Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The decision concerns the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal in a criminal case involving convictions for offences arising from an unlawful entry into a dwelling.

The appellant, Gediminas Kevalas, sought to admit medical and related records to support his intoxication defence, arguing that he lacked the requisite mens rea for the offences.

The court found that the fresh evidence was compelling, relevant, and credible, and that its admission was in the interests of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The accused, Norbert Budai, was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his estranged wife, Henrietta Viski, who died after being doused with gasoline and set on fire.

Budai pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder but guilty to second-degree murder, which the Crown did not accept.

The court, sitting without a jury, found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, rejecting the defence's argument that Budai's consumption of alcohol and fentanyl limited his capacity to plan and deliberate.

Budai was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The defendants, Basil Dixon and Nathan Brown, were charged with conspiracy to import cocaine following a large-scale police investigation ("Project Southam").

The trial, heard by a judge alone, relied heavily on intercepted communications and surveillance.

The court found that voice identification evidence from a detective constable was unreliable due to limited exposure and lack of formal training.

However, based on circumstantial evidence, including intercepts and surveillance footage, the court identified Dixon as "B" and Brown as "R" in the communications.

Applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon conspired to import cocaine from Guyana (Count One) and that both Dixon and Brown conspired to import cocaine using a pilot (Count Three).

The applicant, Eze Moses Ojukwu, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence (heroin found in a knapsack) under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defence argued the search was unlawful as it was not truly incidental to the arrest and reflected a systemic failure by the Toronto Police Service.

The Crown contended the search was lawful for safety and evidence discovery purposes, or alternatively, that the evidence should be admitted under s. 24(2).

The court found the search was a lawful search incident to arrest based on safety concerns, given the high-risk domestic violence context and the accused's breach of release terms.

Even if there was a s. 8 breach, the court found the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) due to the minor nature of the breach, the moderate impact on the accused's privacy, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges on their merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, brought an application to exclude evidence (text messages) seized from a third party's phone without a warrant, arguing the search was unlawful and exceeded permissible scope.

The applicant also challenged the lawfulness of their arrest, alleging excessive force, and the subsequent strip search.

The court dismissed the application, finding the phone search was properly incident to a lawful arrest and tailored to its purpose.

It further held that the force used during the arrest was reasonable given the circumstances, and the strip search was justified by reasonable and probable grounds, thus no Charter breaches occurred.

This ruling addresses a Corbett application in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused sought to limit the admissibility of his criminal record for cross-examination on credibility.

The Crown argued for the full record, contending the defence would attack the deceased's character.

The court balanced the probative value of the convictions against the prejudicial effect of propensity reasoning, particularly for violent and similar offences.

The judge ruled that only convictions for obstruction of a Peace Officer and theft (read down from robbery) would be admissible, finding that the defence's argument regarding the deceased's possession of a firearm was a direct response to the indictment, not an attack on character, thus not creating an imbalance requiring the full record.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Mohamad Barkhadle, who is charged with first-degree murder involving strangulation during a sexual assault.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of three prior incidents where Mr. Barkhadle allegedly choked women in sexual circumstances.

The court analyzed the admissibility of this evidence, focusing on its relevance to the nature of the actus reus, motive, and identification.

The court found a "striking similarity" in Mr. Barkhadle's "peculiar and distinctive method" of using a choke hold to overcome resistance to sexual activity, deeming it a "signature." Balancing the high probative value against the potential for moral and reasoning prejudice, the court ruled the similar fact evidence admissible.

In this criminal trial before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, John Gubbels faced charges of assault with a weapon and sexual assault with a weapon against the complainant, M.D., within the context of a BDSM relationship.

The central issue was consent.

The court found the defendant not guilty of sexual assault with a weapon (Count 1) and two counts of assault with a knife (Counts 2 and 3) due to reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's consent and the defendant's knowledge of lack of consent, stemming from inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and the nature of BDSM play.

However, the defendant was found guilty of one count of assault with a hose (Count 4), as these incidents occurred outside the BDSM context and were clearly non-consensual acts of intimidation.

The accused, Linda Ceasor, was charged with attempted murder, dangerous use of a knife, and threatening bodily harm.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the cumulative effect of alcohol consumption, emotional distress (due to her son's incarceration), and the nature of the assault.

The defence argued that these factors negated specific intent, proposing conviction for lesser included offenses.

The court found that the combination of intoxication and emotional distress overrode her capacity for critical thought, leading to a misconceived purpose rather than an intent to kill.

She was acquitted of attempted murder and convicted of assault with a weapon and threatening bodily harm, with a judicial stay on the dangerous use of a knife charge.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

The defendant brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, alleging that police used excessive force during his arrest in violation of ss. 7 and 12.

The defendant sustained a laceration to his head and bruising during a struggle after attempting to flee in his vehicle.

The court found that the defendant violently resisted arrest and weaponized his vehicle, and that the force used by the officers to subdue him was not unnecessary or excessive.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, convicted of 12 counts of fraud in a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme, brought a motion alleging the Crown failed to make timely disclosure and failed to preserve evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that while there were some minor oversights in disclosure, they did not impact the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court also found no duty on the police to preserve irrelevant emails and noted a lack of due diligence by the accused in requesting disclosure.

The disclosure application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with fraud over $5000 for allegedly collecting social assistance overpayments, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings pending state-funded counsel.

The applicant argued the case was complex and he lacked the means to retain private counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding the case was primarily fact-based and not sufficiently complex to warrant state-funded counsel at the preliminary inquiry stage, without prejudice to renew the application if committed to trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm against his father and sister.

The appeal was based on the trial judge's erroneous application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and an impermissible adverse inference drawn from the appellant's exercise of his right to silence when questioned by police about his injuries.

The Crown conceded the Browne v. Dunn errors but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the errors were not harmless or trivial and the evidence was not so overwhelming as to make a conviction inevitable.

The accused applied for the production of third-party records from a school board and a children's aid society relating to two complainants.

Having previously found the records likely relevant, the court proceeded to the second stage of the O'Connor application to determine whether production should be ordered.

Applying the principles from McNeil, the court balanced the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainants' privacy interests.

The court ordered the production of the records, subject to redactions for plainly irrelevant and highly sensitive personal information.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit expert opinion evidence on shooting scene reconstruction.

The court ruled on the admissibility of Detective Constable Grant Sutherland's expert testimony.

While evidence concerning the general operation of revolvers and the specific firearm's design and gunshot residue (GSR) dispersal was deemed admissible, the expert's opinions on the gun's position, orientation, and the likelihood of the deceased discharging the shot were excluded.

The exclusion was primarily due to concerns about the expert's methodology and demonstrated confirmation bias, indicating an unwillingness or inability to provide impartial, independent, and unbiased evidence.

The accused was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police found 5,000 fentanyl pills in his possession during a traffic stop and hotel search.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence sought 4 years.

The court emphasized the extreme danger of fentanyl, the large quantity involved, and the accused's commercial motivation.

The court sentenced the accused to 8 years in custody, reduced to 4 years and 320 days after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

Anna La Force was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and unlawful entry into a dwelling.

The charges stemmed from an attack on Allison Robinson, a friend of Luisa Botelho, with whom La Force and Botelho were both in a relationship with Cavin Banfield.

The court found La Force to be the aggressor, rejecting her self-defence claim.

She was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that La Force was in the dwelling without lawful excuse, leading to an acquittal on the unlawful entry charge.

Mr. Milani was convicted of multiple home invasion sexual assaults and related offences committed between 1985 and 1987.

The court determined a fit sentence, considering the Kienapple principle for multiple convictions, the circumstances of the four incidents, the offender's background, and the profound impact on victims.

The Crown sought 20 years to life, while the defence proposed 5-8 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 20 years imprisonment, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, communication prohibition with victims, DNA sample submission, and sex offender registration.

Arthur John Blackwood was charged with multiple offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code.

He pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana (Count 3) and was deemed to have pleaded guilty to production of marijuana (Count 1).

The trial proceeded on charges of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking (Count 2), possession of ammunition while prohibited (Count 5), and possession of proceeds of crime (Count 6).

The court found Blackwood guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking based on his statements, lack of conventional income, and the large quantity of marijuana and plants.

He was found not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime due to insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

He was found guilty of possession of ammunition, as his ownership of the residence and knowledge of the ammunition constituted "control" despite his argument that he did not bring it into the house.