and that the subsequent review of the extracted data was conducted reasonably and in good faith within the warrant's scope.

The court therefore dismissed the s. 8 application, found no s. 7 breach, and refused to declare a mistrial.

The defendant was found guilty of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and fentanyl) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6 years, while the defence sought 3 years.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of trafficking highly toxic fentanyl in a public area while accompanied by a child against the mitigating factors of the defendant's good prospects for rehabilitation and lack of a serious related criminal record.

The court sentenced the defendant to a total of 5 years in prison.

The applicants, charged with firearms and drug offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The trial was scheduled to conclude 41 months after charges were laid.

The court deducted 280 days as an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic and 470 days as defence delay due to counsel unavailability when the Crown and court were ready.

The net delay was calculated at 17 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court found the delay was not markedly longer than it reasonably should have been and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation on a public transit bus.

The appellant claimed he was making a citizen's arrest after the complainant inadvertently bumped him with her knapsack.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding the appellant used grossly excessive force and had no reasonable grounds for an arrest.

On appeal, the appellant raised new arguments, including Charter violations and claims that the complainant committed mischief, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or sentence, and dismissed the motions to admit fresh evidence.

The applicant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm in 2015 and received a suspended sentence.

He later learned that the conviction constituted 'serious criminality' under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, creating a likely insurmountable barrier to his application for permanent resident status.

He brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction and sentence, arguing he was not informed of the immigration consequences at the time of his plea.

The court granted the extension, finding the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay, the proposed appeal had merit based on an uninformed plea and ineffective assistance of counsel, and the interests of justice favoured granting the extension.

The applicant, charged with aggravated assault and weapons offences, brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total time from charges to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 37.5 months.

The court deducted periods of delay caused by the applicant's change of counsel and the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, bringing the net delay to 26.5 months, below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the Crown took reasonable steps to mitigate delay and concluded the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

At the police station, after speaking with duty counsel, the appellant refused to leave her cell and began speaking only in French, despite having communicated in English previously.

The trial judge found she was 'playing games' and convicted her.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's credibility findings and conclusion that the refusal was unequivocal were supported by the evidence.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and firearms offences, applied for a bail review following a detention order.

He argued a material change in circumstances due to a COVID-19 outbreak at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court found the outbreak constituted a material change, warranting a hearing de novo.

Although the Crown's case was strong and the offences serious, the court concluded the accused met his onus on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused was released on strict house arrest with GPS monitoring and three sureties.

The applicant sought an order under ss. 462.34(1) and 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for the return of $99,475 in seized Canadian currency to cover reasonable legal expenses.

The primary issue was whether the applicant was required to apply for Legal Aid funding as a prerequisite.

The court, informed by R. v. Rafilovich, found that requiring a Legal Aid application would conflict with the statutory objectives of providing access to counsel and upholding the presumption of innocence, especially given the applicant's desire for counsel of choice.

The court was satisfied that the applicant had an interest in the seized property and no other available assets or means.

The application for the return of funds for legal expenses was granted, with the reasonableness of the expenses to be determined at a subsequent in camera hearing.

The offender, a police officer, pleaded guilty to careless use of a firearm after firing his weapon at a fleeing vehicle in a busy shopping area without legal justification.

The defence sought an absolute discharge, while the Crown sought a conviction and a fine.

The court held that an absolute discharge would be contrary to the public interest, as it would fail to adequately address the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence given the offender's breach of public trust.

A conviction was entered and a $5,000 fine was imposed.

The appellant, Daniel Palmer, appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor (J.P.), who was his youth advisor.

The trial judge found Palmer guilty, disbelieving his testimony and concluding that the elements of sexual exploitation, including sexual purpose, were met.

Palmer argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in assessing mens rea by not considering J.P.'s testimony about punitive intent, and improperly considered a defence concession.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding sexual purpose, which does not require the accused's sexual gratification, and properly assessed the evidence and mens rea.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against his former common-law partner.

Both parties acknowledged that sexual activity occurred, making consent the sole issue at trial.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the conflicting testimony regarding the events.

Finding the evidence ambiguous and noting alternative explanations for the complainant's post-incident demeanour, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The applicant sought to exclude his statement to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

Upon arrest, the applicant repeatedly requested to speak with a specific lawyer.

After learning the chosen lawyer was a civil litigator and unavailable until later that day, the police officer presented the applicant with the option to speak to duty counsel or another lawyer, without advising him of his right to wait a reasonable time for his counsel of choice.

The court found this constituted a breach of s. 10(b), as the police improperly steered the applicant away from his chosen counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the breach was serious and impacted the applicant's protected interests, warranting the exclusion of the statement.

The applicant and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences.

The applicant brought a motion to sever her trial from her co-accused so that she could call him as a witness to support her defence.

The applicant offered significant procedural concessions, including re-electing a judge-alone trial and admitting the Crown's case, to ensure both trials could be completed within the originally scheduled time.

The court granted the severance motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured separate trials given the lack of prejudice to the Crown and the preservation of court resources.

This is an application by Sophie Belleau for a stay of a one-year driving prohibition, imposed after her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, pending her summary conviction appeal.

Belleau alleged she drove to flee an alleged sexual assault involving a "date rape drug." The court applied the three-part test for a stay: whether the appeal is frivolous, whether continuation of the prohibition would cause hardship, and whether granting the stay would detrimentally affect public confidence in the justice system.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous, that Belleau would suffer hardship (risk to employment as a social worker and impact on family life), and that she did not pose a danger to the public.

The application for a stay was granted with a condition of zero blood alcohol content while driving.

The offender, a 19-year-old first offender, was convicted of robbery, being disguised with intent, and dangerous driving following a home invasion where he and three others forced their way into an apartment while masked and armed with knives.

He later fled police, driving dangerously.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the home invasion against the offender's youth, lack of record, and supportive family.

The court imposed a total sentence of 3 years in custody, prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.

The Crown sought to admit expert testimony on urban street gang slang to interpret intercepted communications in a murder trial.

While the defence conceded the general admissibility criteria, the judge raised concerns about the expert opining on the precise meaning of communications, which could trench on the ultimate issue.

Despite conflicting authorities, the judge permitted the expert to interpret the communications directly, as all counsel uniformly preferred this approach over hypotheticals.