Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused was charged with first-degree murder and aggravated assault following an execution-style shooting at a bird-dog trial event.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including motive, opportunity, and post-offence conduct, as well as eyewitness identification.

The court found significant discrepancies in the eyewitness descriptions of the shooter and the shooter's vehicle compared to the accused and his vehicle.

Applying the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The applicants, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought a Charter motion alleging their s. 8 rights were violated by a search of a residence based on a warrant obtained using confidential informant information.

The court found that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient credibility regarding the informants, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the seized evidence (fentanyl, cocaine, and a firearm) under s. 24(2), emphasizing society's strong interest in adjudicating serious offences on their merits.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found over 280 grams of cocaine and crack cocaine in his residence.

The Crown sought a 3.5-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day, citing collateral immigration consequences.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding the commercial nature and large quantity of drugs warranted a penitentiary term to address denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to two years in a federal penitentiary.

The accused, L.S., was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 15-year-old victim.

This decision outlines the sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the gravity of the offence and the victim's severe impact, alongside mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of criminal record, intellectual disability, and family circumstances.

The Crown sought 3-5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-month penitentiary sentence, reduced to 26 months after credit for house arrest bail, and ancillary orders.

The applicant, charged with offences related to his involvement in the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa, brought a motion for a change of venue for his trial.

He argued that extensive negative media coverage and the high concentration of federal government employees in Ottawa would prevent him from receiving a fair trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the media coverage was not specifically directed at the applicant and that his concerns about government employees were baseless.

The court concluded that traditional safeguards, such as screening questions and challenges for cause, would be adequate to ensure an impartial jury and address any potential bias from residents directly affected by the protest.

The respondent sought to commence a private prosecution against the Premier of Ontario regarding COVID-19 vaccine mandates, which a Justice of the Peace refused to receive.

The respondent then applied for mandamus to compel the Justice of the Peace to receive the information.

The Crown brought an application to summarily dismiss the respondent's application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding the respondent's claims of a fake pandemic and vast conspiracy to be frivolous, vexatious, and lacking any air of reality.

The accused was convicted of intentionally discharging a firearm and several other weapons offences after firing 13 shots at a fleeing vehicle in downtown Ottawa.

At the time, he was bound by a recognizance prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence, while the defence sought 4 years plus credit for stringent bail conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment, finding the offence fell at the lower end of the range for serious firearms offences since no one was injured by the accused's shots.

The court also granted 12 months of enhanced credit for the restrictive house arrest and curfew conditions the accused endured while on bail.

The accused pled guilty to possession of proceeds of crime and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and crack cocaine.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a sentence of two years less a day, but disagreed on whether it should be served in custody or as a conditional sentence.

The court found that while the aggravating factors of commercial trafficking would normally require incarceration, the collateral consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the accused's asthma tipped the scales in favour of a conditional sentence.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the accused applied to reopen the evidentiary portion of the trial to cross-examine the Crown's principal witness, a Vetrovec witness, about new second-degree murder charges laid against him after he testified.

The court applied the Hayward test and dismissed the application, finding the proposed fresh evidence was not sufficiently relevant to material issues, would cause undue delay, and was unnecessary given the witness's character had already been thoroughly impeached at trial.

The applicant, who suffers from mental illness and auditory hallucinations, applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault of a police officer.

He presented a new bail plan with a surety.

The court found that while the applicant's dangerousness is linked to his mental illness, the proposed plan did not provide adequate supervision to ensure he would remain medicated and stable.

The application was dismissed under the secondary ground.

The accused applied for judicial interim release after being charged with firearms and drug offences while already on bail for similar charges.

The accused proposed a new release plan involving house arrest, a GPS ankle bracelet, and his girlfriend as a surety.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused had previously breached his bail conditions flagrantly and had shown a lack of respect for the proposed surety by taking her car without her knowledge.

The court concluded that GPS monitoring is reactionary and insufficient to prevent further offences, justifying detention on the secondary ground.

The accused, charged with firearms trafficking, sought a bail review after being detained on the tertiary ground.

The reviewing judge found no error of law in the original bail judge's decision but concluded that a material change in circumstances had occurred.

The accused presented a new release plan involving house arrest, two suitable sureties, and an ankle monitor.

The court held that this new plan was sufficient to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the accused's release.

The accused was charged with first degree murder following the abduction, severe beating, and death of the victim over a drug debt.

The accused conceded causing the death and forcible confinement, leaving the sole issue of whether he had the requisite intent for murder.

The court found that the accused's actions, including the brutal attack and leaving the victim in a remote, freezing field with severe injuries, demonstrated the requisite intent for murder.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's habeas corpus application, the respondent Attorney General sought costs of $15,951.78.

The court noted that while costs can be awarded in habeas corpus applications relating to the administration of a lawful sentence, they must not become a roadblock to accessing the writ.

Given that the application required additional work due to the applicant's request for an adjournment to file further materials, the court fixed costs at $6,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a demand for a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal test for determining whether he possessed the requisite mens rea, specifically regarding whether he should have been given another opportunity to provide a sample.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the relevant legal tests and that there was sufficient evidence to conclude the appellant wilfully refused to provide a breath sample by feigning his efforts.

The accused was found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, assault with a weapon, and uttering a death threat after she and her son attacked their neighbour and police officers.

The Crown subsequently applied for an assessment to determine if the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR).

Based on a psychiatric report, the court found that the accused suffered from a psychotic disorder, likely schizophrenia, and experienced severe delusions at the time of the offences.

The court concluded that her mental illness rendered her incapable of knowing her actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on all counts and the matter was referred to the Review Board.

Dion Bacchus and Stephen Motoo brought an application for a stay of charges, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter rights due to an approximately 41-month delay between being charged and the impending trial date.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay, subtracted defence-attributable delay, and found the net delay for both applicants exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances, particularly regarding a significant delay in DNA evidence disclosure.

The court found the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were infringed and stayed the charges.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in an impaired driving prosecution where the trial judge found that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had rejected several indicia of impairment due to inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony and concluded that odour of alcohol and poor driving provided only suspicion warranting a roadside screening demand.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by effectively conducting a full trial-level assessment of whether indicia actually existed rather than assessing whether the arresting officer reasonably believed an offence had been committed at the time of arrest.

Evidence of dangerous swerving combined with a strong odour of alcohol provided an objective basis for reasonable and probable grounds.

The arrest was lawful and the trial judge’s analysis improperly conflated the threshold for arrest with proof of impairment.

The accused was charged under s. 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act for agreeing to offer bribes to officials of a foreign state-owned airline and the country’s Minister of Civil Aviation in order to secure a contract for biometric facial recognition technology.

The Crown alleged that the accused conspired with corporate executives and intermediaries to arrange payments and other benefits to influence the tender process.

The defence argued that no actual bribe to a specific foreign official was proven and that Canada lacked territorial jurisdiction.

The court held that the offence under the Act includes agreements or conspiracies to offer bribes and does not require proof that a bribe was ultimately delivered.

Applying the “real and substantial connection” test, the court found sufficient jurisdiction because a Canadian company, Canadian agents, and significant conduct related to the scheme were based in Canada.

The accused was convicted.

Multiple applicants charged with bid‑rigging under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act and conspiracy under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry.

They argued that the government Requests for Proposals used to procure information technology services merely created standing offers or pre‑qualification lists and therefore could not constitute “calls for bids or tenders” within the meaning of the Competition Act.

The court reviewed the Contract A/Contract B tendering framework and relevant procurement jurisprudence, emphasizing that the existence of a bidding contract depends on the parties’ intention to create binding rights and obligations.

It held that there was some evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the RFP process created contractual relations sufficient to constitute bids or tenders, even though the government retained discretion not to award work.

The application to quash the committal was therefore dismissed.